

DEF 12-5 IRA

Systematic declassification review of material in this folder
was completed by the Department of State on:

3/6/96 TRB

(Date and Reviewer's Initials)

The remaining material was declassified as of that date.

0002

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY JAC NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 332

PAGE 01 STATE 169326

12
ORIGIN SS 10

INFO /010 R

DRAFTED BY: IO/JPOWENS
APPROVED BY: IO - JOHN P. OWENS
S/S - MR. GRIBBLE

R 230210Z MAY 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 169326

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE MAY 22 FROM TEL AVIV
REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE:

TEL AVIV 3810

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BATTLE

SUBJECT: ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES ETC

REF: STATE 167085; TEL AVIV 3799

1. I EARNESTLY SOLICIT YOUR INTERCESSION INTO THE PROBLEM WHICH
HAS ARISEN AND IS APPARENTLY STALLING SOMEWHERE. PROGRESS ON
OUR SUPPLY TO THE ISRAELIS OF ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES, ETC.

2. THE SITUATION IS SET FORTH IN SOME DETAIL IN TEL AVIV
3799 BUT THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO INDICATE THAT MY
OWN FEELING IN THE MATTER IS CONSIDERABLY STRONGER THAN
REFLECTED THERE.

3. SUMMARIZED BRIEFLY WE DEVOTED A LOT OF EFFORT OVER A
LONG PERIOD TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO RELY INCREASINGLY ON

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STATIC DEFENSE TO COUNTER INFILTRATION TO REPLACE THEIR SINGLE MINDED RELIANCE ON EVER INCREASING LARGE SCALE RETALIATORY EXCURSIONS INTO JORDAN. WE SUCCEEDED TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY AGREED TO CONSULT WITH US ON FEASIBLE ANTI-INFILTRATION SYSTEMS, A LONG SERIES OF COMPLICATED TECHNICAL STUDIES AND REPORTS ENSUED, AND AS A RESULT THE ISRAELIS CAME UP WITH THREE TYPES OF DEVICES THEY WERE PREPARED TO BUY. FINAL APPROVAL OF SALE HAS HOWEVER BEEN STYMIED. I RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS WE CONTINUOUSLY CITED RESERVATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT JOINT STUDIES DID NOT COMMIT THE US TO MAKE ANYTHING AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THE FACT OF OUR INITIATIVE IN THE PROJECT AND THAT THE STUDIES HAVE REVEALED MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON THE UTILITY OF CERTAIN DEVICES SEEMS TO ME TO JUSTIFY ISRAELI EXPECTATION THAT THEY WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.

4. NOW IN RECENT WEEKS THE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAS ALSO REQUESTED A NUMBER OF MINES WHICH WOULD ALSO BE USED AGAINST INFILTRATORS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN LATCHED ONTO AS AN EXCUSE TO POSTPONE APPROVAL OF THE WHOLE WORKS, AND THE DEVICE BEING UTILIZED IS THAT WE WANT TO BRING ON THE WHOLE ANTI-FILTRATION DEFENSE PICTURE BEFORE AGING ON ANYTHING. SUCH A BRIEFING IS OF ITSELF REDUNDANT. OUR MILITARY CAN ON THE BASIS OF THEIR OWN RECONNAISSANCE PROVIDE ANY ESSENTIAL INFORMATION WE MIGHT NEED AS TO THE SITUATION ON THE CEASEFIRE LINES. ALSO THIS IS KNOWN TO THE ISRAELIS AND MAKES THE REQUEST FOR A FORMAL BRIEFING IN THE ABSENCE OF APPROVAL FOR THE SALE OF THE HARDWARE TRANSPARENTLY SUSPECT AS A DEVIATION TACTIC.

5. ALL THIS INEVITABLY RAISES QUESTIONS IN THE ISRAELI MINDS OF OUR GOOD FAITH WHICH COULD, I DON'T SAY WILL, ADVERSELY AFFECT AT LEAST THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING SEVERAL OTHER PROJECTS, WHICH WILL BE KNOWN TO YOU, IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS ARE FULLY COOPERATING TO OUR GREAT BENEFIT.

GP-3. BARBOUR UNQUOTE RUSK

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DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 190.

PAGE 01 STATE 169443

47
ORIGIN SS 10

INFO /010 R

DRAFTED BY: IO: HSTEIN
APPROVED BY: IO: HARRY STEIN
S/S: MR. GRIBBLE

P 231832Z MAY 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 169443

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE, OFF SECDEF, DIA, UFEPT ARMY,
CINCSRIKE, MAY 22, FROM TELAVIV:

QTE SECRET TEL AVIV 3799 — DEF 12-5 ISR
XR POL 27 ARAB-ISR

SUBJECT: "EGG ROLL", ANTI-INFILTRATION AND MINES.

- REF: 1. DIA (H) MAR 68 (NOTAL)
2. USDAO TEL AVIV 0861, DTG 0913351 MAY 68
3. SEC DEF 009051, DTG 151329Z MAY 68 (NOTAL)
4. STATE 165386
5. STATE 142978
6. STATE 150845
7. USDAO 0179, 250712 JAN 68 (NOTAL)
8. USDAO 0751, 241121 APR 68

OSD FOR ISA/ILN AND ARPA/AGILE. DIA FOR DIACO.
DA FOR DCSLOG.

JOINT EMBASSY/DAO

1. EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO RELUCTANT ISRAEL AGREED TO PROCEED
WITH PROJECT EGG ROLL ONLY AFTER QUOTE EGG SELL UNQUOTE
BY EMBASSY, USDAO AND ARPA/AGILE. WE WERE AT THAT
TIME CONVINCED THAT STATIC BORDER DEFENSE SYSTEM WAS

Carded

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PAGE 02 STATE 169443

PREFERABLE TO ACROSS-THE-BORDER RETALIATORY EXCURSIONS. WITH CURRENT CHANGED BORDER SITUATION SUBSEQUENT TO SIX DAY WAR AND INCREASED BORDER VIOLATIONS, WE ARE EVEN MORE FIRMLY CONVINCED OF SAME. ACCORDINGLY, WE REGRET DELAY IN APPROVAL OF SALE OF ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES TO ISRAEL AS DECIED BY C/S BAR LEV (SEE REF 2) AND CONFIRMED BY REF 3. (REF 1 HAD LED US TO BELIEVE THAT ALL WAS PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY.)

2. CONTINUED DELAY IN SALE OF THESE DEVICES CAN BECOME DELETERIOUS TO ISRAEL'S PLANS FOR STATIC DEFENSE SYSTEM, AND IT WOULD BE CAUSE OF SOME EMBARRASSMENT TO US TO HAVE TO PUSH REQUEST FOR BRIEFING (REF 4) WITHOUT SOME INDICATION OF FAVORABLE DECISION ON SALE OF DEVICES. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WE SUGGEST FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:

A. USG INTEREST IN GOI INTENDED USE FOR MINES BE HANDLED AS SEPARATE MATTER FROM GOI REQUEST TO PURCHASE FIFTY STARLIGHT SCOPES, FIFTY MCID AND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY BREAK WIRE SETS AND THAT LATTER BE APPROVED FORTHWITH.

B. EVRON'S STATEMENT REPORTED IN REF 5 THAT MINES BE USED SOLELY IN CONNECTION WITH BORDER SEALING PROJECT AND WEIZMAN'S STATEMENT TO I (REF 6) THAT MINES ARE INTENDED TO BE USED BETWEEN DOUBLE FENCING ON WEST BANK OF JORDAN, BE ACCEPTED.

3. IDF BRIEFING REPORTED IN REF 7 GAVE US SUMMARY OF EXTENSIVE US COOPERATION WITH GOI IN ANTI-INFILTRATION PROJECT EGG ROLL. FINAL REPORT OF EGG ROLL HAS BEEN FORWARDED BY DOD (ARPA) AND PASSED TO IDF. IT ALREADY CONTAINS MUCH SPECIFIC INFORMATION. ARPA/AGILE IN DOD CAN AMPLIFY GOI INTENDED USE OF EGG ROLL EQUIPMENT. IF, AFTER REVIEWING INFORMATION ALREADY HELDON GOI ANTI-INFILTRATION PROGRAM, MORE INFORMATION IS REQUIRED, WE WILL ASK FOR BRIEFING.

GP-3. SIGNED BARBOUR UNQTE RUSK
(#) AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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Approval received fm Lois
Nevins by Maria Gardosik on
9/28/68

~~S/S Pending~~
12978

NEA D.O. informed
9/28
fw

SECRET

SEP 26 1968

RS/R FILES

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attention NSA/ISA
Keep this study together

Subject: Sale of 12 Additional A-4H Skyhawk
Aircraft to Israel

Recommendation:

That you approve the sale of 12 additional A-4H Skyhawk
aircraft to Israel to meet normal peacetime attrition require-
ments.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Background:

Our June 2, 1966 agreement for the sale of A-4H Skyhawks
to Israel provides that the Government of Israel will have
the further right to purchase additional A-4H aircraft to
replace those lost in normal peacetime training. The Israelis
have now asked to buy 12 A-4H aircraft in order to compensate
for normal attrition requirements and in view of the expected
cessation of the A-4H production line by April 1970. (Douglas
Aircraft Corporation has informed us that the order must be
placed by the end of September 1968 to avoid a break in the
production line which will add considerably to the cost.)

Including the 40 A-4's you authorized at the time of
Prime Minister Eshkol's visit last January, Israel will have
received a total of 88 A-4H aircraft in-country by January 1970.
Given this figure, the request for 12 additional aircraft for
anticipated attrition requirements--although the Israelis have
not yet lost any of the A-4's delivered to date-- does not seem
excessive.

SECRET
Group-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified.

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BY S/S: CMS

NEA/IAI
J.D. Leonard
9-24-68

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The sale of these additional A-4H aircraft would avoid what could otherwise become a new if minor irritant in our relations with Israel and should not pose any new political problems for us in the Middle East.

Clark Clifford concurs in the proposed sale.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

S/S *R.L.L.*
A True Copy

Cleared by:

NEA - Mr. Handley
OSD/ISA/NESA - Mr. Murray
G/PM - Mr. Chapman
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
NEA/RA - Mr. Sober
NEA - Mr. Davies

SECRET

1003 FEB 50 PM 1 21
NEA/IAI: JDLLeonard:cr:Ext. 4967 9/24/68

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DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 752

PAGE 01 COPENH 06244 241053Z

22

ACTION GPM 04

INFO EUR 15, RSR 01, RSC 01, /021 W

R 241036Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1911
INFO DOD
USAFE R&M FMC WIESBADEN AB

UNCLAS COPENHAGEN 6244

APPRECIATE EARLY REPLY COPENHAGEN 5902. WHITE

*Copenhagen 6244
8/24/68*

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BY 161 NARA Date 12/5/05

37



DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED ^B 601

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05288 111328Z

51
ACTION E 15

INFO NEA 13, CIAE 00, COM 08, DODE 00, INR 07, RSC 01, TRSY 11, NSA 02, LI 03,

RSR 01, /061 W

R 111315Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4649

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 5288

SUBJ: SALE OF US MACHINERY TO ISRAELI MILITARY INDUSTRIES

1. US BAIRD CORPORATION, STRATFORD, CONN, CURRENTLY
NEGOTIATING SALE MULTI-SLIDE MACHINERY TO IMI. HAS WRITTEN
EMBASSY BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED.2. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT NOTIFY E DUNBAR, BAIRD
CORPORATION TELEPHONE (203) 375-3361 THAT YAKOV LION, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF IMI - NOW VISITING US UNTIL SEPTEMBER 21 - MAY
BE REACHED THROUGH ISRAEL EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

ZURHELLEN

MICROFILMED BY 854

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Tel Aviv 5288
9-11-68

Per 292 10-14-68
DEF 12-5 ISR
DEF 12-5 US-ISR
SEE
A-516
TO TEU AVIV
9-20-68

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By J4 NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State

DEF 12-5 ISR

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 052

PAGE 01 PARIS 20793 131202Z

44
ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, ACDA 16, MC 01, E 15, COM 08,
TRSY 11, SA 01, SAL 01, RSR 01, /156 W

R 131050Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6000
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 20793

1. ISRAELI MINISTER TOLD DCM BLAKE THAT ISRAELIS, WHO THOUGHT
THEY HAD DETECTED A LOOSENING OF FRENCH POSITION ON SALE OF
MIRAGES, NOW CONVINCED THEY ARE WRONG. IN LAST FEW DAYS
THEY TOLD BY "FRENCH INDUSTRIALIST" WHO ACTED AS INTERMEDIARY
WITH DE GAULLE THAT PRESIDENT AS ADAMANT AS EVER AGAINST
FURTHER AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL.

SHRIVER

RECORDED BY 65/2

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS-20793
9-13-68

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State ^{DEF 12.5 ISR} TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 746

PAGE 01 COPENH 06512 131833Z

47
ACTION: GPM 04

INFO: EUR 08, NEA 07, RSR 01, RSC 01, /021 W

R: 131630Z SEP 68
FM: AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1964
INFO: DOD
USAFER RM FMC WIESBADEN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL COPENHAGEN 6512

1. COPENHAGEN'S 5902 OF AUGUST 2 REQUESTED WASHINGTON GUIDANCE RE: SALE 289 MACHINE GUNS TO ISRAEL.

2. TEL AVIV'S 5101 OF AUGUST 27 SAID MATTER IS WASHINGTON DECISION.

3. COPENHAGEN'S 6244 OF AUGUST 24 REQUESTED REPLY TO EMBASSY'S AUGUST 2 TELEGRAM.

4. WE RESPECTFULLY AWAIT GUIDANCE.
GP-4. BLANKINSHIP

*Copenhagen 6512
9/18/68*

CONFIDENTIAL

0012

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

DEF 12-5 15R
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23 Sep 68 18 47z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy COPENHAGEN

Info:

INFO; USAF, R&M Wiesbaden
USCINCEUR
Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE

REF: ~~Amembassy~~ COPENHAGEN 5902 and 6244
to Government of Israel

1. Sale of 289 machine guns and 41 mount tripods located Copenhagen ~~xxxxxx~~
approved providing excess materiel has been reported and screened as prescribed
in DOD ~~xxxxxx~~ Instruction 4160.20.
2. We defer to Embassy discretion on how handle shipment from Denmark given
Danish arms policy. Suggest that US Military Liquidation Section and local
Israeli authorities Wiesbaden work out jointly procedures ~~xx~~ for handling
shipment discretely and keeping American Embassy Copenhagen informed. For
time being we believe it unnecessary to make any approach to Danish Govern-
ment re these shipments but may become ~~xx~~ necessary in event routine handling
by Israelis and US military runs into trouble.

GP
GP-4

END

RUSK

RECEIVED BY ES/B

Drafted by: NEA/RA:DWBunte:jc 9/23/68	Tel. Ext. 2992	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA/RA:SSober
Clearances:		
G/PM:RBarnard (subst) <i>ab</i>	OASD/ISA/NESA:RMurray(subst) <i>ab</i>	OASD/ISA/EUR:WJames <i>ab</i>
G/PM-MC:JBowie (Subst) <i>ab</i>	EUR/SCAN:RDwyer <i>ab</i>	
NEA/IAI:JBahti(subst) <i>ab</i>	EUR/RPM:ERehfeld(subst) <i>ab</i>	
OASD/ISA/ILN:SManolas(subst) <i>ab</i>	CONFIDENTIAL	

FORM 8-65 DS-322

Classification

0013

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AUTHORITY NND 969000
DATE 12/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. Box 92 ①
DEF 67-69 Contel Files

DATE: 9/20/68 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: ME

FROM: NEA-Handley TO: Secretary

SUBJECT: Israel's Acquisition of Surface-to-Surface Missiles

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

_____ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

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CONTINUED

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AIRGRAM

DEF 12-5 ISR

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TO : Department of State

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INFO : AMMAN, BEIRUT, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, CAIRO

OCT 1 10 19 AM 1968

RS/AN

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

DATE: September 28, 1968

SUBJECT : Prime Minister Eshkol and Foreign Minister Eban
on Phantoms

REF :

In interviews accorded Maariv, Davar and Yediot Aharonot for their Jewish New Year's eve editions on September 22, Prime Minister Eshkol and Foreign Minister Eban are quoted as replying as follows to questions about Israel's chances of obtaining Phantom aircraft from the United States:

Eshkol to Davar: "I see no reason to retreat from the stand of reserved optimism on this matter which I adopted after our meeting at President Johnson's ranch in Texas. He told me that he would decide before the end of the year, and perhaps before that time, and the appointed time interval has not yet elapsed. In the meantime, we must not forget the Sky Hawk deal. I do not think that at present we have grounds for a pessimistic appraisal."

Eshkol to Maariv: "I believe that in the end President Johnson will carry out his expression of desire to furnish us the Phantoms, as he said in his conversation with me. If he doesn't do it before the American presidential elections he will do so afterwards. President Johnson is a man of character who never backs away from his promises."

Eban to Yediot Aharonot: "The matter is now in President Johnson's hands. He is the one who will decide. I would

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Drafted by:

POL:DAKorn:do 9/26/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:HHStackhouse

Clearances:

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Tel Aviv A- 1219

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like to say that on the basis of experience and on the basis of the weight we accord the President's statements, I believe it is permitted to expect a favorable response by the United States to Israel's security requirements."

ZURHELLEN *JS*

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

31

Def 12-5 Jan

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PAGE 01 LONDON 05226 042148Z

81
ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 20, MM 01, NSA 02, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03,

INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 20, AID 28, E 15, MC 01, IO 15,

GDP 01, RSR 01, /169 W

R 041830Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0945
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS 2017
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0363

UNCLAS LONDON 5226

SUBJ AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAEL

1. ITEM IN BBC MONITORING SUMMARY OF JAN 2, CITED BELOW,
HAS EXCERPTS FROM INTERVIEW WITH IDF COS BAR-LEV BROADCAST
LIVE ON ISRAEL HOME SERVICE IN HEBREW 1830 GMT DEC 31.
2. QTE. QUESTION: WHAT ABOUT THE AIR FORCE? THERE IS A CERTAIN
MEASURE OF ANXIETY ABOUT THE AIR FORCE IN VIEW OF THE
EMBARGO IMPOSED ON IT. ANSWER: I THINK THAT THIS ANXIETY
IS TO A GREAT EXTENT EXAGGERATED.
(WORDS INDISTINCT) THAT THE BALANCE OF FORCES TODAY IS BETTER
THAN IT WAS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR. THE EMBARGO AFFECTS ONLY
A CERTAIN TYPE OF AIRCRAFT (WORDS INDISTINCT).

PAGE 2 RUDSC 5226 UNCLAS
THERE IS TODAY AN EMBARGO ON THE MIRAGE. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW
LONG OR WHETHER IT WILL CONTINUE...UNQTE.
(JAN. 5 JEWISH OBSERVER AND M.E. REVIEW CARRIES THIS REPLY.
IT NOTES BAR-LEV TOLD ANOTHER CORRESPONDENT. "IT IS NOT

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London
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DIFFICULT TO GET OTHER TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. GOOD PLANES.")
3. BAR-LEV SAID SOV. PENETRATION UAR ARMED FORCE HAD MILITARY
ASPECT, WHICH NOT NEW, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT WHICH EFFECTS
BOTH ARABS AND ISRAELIS. QTE: TO DEAL WITH THIS QUESTION,
ONE MUST HAVE A COOL HEAD AND STRONG NERVES AND EXAMINE EVERY
QUESTION IN ITS PROPER CONTEXT. UNQTE.
4. FULL BBC REPORT BEING POUCHED. DECONTROL ON RECEIPT. BRUCE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Def 12-5 Jer 49

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dr Def 12-5 Jordan

PAGE 01 LONDON 05134 022001Z

47
ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 20, SP 02, SS 20, GPM 03, SC 01, NSC 10, RSC 01, L 03, H 02, SAH 03,
IO 15, P 04, USIA 12, INR 07, CIA 04, NSA 02, ACDA 16, AID 28, E 15,
MC 01, GDP 01, RSR 01, MM 01, /187 W

R 021759Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 884
INFO RUEPJS/DOD WASHDC
AMEMBASSY TELAVIV 356
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 309

UNCLAS LONDON 5134

DOD FOR ISA/OSD.

SIBJ: US JETS FOR ISRAEL

1. EXPRESS RUNS STORY THIS MORNING UNDER WASHINGTON DATE-
LINE CONTENDING ESHKOL WILL HAVE AT TOP OF HIS AGENDA FOR TALKS WITH
THE PRESEDENT ISRAEL "REQUEST FOR AMERICAN ARMS, INCLUDING
50 F-4 PHANTOM FIGHTER-BOMBERS TO HELP COUNTER THE ARAB
MILITARY BUILD-UP." EXPRESS STORY NOTES THAT THE PRESIDENT IS
RELUCTANT TO BECOME ENGAGED AS "A MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIER IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, AND WILL PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH MODERN EQUIPMENT ONLY
IF IT CANNOT GET IT FROM ANOTHER FRIEND." EXPRESS ARTICLE COV

(2)

PAGE 2 RUDSC 5134 UNCLAS
CLUDES THAT WHILE ESHKOL PROBABLY WILL NOT BE TURNED AWAY
"EMPTY HANDED" THE PRESIDENT IS NOT EXPECTED TO GIVE ISRAEL
ALL THE ARMS REQUESTED.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 LONDON 05134 022001Z

2. EXPRESS ALSO ASSERTS THAT THE U.S. HAS DECIDED TO SUPPLY JORDAN WITH SOME AIRCRAFT "RATHER THAN LET THE SOVIET UNION STEP IN." BRUCE

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BY *JK* NARA Date 12/5/05

SECRET

JUN 3 1968

Mr. Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near East/South Asian Affairs
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Harry:

We note that in one of the briefings which the Israelis gave General Newcomer in Israel recently (reported by USDAO Tel Aviv 0959 of May 1968) it was asserted that the UAR will be receiving 100 more Soviet aircraft, among them the Foxbat, which the Israelis referred to as the "USSR F-4." This, of course, raises two separate questions: whether the Foxbat is indeed comparable to our F-4, and whether it is likely to be delivered any time in the near future to the UAR.

I wonder if we cannot prepare for a possible repetition of this theme by the Israelis. As a first step we could obtain a military comparison of the Foxbat with the F-4 including such factors as speed, maneuverability, range, bomb load, attack and defensive versatility, armament, and difficulty in learning to fly and maintain the aircraft. It is clear that many of the answers will depend on the exact configuration and type of equipment carried. We should try as far as possible to compare relatively stripped down versions of both planes, since that has been the trend in the Arab-Israeli area. The U.S. configuration should be the F-4E. We would appreciate DOD's best estimates even in instances where hard intelligence facts are not available on the Foxbat.

While the whole complicated question of whether or not the Soviets will be delivering such aircraft to the UAR need not be handled as part of this study, it would be very helpful to have any available indications along that line, such as whether the aircraft is likely to be produced in quantity in the USSR itself within the next 18 months or so.

In view of the relevance of this study to several important pending policy questions, I would appreciate whatever information and comments DOD can make available as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Concurrences: *[Signature]*

NEA - Mr. Davies

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton (draft) *[Signature]*

NEA/RA - Col. Fredericks (info) *[Signature]*

INR/RNA - Miss Tait (subs) *[Signature]*

G/PM - Mr. Junior (info) *[Signature]*

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Lucius D. Battle
Assistant Secretary

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GROUP 3

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DEF 12-5 152

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186566

QOR

19 JUN 68 21 51Z

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Origin ACTION: Amembassy TRIPOLI
Info: INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
BAIDA
BENGHAZI
TEL AVIV
SUBJECT: PHANTOM JETS FOR ISRAEL
REF: Tripoli 4000

1. There are no Phantom Jets in Israel or arriving in Israel. The story is without foundation.
2. You are authorized to so state if queried.

END

186566

RUSK

5

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Drafted by: AF/P:Raltier:mb 6/19/68 Tel. Ext. 3887 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF/P:RLPerkins
Clearances: NEA/P - Mr. Brown P/ON - Mr. Thirkield
AFN - Mr. Horen USIA/IAA - Mr. Hedges

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PAGE 01 TRIPOL 04000 191416Z

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 09, EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAL 01, SA 01, IO 13,
ACDA 16, AID 28, E 15, MC 01, RSR 01, 180 W

P R 191125Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2828
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BAIDA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TRIPOLI 4000

SUBJ: PHANTOM JETS FOR ISRAEL

1. FOLLOWING JOINT USIS/STATE MESSAGE JUST RECEIVED FROM BENGHAZI OFFICE: QUOTE: PROMINENT FRONT PAGE HEADLINE TODAY'S ENGLISH AND ARABIC DAILIES "THE LIBYAN TIMES" AND "AL HAKIKA" REPORT 'ISRAEL' SAID MASSING TROOPS TO ISOLATE JORDAN. THE STORY PROBABLY UPI ORIGIN FROM CAIRO STATED THAT ISRAEL IS PRESENTLY CONCENTRATING A POWERFUL MILITARY BUILDUP ON WEST BANK OF JORDAN RIVER WITH AIM OF ATTACKING TOWN OF IBRID AND THUS ISOLATING JORDAN FROM TWO ARAB NEIGHBORS, SYRIA AND IRAQ. BOTH DAILIES ALSO CARRY FRONT PAGE HEADLINE 'PHANTOM JETS ARRIVING IN TEL AVIV'. COVERAGE CLAIMS UAR HAS CHARGED THAT THE US HAS SHIPPED THE AIRCRAFT ALREADY SPOTTED IN ISRAEL OCCUPIED TERRITORY. STORY CONCLUDES THAT JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION UNDER EXTREME POLITICAL PRESSURE THIS ELECTION YEAR TO GRANT ISRAEL REQUEST FOR AIRCRAFT AND OTHER MILITARY HARDWARE. UNQUOTE

2. EMBASSY REQUESTS GUIDANCE SOONEST ON HANDLING ANY OFFICIAL OR PRESS INQUIRIES ON CAIRO STORY. SINCE BOTH HAKIKA AND TIMES CIRCULATE WIDELY IN TRIOPOLI AND TO

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Tripoli 4000
6/19/68

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TELEGRAM
23

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PAGE 02 TRIPOL: 04000 191416Z

LESSER DEGREE IN OTHER CITIES, CAIRO CHARGE WILL BE
GENERALLY KNOWN THROUGHOUT LIBYA BY LATE AFTERNOON
TODAY. NEWSOM

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DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
23

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PAGE 01 201532Z

49
ACTION NEA 15

INFO GPM 04, INR 07, RSR 01, FILE 01, 028 W

P 201255Z JUN 68
FM USDAO/TEL AVIV
TO DA
CINCSRIKE USCINCEAFSA
INFO DIA
DEPT STATE
SECDEF

UNCLAS E F T O 1132Z JUN 68
THIS IS AN ADMIN MSG. THIS IS A JOINT AMEMB-USDAO MSG.
DA FOR DCSLOG/MSD. SECDEF FOR ISA. CINCSRIKE FOR STRJ7-RT.
REF: A. DA 868128, DTG 141609Z JUN 68.
B. UNCLAS EFTO STRJ7-RT 4932, DTG 191935Z JUN 68.
SUBJ: PROPOSED BRIEFING ON M561 TRUCK (GAMA GOAT)
REF MSG SOLICITS ISRAELI INTEREST IN SUBJECT VEHICLE AND
PROPOSES A U.S. BRIEFING VISIT. THIS PROPOSAL IMPLIES A
COMMITMENT TO SELL IF INTEREST IS AROUSED. IN ORDER TO AVOID
EMBARRASSMENT REQUEST ASSURANCE THAT SALES OF THIS TRUCK WOULD
HAVE USG APPROVAL PRIOR TO OUR APPROACHING ISRAELI MOD.

Defense Dept.
6-20-68

DEF 12-5

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PAGE 01 PARIS 16714 01 OF 02 202131Z

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ACTION SS 30

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INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

P 201845Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3334

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS: PARIS 16714

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DEFENSE ATTACHE MESSAGE

SUBJ: FRENCH EMBARGO ON ISRAEL MIRAGES

REF: STATE 183902 - Def 12-5 Ser

SUMMARY: ECONOMIC-POLITICAL PRESSURES TO RELEASE MIRAGES ARE INCREASING BUT CHANGE IN EMBARGO RESTS EXCLUSIVELY WITH DE GAULLE WHO GENERALLY REACTS BADLY TO PRESSURE. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR SEES "MOVEMENT," ALTHOUGH MOST OTHERS BELIEVE EMBARGO WILL BE LIFTED ONLY AFTER SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TAKE PLACE IN MID-EAST SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

SERIATIM RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED REFTEL FOLLOW:

1. EMBASSY CONCURS SUBSTANCE PARAGRAPH 1. MIRAGE 5 IS PARTICULARLY "WELL SUITED TO ISRAEL'S NEED," PARTICULARLY SINCE THIS MODEL WAS SPECIFICALLY DEVELOPED TO ISRAELI SPECIFICATIONS.
2. EMBASSY CONCURS THAT ISRAELIS HERE AND THEIR FRENCH SUPPORTERS HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT "ABANDONED BELIEF THAT EMBARGO WILL BE LIFTED AT SOME POINT." ISRAELI AMBASSADOR EYTAN (PROTECT) IS ONE OF MORE OPTIMISTIC ISRAELI OFFICIALS WHO SEES "MOVEMENT." ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICIALS POINT TO FOLLOWING ELEMENTS IN THEIR FAVOR: (A) STRONG LEGAL POSITION; ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MIGHT TAKE CASE TO COURT AND WIN; ISRAELIS HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY MADE PAYMENTS AMOUNTING TO SOME \$50 MILLION IN ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS OF CONTRACT; FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS ACCEPTED AND CASHED ISRAELI CHECKS. (B)

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S/AH	<u>24</u>	OTHER AGENCIES	
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S/C		Vice President <u>25</u>	
S/P		Defense <u>15</u>	
		CIA <u>16</u>	
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		NSA	
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INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

P 201845Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3335

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTIONS PARIS 16714

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DEFENSE ATTACHE MESSAGE

SUBJ: FRENCH EMBARGO ON ISRAEL MIRAGES

REF: STATE 183902

(C) WE SEE NO TECHNICAL REASON WHY DE GAULLE, SO LONG AS HE IS IN POWER AND SO INCLINED, WILL NOT BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND ALL PRESSURES TO RELEASE PLANES FOR "6-12 MONTHS." BREACH OF CONTR-
ACT PROCEEDINGS ARE APPARENTLY OF NO GREAT CONCERN TO HIM, AS WITNESSED BY CANCELLATION OF NATO CONTRACTS. NOR WOULD COURT ACTION OFFER REAL SATISFACTION TO ISRAELIS. MAINTAINING AIRCRAFT IN FLYABLE STORAGE FOR 6 TO 12 MONTHS IS TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE ALTHOUGH COSTLY AND INCONVENIENT. COSTS ARE REPORTEDLY BEING HELD DOWN BY UTILIZING COMBINATION OF DASSAULT AND FRENCH AIR FORCE RESOURCES.

(D) EMB REPEATS THAT "INTERNAL SITUATION IN FRANCE COULD AFFECT FRENCH POLICY," AS CLAIMED BY ISRAELI OFFICIALS, BUT IT PROBABLY WILL NOT. CONCEIVABLY, IF GAULLISTS DO BADLY ON FIRST ROUND, DE GAULLE MIGHT DECIDE TO BUY EXTRA VOTES AS HE DID RECENTLY BY RELEASING OAS OFFICERS. INTERNAL ECONOMIC PRESSURES CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED TO BUILD UP IN THE FALL WHEN THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF THE RECENT STRIKES ARE FELT. AGAIN, HOWEVER, THE HEART OF THE MATTER IS DE GAULLE, WHO SELDOM BACKS DOWN ON CONTROVERSIAL POLICIES, PARTICULARLY UNDER PRESSURE. SPECULATION RE HIS POSSIBLE RETIREMENT AFTER ELECTIONS MAY BE OF ENCOURAGEMENT ISRAELIS.

5. AUSTRALIA ACTUALLY HAS 4 CONTRACTS WHICH COMPRISE ITS ARRANGE-

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16714 02 OF 02 202131Z

MENTS. I.E. DASSAULT FOR AIRFRAME, SNECMA FOR ENGINE, CSF FOR ELECTRONICS AND MATRA FOR ARMAMENT. CONTRACTS CONTAIN CLAUSE THAT EXECUTION IS SUBJECT TO FRENCH GOVERNMENT APPROVAL, WHICH AS A PRACTICAL MATTER MEANS TO AUSTRALIAN TECHNICAL MISSION HERE THAT FRENCH GOVT COULD STOP SHIPMENTS AT ANY TIME BY FAILING TO GRANT EXPORT LICENSES IF IT CHOSE TO DO SO. FURTHERMORE, CONTRACTS CONTAIN CLAUSE THAT AUSTRALIA IS REQUIRED TO PROTECT CLASSIFIED EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED AGAINST THIRD COUNTRIES. AUSTRALIANS INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN THAT THEY COULD NOT DISPOSE OF AIRCRAFT OR EQUIPMENT TO THIRD COUNTRY WITHOUT FRENCH CONSENT. HOWEVER, THEY ALSO STATE THE FRENCH HAVE NOT CONTROL OVER UTILIZATION OF AIRCRAFT BY RAAF. I.E. DECISION TO UTILIZE AIRCRAFT IN VIETNAM WOULD NOT BE REFERRED TO FRENCH.

6. EMBASSY DOUBTS THAT ANOTHER "HIGH-LEVEL APPROACH TO FRENCH" WOULD BE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN PREVIOUS EFFORTS AND MIGHT FURTHER CONVINCE DE GAULLE THAT HE IS RIGHT AND THAT ISRAELIS ARE JUSTLY SUFFERING FROM MISGUIDED POLICIES AND ACTIONS WHICH HE HAS REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT. HE BELIEVES THAT ISRAELIS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR AGGRESSION AND THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN MORE AIRCRAFT UNTIL THEY BACK UP. HE IS UNSYMPATHETIC TO ANY US EFFORTS TO REARM ISRAEL AND WOULD PROBABLY SAY SOMETHING WISE ABOUT REAPING "WHIRLWIND" SHOULD WE TAKE ACTION. ONLY IF HE SEES BASIC CHANGE IN THE "NATURE OF THINGS" SUCH AS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, REAL PROSPECT OF ARAB MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST ISRAEL, OR PERHAPS SOMETHING LIKE WIDESPREAD NATIONALIZATION OF ARAB FRENCH PROPERTIES, COULD HE BE EXPECTED TO ALLOW CHANGE IN EMBARGO. INTERNAL FRENCH PRESSURES CONTRIBUTE, BUT PROBABLY DO NOT CONTROL.

7. IN SUMMARY, EMBASSY CAN ONLY RECOMMEND USG PLAY FOR TIME, IF WE HAVE TIME TO PLAY WITH. ONLY OTHER POSITIVE SUGGESTION MIGHT BE TO LOWER CLASSIFICATION OF THESE MESSAGES TO POINT WHERE POSSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION PHANTOMS (BY BOTH ISRAELIS AND ARABS) COULD BE MORE FREELY DISCUSSED, PARTICULARLY WITH LOWER-LEVEL FRENCH OFFICIALS AND BUSINESS INTERESTS HERE, THUS SERVING TO BUILD UP POL-ECON-FIN-MIL PRESSURES WITHIN FRANCE FOR PROTECTION THEIR MIRAGE MARKETS.

GP-1 SHRIVER

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PAGE 03. PARIS 16714 01 OF 02 202131Z

THE US WILL IDENTIFY ITS MIDDLE EAST INTERESTS MORE EXCLUSIVELY WITH ISRAELIS BY SUPPLYING PHANTOMS; HOWEVER, THIS VIEW MAY BE OFFSET BY FRENCH BUSINESS INTERESTS, FRENCH MILITARY WHO ARE STRONGLY PRO-ISRAELI, AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR SOLVING FRENCH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION (UNFORTUNATELY LED BY COUVE). AGAIN, HOWEVER, DE GAULLE IS KEY.

4. (A) AIR ATTACHE'S "BEST ESTIMATE OF STATUS OF PRODUCTION- IS THAT 25 MIRAGE 5'S WERE PRODUCED ON ISRAELI ACCOUNT BEFORE RECENT DASSAULT STRIKE AND 2 AIRCRAFT PER MONTH PRODUCTION WAS RESUMED ON JUNE 17. MEROZ CONFIRMED THAT 50 MIRAGES HAVE BEEN PAID FOR AND THAT PRODUCTION CONTINUES.

(B) EACH AIRCRAFT IS GIVEN AN ACCEPTANCE TEST FLIGHT BY ISRAELI PILOT AFTER RELEASE BY DASSAULT. BEYOND THIS WE DO NOT BELIEVE AIRCRAFT HELD IN FLYABLE STORAGE ARE FLOWN BY ISRAELI PILOTS.

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PAGE 01 PARIS 16714 01 OF 02 202131Z

81
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INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

P 201845Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3334

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS PARIS 16714

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DEFENSE ATTACHE MESSAGE

SUBJ: FRENCH EMBARGO ON ISRAEL MIRAGES

REF: STATE 183902 - Def 12-5 Ser

SUMMARY: ECONOMIC-POLITICAL PRESSURES TO RELEASE MIRAGES ARE INCREASING BUT CHANGE IN EMBARGO RESTS EXCLUSIVELY WITH DE GAULLE WHO GENERALLY REACTS BADLY TO PRESSURE. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR SEES "MOVEMENT," ALTHOUGH MOST OTHERS BELIEVE EMBARGO WILL BE LIFTED ONLY AFTER SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TAKE PLACE IN MID-EAST SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

SERIAM RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED REFTEL FOLLOW:

1. EMBASSY CONCURS SUBSTANCE PARAGRAPH 1. MIRAGE 5 IS PARTICULARLY "WELL SUITED TO ISRAEL'S NEED," PARTICULARLY SINCE THIS MODEL WAS SPECIFICALLY DEVELOPED TO ISRAELI SPECIFICATIONS.

2. EMBASSY CONCURS THAT ISRAELIS HERE AND THEIR FRENCH SUPPORTERS HAVE

NOT REPEAT NOT "ABANDONED BELIEF THAT EMBARGO WILL BE LIFTED AT SOME POINT." ISRAELI AMBASSADOR EYTAN (PROTECT) IS ONE OF MORE OPTIMISTIC ISRAELI OFFICIALS WHO SEES "MOVEMENT." ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICIALS POINT TO FOLLOWING ELEMENTS IN THEIR FAVOR: (A) STRONG LEGAL POSITION: ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MIGHT TAKE CASE TO COURT AND WIN; ISRAELIS HAVE SCRUPULOUSLY MADE PAYMENTS AMOUNTING TO SOME \$50 MILLION IN ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS OF CONTRACT; FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS ACCEPTED AND CASHED ISRAELI CHECKS. (B)

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16714 01 OF 02 202131Z

THREAT OF ECONOMIC RETALIATION; EXTENSIVE ISRAELI TRADE WITH AND PURCHASES FROM FRANCE WILL BE INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT; HOWEVER, THIS ADMITTEDLY WORKS BOTH WAYS SINCE OTHER MILITARY ITEMS (E.G. MISSILES) FROM FRANCE ARE STILL BEING PRODUCED AND DELIVERED. (C) THREAT TO FRENCH AIRCRAFT SALES ELSEWHERE; ISRAELI OFFICIALS ARE CONVINCED THAT FRENCH POLITICAL EMBARGO REPRESENTS SERIOUS HANDICAP TO MIRAGE SALES WORLD WIDE; THEY BELIEVE LARGE BELGIAN PURCHASES MAY STILL NOT BE CONSUMMATED. (D) DETERIORATION IN FRENCH ECONOMIC SITUATION; IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST KEY INDUSTRIES TO MAINTAIN FULL PRODUCTION AND EXPAND SALES; (E) ELECTORAL SITUATION; ISRAELI DIPLOMATS NOT THAT GAULLISTS FIGHTING FOR LIVES, PARTICULARLY IN PARIS AREA WHERE THEY SAY JEWISH VOTES COULD REPRESENT SWING IN HALF A DOZEN CONSTITUENCIES. ALL FOREGOING POINTS, HOWEVER, ARE BY NO MEANS ASSESSED UNIFORMLY EVEN WITHIN ISRAELI EMBASSY. EXPERIENCED ISRAELI MINISTER MEROZ, FOR EXAMPLE, IS CONVINCED THAT DE GAULLE WILL IGNORE THESE PRESSURES IN CHARACTERISTIC FASHION AND CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN PRO-ARAB POLICY.

3. RE PARA 3(A) EMBASSY AGREES WITH ISRAELI CONTENTION THAT "FRENCH GOVT IS UNDER CONTINUING DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO RELEASE AIRCRAFT," PARTICULARLY FROM DASSAULT AND BUSINESS COMMUNITY, FROM GAULLIST POLITICIANS POSSIBLY INCLUDING POMPIDOU AND FOREIGN MINISTER DEBRE (WHO UNLIKE COUVE HAS NO LOVE FOR ARABS), AND FROM FRENCH PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION; HOWEVER, WITH DE GAULLE ALL THIS CAN BE ACCADEMIC AS DEPARTMENT WELL KNOWS. RE QUESTION 3(B) EMBASSY BELIEVES "ISRAELIS ARE CURRENTLY PRESSING THE FRENCH DISCREETLY AND INDIRECTLY FOR MIRAGES, REGARDLESS OF HOW HARD THEY ARE PRESSING US GOVT FOR PHANTOMS. THEY MAY EVEN FIGURE THAT THE CLOSER THEY GET TO PHANTOMS, THE NEARER THEY ARE TO CRACKING MIRAGE EMBARGO. INDIRECT PRESSURE MAY BE REFLECTED IN CRITICISM OF FRENCH MIDEAST POLICY IN SOME LOCAL SPEECHES OF GAULLIST AND OPPOSITION CANDIDATES DURING CURRENT CAMPAIGN E.G. FREY, EX-AMB GILBERT, FAUTON, LECANUET, KASPEREIT, DUHAMEL. ISRAELI OFFICIALS SEEM TO THINK THIS IS IMPORTANT, ALTHOUGH EMBASSY MORE SKEPTICAL THAT ANY FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE WILL PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN ELECTIONS. RE QUESTION 3(C) EMBASSY BELIEVES FRENCH MIGHT RELEASE MIRAGES "IF LATER ISRAELI NEED APPEARED URGENT AND REAL." HOWEVER, QUAI MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR LEBEL TOLD EMBOFF JUNE 18 THAT NO REPEAT NO CHANGE WAS CURRENTLY FORESEEABLE. RE QUESTION 3(D) EMBASSY BELIEVES SOME ELEMENTS IN FOREIGN OFFICE AND IN ELYSEE MAY "HOPE FOR SUPPLY FROM ELSEWHERE" AND THAT

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16
ACTION AF 15

INFO NEA 13, ACDA 16, MC 01, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,

L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 02, AID 28, RSR 01, IO 13,

SA 01, /145 W

R 211044Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 103
USIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

UNCLAS BENGHAZI 1063

JOINT USIA/STATE MESSAGE

ENGLISH DAILY THE LIBYAN TIMES ONLY BENGHAZI PAPER PUBLISHED
ON FRIDAY, HAS AS LEAD STORY PROMINENTLY HEADLINED FRONT PAGE
"TO DETER AGGRESSION BY NEIGHBORS U.S. SHOPPING FOR JETS FOR
ISRAEL". STORY DATED THURSDAY WASHINGTON STATES THAT DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE OFFICIAL PAUL WARNKE DISCUSSED CAPABILITY OF ISRAEL
TO DETER AGGRESSION BY HER NEIGHBORS AND THAT THE U.S. HAS UNDER
CONTINUAL REVIEW THE QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES, INCLUDING
PHANTOM JETS TO ISRAEL.
SAVALAS

Benghazi 1063
6-21-68

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PAGE 01 RABAT 04832 211809Z

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INFO NEA 13, EUR 15, GPM 04, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, INR 07, P 04, RSC 01,

USIA 12, RSR 01, /074 W

R 211724Z JUN 68

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4664

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 4832

SUBJ: REPORTED WARNKE STATEMENT RE ARMS FOR ISRAEL

1. MAP REPORT DATED LINED WASHINGTON JUNE 21 QUOTES ASST. SEC. DEFENSE (SIC), PAUL C. WARNKE, AS SAYING JUNE 20 THAT (A) U.S. HOPES FRANCE WILL DECIDE SELL MIRAGE AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL; (B) ISRAELI REQUEST FOR AMERICAN COMBAT AIRCRAFT STILL UNDER STUDY; AND (C) "UNTIL NOW WE HAD THOUGHT ISRAEL HAD SUFFICIENT MILITARY POTENTIAL TO DISCOURAGE ANY AGGRESSION BY ITS NEIGHBORS".

2. EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE ANY AMPLIFICATION OR BACKGROUND REPORTED STATEMENT. TASCA

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Authority NND 96900

By J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

~~S/S Pending~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

9281

Signed original of Presidential Determination No. 68-13
received from White House

SECRET

Action on Presidential
Determination sent to
Don Junior, G/PM 7/3/68. RLB

JUN 25 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attention: MR. ROBERT
Keep this study together.

COPIES TO:
S/S:RP
L/E
H
NSA
DOD
EX-IM Bank
BOB
U
G/PM
ATD

SUBJECT: Determination to Authorize Export-
Import Bank to Finance a Credit
Sale (with Department of Defense
Guarantee) in FY 1968 to Israel, an
Economically Less Developed Country
for Purposes of the Interest Equalization
Tax

The attached formal Memorandum recommends your
favorable determination to permit Export-Import Bank
participation in the financing of an up to \$25 million
credit sale to Israel for the purchase of four (4) HAWK
batteries, related ground equipment, and missiles in order
to assist Israel to conserve its cash position for possible
purchases, in the next year or two, of other items of
military equipment. The Israelis want to buy F-4's but,
in offering this credit, we have not indicated to them
any change in our current reservation on a decision to sell
these aircraft to them at the present time. Should you
decide, in the future, to sell F-4's to Israel, the proposed
credit for HAWKS in FY 1968 would reserve Israeli cash for
purchase of aircraft or any other extensive purchases they
are interested in.

No consultations regarding this proposal have taken
place with Congress but we anticipate no Congressional
difficulties with the proposed credit sale. Our FY 1969
military sales justification to Congress projected such a
sale of HAWKS to Israel in FY 1968. The Conte-Long
Amendments and the penalty provisions of the Symington
Amendment do not apply to Israel.

SECRET

G/PM/MASP!
WMC Henno

Group 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

FN 6-1 ISR
X R DEF 18-5 ISR
X R DEF 14-8 48 ISR

0036

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 9600
BY: JEA NARA Date: 12/5/05

NEA/IAI:GLambrakis
NEA/RA:EPadelford:jc 7/5/68
(Drafting Office and Officer)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 27, 1968

SUBJECT: Boeing Company Helicopter Sales to Israel

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. J. H. Carney, The Boeing Company, Vertol Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Mr. J. A. Felton, The Boeing Company, Vertol Division, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ NEA/IAI - Mr. George Lambrakis (latter part of meeting)

NEA/RA - Mr. Edward A. Padelford

COPIES TO: (17) NEA/RA
NEA/IAI
G/PM

CINCSTRIKE
INR -10
Amembassy TEL AVIV

OASD/ISA/NESA
H

Messrs. Carney and Felton called on Mr. Padelford without appointment to discuss Boeing's continued interest in selling Israel the CH-47 CHINOOK helicopter. Mr. Felton said that the Israel Government had now indicated that it was ready to give Boeing a check for \$8 million. Boeing said that it was most interested in any indication of U.S. policy.

Mr. Padelford explained that for reasons with which Boeing was acquainted, we were taking a close look at all helicopter applications for Israel. Mr. Padelford said he could give Boeing no information on when a decision on the matter would be reached. Mr. Felton informed Mr. Padelford Boeing was considering having various Senators or Congressmen intercede on Boeing's behalf and inquired about the efficacy of this. Mr. Padelford replied that this was entirely a matter for Boeing to decide. Mr. Padelford also--in response to a question--said that a letter from Mr. Allen, Chairman of the Board of Boeing to the Secretary would be quite proper.

Mr. Lambrakis joined the meeting at this point. The Boeing people raised the subject of a note from the Government of Israel to the Department formally requesting permission to buy four CH-47's. Mr. Lambrakis suggested the note be submitted as soon as possible. Mr. Lambrakis also inquired about Boeing's connection with an Italian firm, Ellicotteri Meridionale. Mr. Felton said that Boeing had no formal agreement with the Italian firm, although Boeing did do business with the Italian firm. He said that firm would not be selling helicopters to Israel.

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By J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

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(In a telephone conversation two days later, Mr. Felton assured Mr. Lambrakis that the projected sale of the CH-47's had been based on information given the Israeli military attache in Washington, and there had been no in-country presentation in Israel--for which a license application is still pending. Felton offered to stand behind this statement before any other USG official who may wish to know.)

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0038

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY *JK* NARA Date 12/5/05

Pol 24 Ser
to Def 12-5 Ser
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

31

SECRET
Classification

191687

27 JUN 68 01 43Z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS

Info

INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV

EXDIS

STATE

REF: Paris 16714 *Pol 24 Ser*
to Def 12-5 Ser

1. Department and other end users most interested in statement para 2 of reftel that QTE other military items (e.g. missiles) from France are still being produced and delivered UNQTE. This is first such indication we have had. Request full available details earliest re type of missile produced (i.e. MD-620 or other); status of flight test program; whether production is current and at what rate; number produced to date; time deliveries began or might begin; whether this involves training or operational units; any evidence production or assembly may be transferred to Israel; and any other information at Embassy's disposal.

2. If above reference is not to MD-620 or other medium-range ballistic missile, would appreciate best Embassy/CAS estimate whether or not embargo on Mirages also affecting MD-620.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA/State/CBLambakis:cr:6/26/68

4967

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

INR - Miss Tait (subs) *6/26*

ACDA - Dr. Rochlin (subs) *6/26*

EUR/FBX - Mr. Beigel

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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AUTHORITY **NND 9600**
BY *JK* NARA Date **12/5/05**

DEF 12-5 ISR

191687

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS

Info:

INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV

EXDIS

STATE

REF: Paris 16714

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2. If above reference is not to MD-620 or other medium-range ballistic missile, would appreciate best Embassy/CAS estimate whether or not embargo on Mirages also affecting MD-620.

-GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

NEA/CAS/CBLambrakis:cr:6/26/68

4967

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

INR - Miss Tait (subs)

ACDA - Dr. Rochlin (subs)

EUR/FBX - Mr. Beigel

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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S/S-S-CMS 29, 30		Serial No. 191687	Dpty
S/S-0 11		Date June 27, 1968	
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S 4		AF	
U 5		ARA	
M 6		EA	
G		EUR	
G/PM		NEA 12, 13	
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AL		White House 2, 3	
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Department of State

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31

28

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PAGE 01 PARIS 17175 281508Z

42

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 281457Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3651

SECRET PARIS 17175

EXDIS

SUBJECT: FRENCH-ISRAELI DEFENSE ITEMS

1. LATEST EMB REPORT ON STATUS FRENCH-ISRAELI MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WAS CONTAINED IN EMBTELS 3178 AND 13184. WE HAVE HAD NO FURTHER INFO.

2. STATEMENT PARA 2 EMBTEL 16714 SHOULD NOT HAVE ADDED EXAMPLE OF MISSILES TO DIRECT QUOTE FROM ISRAELI MINISTER MEROZ THAT OTHER MILITARY ITEMS FROM FRANCE ARE STILL BEING PRODUCED AND DELIVERED. A BETTER EXAMPLE WOULD HAVE BEEN PATROL BOATS, WHICH MEROZ MENTIONED BUT SAID HE COULD NOT GO INTO DETAILS AND ASKED THAT INFO NOT BE REPORTED. ESSENTIAL PROTECT SOURCE.

GP-1. WALLNER

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S/S-O	11	Date JUNE 28, 1968	
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S ✓ 4		AF	
U ✓ 5		ARA	
M		EA	
G ✓ 7		EUR ✓ 12	
G/PM		NEA ✓ 13-14	
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AL		White House ✓ 2-3	
S/C		Vice President	
S/P		Defense ✓ 15	
		CIA ✓ 16	
		NSA	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		Treasury	
E		State Rep ✓ 17	
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

DEF 12-5 ISR

CONFIDENTIAL: 509

PAGE 01 PARIS 17215 282028Z

89
ACTION EUR 20

INFO NEA 13, RSR 01, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01,

SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, ACDA 16, MC 01, IO 13, E 15, COM 08,

TRSY 08, AID 28, SAL 01, 191 W

R 281709Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3675
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECDEF
USCINCEUR

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 17215

REF: USDAO PARIS C-397-AF

SUBJ: FOUGA MAGISTER PARTS TO ISRAEL

1. ON JUNE 26 FRENCH PRESS CARRIED STORY THAT FRANCE DELIVERING 25 DISASSEMBLED FOUGA MAGISTERS TO ISRAEL. ON JUNE 27, SEMI-OFFICIAL GAULLIST DAILY "LA NATION" REPLAYED STORY, STRESSING THAT THE CONTRACT FOR MAGISTERS PREDATED THE JUNE 67 HOSTILITIES, AND THE MAGISTER IS NOT A COMBAT AIRCRAFT BUT A TRAINING PLANE. "LA NATION" STATES THAT THIS DELIVERY IS NOT IN SAME CATEGORY AS THAT OF THE MIRAGES, AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE FRENCH EMBARGO ON DELIVERY OF OFFENSIVE ARMS TO COUNTRIES THAT WERE BELLIGERENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. COMMENT: "LA NATION'S" RAISONALE IS TRANSPARENTLY FALSE, SINCE IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT FOUGA MAGISTER PLAYED OFFENSIVE ROLE IN SIX DAY WAR AND MIRAGE CONTRACT ALSO PRE-DATED JUNE 67 HOSTILITIES. ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME SPECULATION HERE THAT RELEASE OF FOUGAS IS TRIAL BALLOON TO TEST ARAB REACTION, ANDRE FONTAINE IN JUNE 28 LE MONDE ANALYZING IMPACT OF MAY CRISIS ON DEGAULLE FOREIGN POLICY SAYS NO ONE CAN EXPECT TO SEE EMBARGO ON MIRAGES FOR ISRAEL RAISED, NO MATTER WHAT THE BENEFIT TO FRENCH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. IN LUNCH CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH TWO EMBASSY OFFICERS, A MEMBER OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE MESSMER'S STAFF ALSO GAVE PERSONAL

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PARIS - 17215
6-28-68

DEF 12-5 ISR

0045

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PAGE 02 PARIS 17215 282028Z

VIEW THAT DEGAULLE WOULD NOT CHANGE EMBARGO POLICY DESPITE PRESSURE FROM AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS. FURTHER DOWNGRADING IMPACT OF MAGISTER SALE ON MIRAGE EMBARGO, AIRATT SOURCE REPORTED THAT MAGISTERS HAD BEEN MANUFACTURED IN FRG AND WERE SURPLUS TO GERMAN NEEDS.

GP-4. WALLNER

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0046

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DEF 12-5 ISR

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 072

PAGE 01 280747Z

17

ACTION NEA 06

INFO EUR 08, AF 06, IO 03, ACDA 07, MC 01, GPM 04, INR 07, CIAE 00, RSR 01,

FILE 01, 044 W

P R 280705Z JUN 68
FM USDAO/TEL AVIV
TO DIA
DEPT STATE
USDAO AMMAN
USUN
INFO CINCSRIKE/CINCMFAFSA
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
USCINCEUR/USEUCOM
CINCUSNAVEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L 1168 JUN 68.

1. ON 27 JUN 68 AAIRA HOSTED AT DINNER IDF/AFI FOREIGN LIAISON OFFICER. ISRAELI OFFICER RESPONDED TO COMMENT ON FRENCH AND ISRAEL PRESS DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI RECEIVING ADDITIONAL FOUGA-MAGISTER AIRCRAFT AS SPARE PARTS THAT HE HAD ACTUALLY SEEN THE UNASSEMBLED AIRCRAFT AT ISRAELI AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES, LOD. HE COULD NOT RECALL WHETHER ASSEMBLY WOULD PROVIDE TWENTY-TWO OR TWENTY-FIVE AIRCRAFT. HE STATES THAT RECEIPT OF THESE TRAINERS WILL IN NO WAY AFFECT OUTCOME OF

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 1168 C O N F I D E N T I A L
MIRAGE TRANSACTION.

2. COMMENT: SOURCE IS CONSIDERED RELIABLE AND FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS STATEMENTS.
3. COORDINATED WITH EMBASSY.
GP-3.

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27

CONFIDENTIAL 299

PAGE 01 281022Z

11
ACTION NEA 15

INFO GPM 04, INR 07, CIAE 00, MC 01, RSR 01, FILE 01, /029: W

P 280900Z JUN 68
FM USDAO/TEL AVIV
TO DA
CINCSRIKE USCINCEAFSA
INFO DIA
DEPT STATE
SECDEF

UNCLAS E F T O 0900 JUNE 68
THIS IS AN ADMIN MSG. THIS IS A JOINT AMEMB-USDAO MSG.
DA FOR DCSLOG/MS-8B1. SECDEF FOR ISA. CINCSRIKE FOR STRJ7-RT.
REF: DA 869052 FOUO DTG 201942Z JUN 68 AND STRJ-7-RT 5163. DTG
262118Z JUN 68.
SUBJ: VEHICLE REQMTS FOR FGN COUNTRIES
REF MSG REQUESTS SURVEY OF ISRAEL REQUIREMENTS FOR CARGO CARRIER
M548 AND APC M113A1. THIS REQUEST IMPLIES A COMMITMENT TO SELL
IF ISRAEL HAS REQMT. REQ ASSURANCE THAT SALES OF THESE ITEMS
WOULD HAVE USG APPROVAL PRIOR TO OUR APPROACHING ISRAELI MOD.

Defense Dept.
6-28-68

①

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FT 18-1 IT-45
199122
12 DEF 12-5 IT
12 DEF 12-5 ISA
A
0 JUL 68 13 52z

Origin ACTION: AMEMBASSY ROME
Info INFO: AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
DOD/OSD-ISA AMCONGEN MILAN
Mr. Evans

STATE

Re Embtel 7176 and previous: Agusta Sales Manager Amato in letters of June 22 and 27 has admitted company's violation licensing agreement, apologized therefor and given Dept assurances future strict compliance agreement and traffic in arms regulations. Both Amato and Sullivan, latter Agusta Washington Rep, have stated several times before witnesses no (rpt no) approval in any form received from Dept for Israeli sale. Emb requested convey following FONMIN: Dept grateful assistance by FONMIN and Emb Washington ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ this case. Notes interest both Govts control international arms traffic and fact Bell-Agusta Agreement recd formal approval both Govts. This agreement specifically excluded sales to Sino-Soviet Bloc and, without Dept's prior approval, to countries listed in Amendment Number One of January 1, 1966 to Bell-Agusta Agreement. Latter countries are Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia,

Drafted by: JMBowle:lmw:7/9/68 Tel. Est. 2409 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: MC:JWSipes
G/FM - Mr. Farley & Mr. Wolf (Draft) NEA/RA - Col Fredericks & Mr. Sobel (Draft)
EUR/AIS - Mr. Dozier (Draft) DOD/ISA-OSD - Mr. Delavan Evans
NEA/IAI - Mr. Lambrakis (Draft)

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8-65

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PAGE 01 KUWAIT 01277 071506Z

53

ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 09, EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, AID 28, IO 13,

RSR 01, 164 W

R 071330Z JULY 68
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1677
INFO AMEMBASSY ADEN
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL DHAMRAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TELEVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

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DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

FOREIGN UNDERSECRETARY RASHID SUMMONED ME JULY 7 AT
INSISTANCE OF CABINET: (A) TO ESTABLISH AUTHENTICITY TASS
REPORTS THAT US PROVIDING ISRAEL WITH HAWK MISSILES AND
PHANTOM AIRCRAFT; (B) TO URGE US NOT AUGMENT ISRAEL'S
ARMAMENTS. RASHID AFFIRMED SUCH GESTURE OF US SUPPORT WOULD
MAKE ISRAEL MORE ARROGANT AND LESS COOPERATIVE WITH CURRENT
PEACE EFFORTS. HE ALSO URGED US LOOK BEYOND ISRAEL TO GAINS
SOVIETS ARE MAKING IN M.E. BY OFFERING HELP SOME OF IT

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22✓

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PAGE 02 KUWAIT 01277 071506Z

SPURIOUS, TO ARABS. I EXPRESSED DOUBTS RE PHANTOMS BUT
ACKNOWLEDGED US HAD ANNOUNCED INCREASE DEFENSIVE MISSILES.
I AGREED CONVEY CABINET'S "DISAPPOINTMENT" AND TO REQUEST FACTS.
COTTAM

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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TYPE MSG				FILE-14363CAC/RDD	
PRECEDENCE				1968 JUL 9 AM 1 38	
ACTION				DTG 081801Z JUL 68	
INFO					
FROM: SECDEF				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
TO: AM EMBASSIES: TEL AVIV				COORDINATION:	
OCT STATE 19				STATE/NEA:	
Distribution				MR ATHERTON	
SS 10				ASDPA:MR FREEMAN	
GPM 4				JCS/SAMAA:	
INR 7				CAPT DOUGLAS	
L 3				INFORMED	
IO				X	
AF				DISTRIBUTION:	
ARA				STATE	
EUR 8				JCS	
FE				ARMY	
NTRA 6					
P 3					
OPR					
MC 1					
ACR 7					
RSR 1					
FILE 1/51					
CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA					
USCINCEUR					
USUN					
UNCLAS EFTO DEF 4207 FM:OASD/ISA				4207	
FOLLOWING RELEASED TO PRESS SATURDAY 6 JULY BY					
DOD: QUOTE THE US GOVT AGREED ON 29 JUNE TO					
THE SALE TO ISRAEL UNDER A US GOVT CREDIT					
ARRANGEMENT OF ADDITIONAL BATTERIES OF HAWK					
MICROFILMED BY RS/8					
①					
TYPED NAME AND TITLE				DATE TIME	
MR DELAVAN P EVANS				8	
NESA REGION				MONTH YEAR	
				JULY 1968	
				PAGE NO. NO. OF PAGES	
				1 4	
PHONE 75173				SIGNATURE	
75173				Robert J. Murray	
TYPED NAME AND TITLE				ROBERT J. MURRAY	
Deputy Director				Deputy Director	
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS SOUTH ASIA REGION					

0052

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PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY		PHONE
ACTION	PRIORITY		MR EVANS NESA		75173
INFO					
<p>MISSILES. A BATTALION OF HAWKS WAS SOLD ON CREDIT TO ISRAEL IN 1963 AND DELIVERED EARLY IN 1965. THE HAWK IS A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM DESIGNED FOR DEFENSE AGAINST HIGH SPEED, LOW AND MEDIUM ALTITUDE AIR ATTACK. ACQUISITION BY ISRAEL OF ADDITIONAL HAWKS SHOULD ENHANCE ITS ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST AIR ATTACK. UNQUOTE</p> <p>INFO IN FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS USED IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUERIES.</p> <p>Q: IS THERE SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO SALE ADDITIONAL HAWKS AT THIS TIME?</p> <p>A: NO. THIS IN RESPONSE TO ISRAELI REQUEST.</p> <p>Q: HAS US SOLD HAWKS TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN NEAR EAST?</p> <p>A: YES. HAWKS SOLD TO SAUDI ARABIA TWO YEARS AGO.</p> <p>Q: CAN HAWK BE USED FOR OFFENSIVE PURPOSES?</p> <p>A: HAWK SYSTEM DEFENSIVE IN NATURE AND NOT EFFECTIVE IN ANY OTHER ROLE.</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 2	NO. OF PAGES 4	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION 4207	INITIALS
REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	

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PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE	
ACTION	PRIORITY		MR EVANS NESA	75173	
INFO					
<p>Q: IS US TRAINING ISRAELIS IN OPERATION OF HAWK SYSTEM? 4</p> <p>A: AS PART OF SALE OF BATTALION OF HAWK MISSILES IN 1963, US TRAINED ISRAELIS IN THEIR USE. NO ADDITIONAL TRAINING HAS BEEN REQUESTED.</p> <p>Q: HAS US SOLD OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL?</p> <p>A: YES. US IS CURRENTLY DELIVERING SKYHAWK AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS OTHER MILITARY ITEMS.</p> <p>Q: DOES THIS MEAN THAT US WILL MEET ISRAEL'S REQUESTS FOR SUCH MAJOR ITEMS AS F-4 AIRCRAFT?</p> <p>A: AS INDICATED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL ON 8 JAN 68: QUOTE THE PRESIDENT AGREED TO KEEP ISRAEL'S MILITARY DEFENSE CAPABILITY UNDER ACTIVE AND SYMPATHETIC EXAMINATION AND REVIEW IN LIGHT OF ALL RELEVANT FACTORS INCLUDING THE SHIPMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY OTHERS TO THE AREA. UNQUOTE</p>					
CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		3	4	4287	
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	

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ACTION		PRIORITY		MR EVANS NESA	
INFO				PHONE 75173	
<p>Q: CAN YOU TELL US MORE ABOUT CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF HAWK?</p> <p>ARMY FACT SHEET MADE AVAILABLE. BEING POUCHED BY STATE. GP 4 BT</p>					
CONTROL NO.		TOR/TOD		MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
				4207	
PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES		INITIALS	
4		4			
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 96900
By J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

37



DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
DEF 19-8 US-ISR

UNCLASSIFIED 066

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04425 090805Z

21
ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, MC 01, RSR 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02,

INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, SAH 02,

SA 01, AID 28, 159 W

R 090720Z JUL 68.
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4190
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 4425

HAWKS FOR ISRAELI

1. FOLLOWING ISSUED BY ISRAELI FONMIN SPOKESMAN JULY 8:
QUOTE THE RECENT COMPLETION OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE PURCHASE OF HAWK MISSILES IN THE US IS WELCOMED IN JERUSALEM. HOWEVER IT WOULD NOT BE CORRECT TO CONSIDER THAT THE SUPPLY OF THESE MISSILES, WHICH WAS AGREED UPON SOME TIME AGO, IS RELEVANT TO THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF ISRAEL'S DETERRENT STRENGTH AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY. THE ISSUE IS THE GROWING GAP, SINCE THE SIX DAY WAR IN JUNE 1967, BETWEEN THE NUMBER AND QUALITY OF SUPERSONIC FIGHTER-BOMBERS AVAILABLE TO EGYPT AND SYRIA, AND THE NUMBER AND QUALITY AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL. UNQUOTE

2. COMMENTING ON FOREGOING, SEMI-GOVERNMENTAL DAVAR JULY 9 SAYS JERUSALEM OBSERVERS EXPRESS HOPE US WILL REMAIN ALERT TO ARMAMENTS PROBLEM IN MIDDLE EAST AND IS GIVING MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO DANGER INHERENT IN CREATION OF ARMS IMBALANCE IN AREA. IN EDITORIAL SAME SUBJECT DAVAR UNDERSCORES ISRAELI APPRECIATION FOR US AGREEMENT SUPPLY ADDITIONAL HAWKS BUT POINTS OUT ISSUE ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM ISRAELI REQUEST PURCHASE PHANTOM AIRCRAFT.

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Tel Aviv
4425
7-9-68

RECEIVED BY RSR

(3)

0056

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DATE 12/3/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**
2

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 04425 090805Z

PAPER EXPRESSES CONFIDENCE THIS FULLY UNDERSTOOD IN
WASHINGTON. BAREBTE

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0057

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05



Def 12-5/512
Department of State

TELEGRAM

29

UNCLASSIFIED 579

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10882 101721Z

45
ACTION NEA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,
SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, ACDA 16, MC 01, AID 28, IGA 02, EUR 15, IO 13,
AF 09, RSR 01, /167 W

R 101418Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5557
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

UNCLAS BEIRUT 10882

SUBJ: PRESS REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF HAWK MISSILE
DELIVERY TO ISRAEL

MICROFILMED BY RS/R

1. LEBANESE PRESS REACTED IN HIGHLY CRITICAL FASHION TO US ANNOUNCEMENT SALE OF HAWK MISSILE TO ISRAEL. REPORTS, IN BOTH CONSERVATIVE AND PRO-UAR PRESS, FOR INSTANCE, HEADLINED IT AS "HARDENING" OF US AND ISRAELI POSITIONS TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ME CRISIS.

2. ANNOUNCEMENT OF DELIVERIES HAS BEEN MAJOR TOPIC OF EDITORIAL COMMENT IN PRO-UAR PRESS, WHICH TAKING TWO GENERAL LINES: (A) DELIVERY OF THESE MODERN WEAPONS US "ANSWER" TO "NEW MODERATION" ON PART OF UAR, I.E., THAT US IS OBSTRUCTING PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL SETTLEMENT; AND (B) PROVISION OF HAWKS TO ISRAEL GIVES NASSER NEW LEVERAGE IN SEEKING SOPHISTICATED AND, BY IMPLICATION, OFFENSIVE WEAPONRY FROM THE USSR. A NUMBER OF CONSERVATIVE PAPERS PORTRAY DEAL AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF US POLICY FACILITATING SOVIET PENETRATION OF MIDDLE EAST.

3. MOST BEIRUT PAPERS JULY 9 CARRIED HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AFP REPORT THAT NASSER EXTENDED STAY IN USSR SPECIFICALLY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

29

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10882 101721Z

BECAUSE OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF HAWK DELIVERIES. ACCORDING
THIS STORY, ANNOUNCEMENT GREATLY EMBARRASSED SOVIETS WHO
TRYING TO PRESSURE NASSER INTO ACCEPTING POLITICAL SOLUTION
OF CRISIS AND STRENGTHENED NASSER'S DETERMINATION TO PRESS
FOR MORE MODERN SOVIET ARMS.

4. US DISCLAIMERS THAT HAWKS PURELY DEFENSIVE WEAPON
SYSTEM AND THAT DEAL NOT A PRELUDE TO SALE OF PHANTOMS TO
ISRAEL HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN MODERATE AND CONSERVATIVE
PRESS BUT GIVEN LITTLE ATTENTION IN PRO-UAR PRESS. PRO-UAR
PAPERS CLAIM HAWK DEAL WILL
SOON BE FOLLOWED BY ANNOUNCEMENT
SALE OF PHANTOMS.

PORTER

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0059

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J4 RARA Date 12/3/05

66
July 10, 1968

Honorable Clifford P. Case
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Case:

I have received your inquiry regarding our program of military assistance in the Middle East.

The United States suspended shipment of arms to the Israel-Arab arena of conflict following the outbreak of hostilities there in June 1967. Exceptions to this suspension have since been made, most notably in October 1967, when we announced that certain carefully selected items were being released to countries such as Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.

A similar announcement was made in February 1968 with regard to Jordan. Exact details of such transactions are of course classified and not publicly releasable. It would be accurate to say, however, that these exceptions involve military equipment and supplies of various types including, in some cases, aircraft. The largest number of such aircraft are the A-4 Skyhawks released for delivery beginning in December 1967 to Israel.

We have opposed the arms race in the Middle East and will continue to exercise restraint in our own shipments to the area. However, until other suppliers show similar restraint, our choice is either to abandon friendly governments in the area to heavy Soviet pressures or to help them preserve their own independence and their ties to the West. We do not believe that to abandon our friends will serve our own national interest nor would it assist efforts to end twenty years of cold and hot war in the area.

For instance, since the June Arab-Israel hostilities, the Jordanian Government has been in the forefront of the Arab countries committed to seeking a just solution of the Middle East crisis by political means. We believe that to provide Jordan with its legitimate defense needs is essential to the stability of the present moderate Jordanian Government and to the maintenance of constructive United States influence in Jordan.

(2)
P/PS/PC D. Rushfield

66
POL 27 ARAB ISR
NR DEF 13-5 ISR

0060

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BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

37



DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State ^{1R} TELEGRAM

DEF 19-8 US-ISR ³²

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PAGE 01 JIDDA 04711 101407Z

45
ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 09, EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, NSA 02, MC 01, AID 28, ACDA 16,
IGA 02, RSR 01, 155 W

R 101328Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3956
USIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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7-10-68*

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REACTION TO HAWK MISSILE SALE TO ISRAEL

MICROFILMED BY 104

1. JIDDA PRESS JULY 7 CARRIED WIRE SERVICE RELEASE OF DOD ANNOUNCEMENT. NO EDITORIAL COMMENT HAS THUS FAR APPEARED. PRESS PROBABLY WAITING FOR MININFO GUIDANCE.
2. JULY 8 LOCAL PRESS REPORTED KUWAIT'S REPRESENTATIONS AND ECHOED JORDAN PRESS CRITICISM OF SALE US MISSILES TO ISRAEL. JULY 9 PRESS CARRIES TEL AVIV DATELINE REPORTS (A) THAT ISRAELIS DO NOT REGARD HAWK SALE AS LESSENING THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR PHANTOMS AND (B) LAUDING TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT AS WARNING TO USSR NOT TO USE OCCASION OF NASSER'S VISIT TO STEP UP ARMS RACE.
3. NO OFFICIAL SAG REACTION AS YET, BUT WE WOULD EXPECT SAUDIS EXPRESS SOME OFFICIAL CONCERN. APART FROM THIS NEW WEAPONS SALE TO ISRAEL, SAUDIS WILL BE CONCERNED AT WHAT THEY TEND TO REGARD AS ATTEMPT JUSTIFY SALE OF FURTHER HAWKS TO ISRAEL BY PUBLIC INDICATION US HAS ALSO SOLD HAWKS TO SAUDI ARABIA. ON PAST SUCH OCCASIONS THEY HAVE BEEN INTENSELY ANNOYED ABOUT THIS ASPECT OF OUR ANNOUNCEMENTS. THEY CLAIM IT EMBARRASSES SAUDI ESTABLISHMENT IN EYES OTHER

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AUTHORITY: NND 96700
BY: J6 NARA Date: 12/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 04711 101407Z

ARABS AND BEFORE ITS OWN YOUNGER MILITARY OFFICERS AND
GENERATES PRESSURES BUY ARMS ELSEWHERE. EILTS

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0062

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Authority NND 96900
By XX NARA Date 12/5/05

RSR

JULY 18, 1968

Honorable Dominick V. Daniels
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Daniels:

I have received your letter of July 8 concerning the views of Mrs. Helene Pesin on the Near East situation.

Despite certain press reports to the contrary, the United States has not turned down an Israeli request for supersonic aircraft. We are keeping Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area.

The United States has sold substantial quantities of military equipment to Israel, notably Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, Patton tanks, and Skyhawk aircraft. The Skyhawk is a first-line jet aircraft now being used extensively by our forces in Viet-Nam. I would observe that quantitative factors, such as the arms inventory level of certain Arab states, are only some and not necessarily the most decisive of the many relevant considerations determining military effectiveness, as demonstrated by the June 1967 war. In the judgment of professional military experts, Israel is not and will not be at a military disadvantage for some time to come.

I might add that we have also given diplomatic support to Israel in the United Nations in the current search for a peaceful settlement in the Near East. The most recent comprehensive statement of our policy is contained in a speech given by Assistant Secretary Battle before the American Jewish Congress in Miami on May 16, 1968. I enclose a copy of his speech.

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful to you in replying to your constituent.

Sincerely yours,

DMD

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. McConnell
H - FORBES

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

7/17

Enclosures:

1. Correspondence returned
2. Ambassador Battle's May 16 speech

NEA/IAI:JHB:pi:pjw:7/16/68 x4422 S/S # 9796

DEF 12-5 ISR

NR DEF 12-5 NEAR E

0063

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
DATE 12/5/05



DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 199628

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DRAFTED BY: IO: JPOWENS
APPROVED BY: IO: JOHN P. OWENS
S/S-MR. BROWN

R 102149Z JUL 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4878

SECRET STATE 199628

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE JULY 10, FROM CAIRO REPEATED
TO YOU

QUOTE: SECRET CAIRO 2880: DEF 12-5 ISR
X2 PPB 9 UAR

EXDIS

1. THUS FAR GUAR PRESS REACTION TO HAWKI MISSILE SALE TO ISRAEL
HAS BEEN RELATIVELY RPT RELATIVELY RESTRAINED.

2. I DID GET A FIFTEEN MINUTE LECTURE ALONG PREDICTABLE LINES
FROM USMAN OF FONOFF YESTERDAY.

3. IT QUITE OBVIOUS PREOCCUPATION HERE IS OVER POSSIBILITY OF
US MAKING PHANTOMS AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL. WE WOULD BE ILL-
ADVISED TO ASSUME ANYTHING LESS THAN A MAJOR DIFFICULTY FOR US
INTERESTS IN THE UAR AND THE AREA IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.

4. I HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT MOST LIKELY SOVIET
REACTION WILL BE PRESSURE ON UAR FOR MORE FACILITIES FOR
DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR SURVEILLANCE AND
NEUTRALIZATION OF US/ISRAELI FORCES IN THE AREA.

5. AS FOR UAR REACTION, IT WILL BE ONE OF TRYING TO STAY
AHEAD OF AND TO EXPLOIT WAVE OF FEELING WHICH WILL ARISE IN

Carded

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 STATE 199628

ARAB WORLD.

6. THROUGHOUT THE YEARS I HAVE CONSISTENTLY SHUNNED THE "CHAMBER OF HORRORS" APPROACH TO US-UAR RELATIONS. PERHAPS I HAVE BEEN WRONG. IN 1956 I PARTICIPATED IN A DEPARTMENTAL GROUP WHICH LISTED ONLY AS NO. 3 THE POSSIBILITY THAT NASSER MIGHT TINKER WITH THE SUEZ CANAL IF WE WITHDREW THE ASWAN DAM OFFER. IN LATE 1966 - EARLY 1967, DURING THE STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN SOME KIND OF FOOD PIPELINE TO EGYPT, I AND OTHERS PROBABLY OVERLY-DISCOUNTED NASSER'S DESPERATION AND READINESS TO TAKE INCREDIBLE RISKS. I HAVE NO CERTAIN DIRE PREDICTION TO MAKE AT THIS TIME. BUT A PHANTOM DEAL WILL CREATE WIDESPREAD IF EVANESCENT WRATH IN ARABDOM AND NASSER WILL DO HIS BEST TO MAKE SOMETHING OF IT.

7. TROUBLING PRECEDENT WHICH KEEPS RECURRING TO MY MIND IS NASSER'S ACTION IN RE-NATIONALIZING SHELL OIL IN 1964 AFTER R.A. BUTLER'S SPEECH IN CANADA. HE COULD BE JUST FOOLISH ENOUGH TO DO SOMETHING TO US OIL INTERESTS IN UAR AND CHALLENGE OTHER ARABS DO LIKEWISE. THERE ARE MANY REASONS INDICATING SUCH AN ACTION WOULD BE IRRATIONAL, SELF-DESTRUCTIVE AND PERHAPS INEFFECTUAL. THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR NOT YIELDING TO BLACKMAIL, PARTICULARLY BEFORE IT HAS EVEN BEEN ATTEMPTED. FINALLY, THERE IS RECOGNITION THAT USG NO LONGER SO CONCERNED ABOUT PROTECTION OF PRIVATE AMERICAN INVESTMENT ABROAD AS IN PAST.

8. BUT FACT REMAINS THAT US PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN UAR IS THE ONLY MEANINGFUL AREA OF COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AT PRESENT AND FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE. ONCE THIS GONE, SOVIETS WILL PRETTY MUCH HAVE IT ALL. SIGNED BERGUS UNQUOTE
RUSK

SECRET

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0065

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BY VA NARA Date 12/5/05

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46

RS/R

July 22, 1968

Honorable Alton Lennon
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

DEF 12-5 ISR

Dear Congressman Lennon:

I have received your letter dated July 11 concerning Mr. Ralph Goldstein's views about the Arab-Israeli situation. You also asked for a statement of United States policy on selling Phantom jet aircraft to Israel.

I should first note that the sale of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel is not related to the matter of jet aircraft for Israel. These missiles are defensive in nature and, as you know, a number of Hawk batteries were sold to Israel in 1962.

One of the basic elements we would like to see in any Near Eastern settlement was described by President Johnson in his statement of June 19, 1967, as the limitation and registration of arms shipments to the region from all sources. In pursuing this aim we have followed, and continue to follow, all military shipments from whatever source, with a view to safeguarding the security of our friends while at the same time minimizing arms escalation in the area. These principles underlay the following sentence in the joint statement issued on January 8, 1968, at the conclusion of the discussions between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol. "The President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area."

Up to now, our best available information indicates over-all arms levels have not essentially surpassed those existing prior to the war in any of the Near Eastern Arab states supplied by the Soviets and are below pre-war levels in the UAR. We are nevertheless continuing to watch the situation closely.

The French embargo on delivery of the Mirage 5 fighter/bomber aircraft which Israel has purchased is an important factor in the situation, but not in itself a determining one so far as Israel's security is concerned.

DEF 12-5 ISR

REPRODUCTION BY RS/R

① NEA/IAI: JHBA HTI: pju
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DATE 12/5/05

In this regard our information indicates that even if the reports of a Mirage sale to Iraq are true, such aircraft have not yet been produced and it is unlikely that they could arrive in Iraq for several years. Nor is it likely that the Mirages built for Israel will go to Iraq since they have been designed to Israeli specifications, have been paid for, and title has passed to Israel.

On the other hand, we can deliver Phantom jets in a relatively short period of time, if necessary to Israel's security. The judgement of professional military experts that Israel is not and will not be at a military disadvantage for the foreseeable future takes the lead-time problem into account.

The A-4 Skyhawk aircraft we are delivering to Israel was the specific choice of the Israeli Government. It is a first-line attack aircraft being used extensively by U.S. forces in Viet-Nam and is well suited to its mission.

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful to you in replying to your constituent.

Sincerely yours,

WBM
Fug

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosure:

Correspondence returned

Clearances:

Mr. Davies
NEA - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
H - Miss Folger *WBM*

NEA/IAI:JHB:1:pjw:7/18/68 x4422 S/S 10056

0067

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
DATE 12/5/05

FORM 12-63 DS-1563

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ACTION SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

CONTROL NO.

10056

TO NEA - Mr. McConnel

DATE 7/15/68

SUBJECT Ltr to S fm Congressman Alton Lennon dtd 7/11 encloses ltr 7/9 fm Ralph M. Goldstein re sale of jets to Israel and requests written statement of US policy to forward to concerned constituents.

*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

For appropriate action.

For direct reply. Comeback copy required _____.

Prepare reply. A response for signature by ~~me~~ Amb. Macomber

Clear with _____.

XXXXXXXXXX

Prepare a _____ to _____.

Refer to White House request of _____.

Due in ~~1/2~~ by 7/18 Rec'd Cpb 7/15/68

XXXXXXXXXX

For your information.

REMARKS

Ans by JHBcti - NEA/IAI
7/18/68

COPIES TO

S - Mr. Steigman (w/att)
H - Mr. Briggs (w/att)
P - Mr. Coates (w/att)

RGHoudek - 4154
SECRETARIAT STAFF

EXT.

0068

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By JKA NARA Date 12/5/05

INCOMING

0069

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05

ALTON LENNON
SEVENTH DISTRICT
NORTH CAROLINA

COUNTIES:
BLADEN Hoke
BRUNSWICK NEW HANOVER
COLUMBUS ROBESON
CUMBERLAND SCOTLAND

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

3

COMMITTEES:
ARMED SERVICES
MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES

10056

July 11, 1968

ACTION
is assigned to

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose a constituent's letter and articles from the New York Times regarding the United States' position on selling Phantom Jets to Israel.

Mr. Edward Padelford of NEA-RA has been most cooperative in relating to my office the guidelines set forth by the President in January. However, I will appreciate a written statement of our policy which I may forward to concerned constituents.

With kind regards.

Most sincerely,

Alton Lennon

Enclosures

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1968 JUL 13 PM 1 57

AMERICAN BRANCH

Encl: From Ralph Goldstein

RECEIVED 13 JUL 1 02
MICROFILMED BY RS/R

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7-13-68

15610

DEF 12-5 ISR

46
141 North Front St.
Wilmington, North Carolina 28401
July 9, 1968.

The Honorable Alton Lennon
House Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lennon:

I noticed both the enclosed article and
"letter to the editor" in today's New York Times.

Surely the interest of the United States
lies in fully supporting Israel, a valuable ally in
a strategic spot.

The comparison of our help to Vietnam, (with
thousands of men and tons of equipment,) with our giving
of less than full support to Israel, leaps to mind.

If and when--as we all hope they do not--
hostilities break out, it may be too late to send aid.

Surely we would rather send 50 Phantom planes
than 50 or even one American soldier.

Thank you for your kind consideration.

Yours most sincerely,


Ralph M. Goldstein

DEF 12-5 ISR

0071

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BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

Concern for Israel

To the Editor:

We, the undersigned, Roman Catholic priests, sisters and lay teachers, have just participated in a two-week Institute of Jewish Studies at Marymount College, Tarrytown, N. Y.

Considering the present dangerous drift of events in the Middle East, it seems fitting to us to call the attention of Christians to the threat of genocide that now exists in that area.

Two and one-half million Israelis did win an almost miraculous victory over their eighty million enemies in the "Six-Day War" of 1967. That miracle may not repeat itself. The Arab armies can afford to lose many wars to Israel; they need only win one of them.

It is obvious from the speeches of their leaders that their motivation is not mere modification of borderlines, but the utter destruction of Israel. This land, brought into being by the United Nations declaration in 1947, has, as Senator Kennedy reminded us, the right to exist.

May it never again be said of Catholics and Protestants that, faced with the potential destruction of the Jewish people, they answered with silence.

[BROTHER] AUGUSTINE CRAWFORD

[Rev.] VICTOR J. DONOVAN, C.P.

[Rev.] KENAN E. FRESON

[Sister] MARIA ROSE

KENNEDY, C.S.J.,

[Rev.] GERALD J. MURPHY

Tarrytown, N. Y., June 24, 1968

Israelis Say U.S. Avoided Plane Issue With Missiles

TEL AVIV, July 7 (AP)—Israeli defense circles were critical today of the United States decision to sell Israel more Hawks anti-aircraft missiles on credit.

Informed sources interpreted the missiles decision as "compensation" for the Pentagon's continued refusal to sell Israel 50 badly needed F-4 Phantom jets.

"They're avoiding the real issue," one informant said.

"The Hawks are a good anti-aircraft defense, but the Phantoms are what Israel really needs."

The United States has already supplied Israel with 72 batteries—each battery has four missiles—of Hawks. It is believed here that 128 more rockets will be sent, but there has been no official confirmation of the figures.

0072

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY JLN/ARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State

DEF 12-5-ISR

TELEGRAM

XR DEF 19-8 US-ISR

CONFIDENTIAL 120

PAGE 01 COPENH 05902 021328Z

54 47
ACTION GPM 04

INFO EUR 15, NEA 13, MC 01, ACDA 16, E 15, INR 07, AID 28, SS 25, NSC 10,

SP 02, L 03, CIAE 00, NSA 02, RSC 01, RSR 01, IGA 02, ID 13, AF 09, 167 W

R 021215Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1847
INFO DOD
USAFE, R & M FMC WIESBADEN AB
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 5902

JOINT EMBASSY/MAAG MESSAGE

1. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM USAFE
R & M FMC WIESBADEN AB.

A. "FOR ECONOMIC DEFENSE OFFICER. REQUEST CLEARANCE FOR THE SALE
OF 289 MACHINE GUNS, CAL. 30, AND 41 MOUNT TRIPODS TO THE GOVT OF
ISRAEL FOR A PRICE OF \$8.00 EACH. PROPERTY IS LOCATED IN ARMY
DEPOTS COPENHAGEN AND JUTLAND. INFO ASAP."

2. IN VIEW UNUSUAL SENSITIVE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND LACK
ADEQUATE INFORMATION HERE GOVERNING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ARMS
SALES TO ISRAEL, REQUEST GUIDANCE.

3. AS GENERAL POLICY, DANISH GOVT DOES NOT PERMIT ARMS
EXPORTS TO ANY AREA WHERE CONFLICT TAKING PLACE OR IMMINENT.
DESPITE GREAT SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL DURING 6-DAY WAR THERE
WOULD PROBABLY NOW BE ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION IF THE MUNITIONS
SALE TO TROUBLED AREAS BECAME KNOWN.

4. EMBASSY ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEPT APPROACHED DANISH GOVT
RE PROPOSED SALE OF HELICOPTERS ALLEGEDLY BOUND FOR A
BELLIGERENT AREA (NIGERIA). COPENHAGEN'S 1076. DANES
PRESUMABLY WOULD OBJECT TO SHIPMENT DIRECTLY FROM DENMARK
TO ISRAEL OF SURPLUS MAP EQUIPMENT. WHITE

CONFIDENTIAL

*Copenhagen 5902
8/12/68*

CLASSIFIED BY 1234

0073

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY JEA NARA Date 12/5/05

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DEF 12-5 ISR
217122

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

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Origin

~~ACTION~~ USUN IMMEDIATE

Info

STATE
FOR BALL
OC/T: Please repeat EXDIS Amman 6086 dated
August 8, 1968 to above addressee.

End

Def 12-5 Jan

22/6/22

RUSK

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Drafted by:

IO: NHF Frisbie:fw

8/8/68

5248

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

IO - Norman H. Frisbie

S/S - Mr. Brown

SECRET

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0074

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96400
BY J4 INARA Date 12/5/05

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 795

PAGE 01 STATE 217122

43
ORIGIN SS 10

INFO /010 R

DRAFTED BY: IO - NHFRISBIE
APPROVED BY: IO - NORMAN H. FRISBIE
S/S - MR. BROWN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 217122

EXDIS

FOR BALL

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION TO SECSTATE, AUGUST 8, FROM AMMAN:

QUOTE

S E C R E T AMMAN 6066

EXDIS

SUBJECT: NEW JET AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAELI

SUMMARY: THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO EVALUATE PROBABLY CONSEQUENCES ON US INTERESTS IN JORDAN OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SALE OF PHANTOM JETS TO ISRAEL AND TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVES FOR THE HANDLING OR THE TIMING OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT IF A DECISION TO SELL IS INESCAPABLE. END SUMMARY

1. WE APPRECIATE THAT IN ANY ARMS SUPPLY SITUATION THERE ARE VARIOUS FACTORS OF TIMING, ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY OR NON-AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SUPPLY THAT MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. WE ARE AWARE OF HOW THESE FACTORS ARE INVOLVED IN THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR PHANTOM AIRCRAFT. WE RECOGNIZE THE ISRAELI REQUEST IS BASED ON A STATED NEED TO MEET ANTICIPATED QUALITATIVE AND

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QUANTITATIVE MILITARY AIRCRAFT DEFICIENCIES IN THE 1970-71 TIME FRAME. WE ARE AWARE OF THE UNLIKELIHOOD THE FRENCH GOVT WILL RELAX ITS EMBARGO ON SUPPLYING MIRAGE AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. MEANWHILE, WE HAVE READ VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES WITH REGARD TO SOVIET SUPPLY AND TRAINING OF UAR AND OTHER ARAB AIR FORCES INDICATING POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN ARAB CAPABILITIES TO EXPLOIT THEIR QUANTITATIVE SUPERIORITY.

2. IT HAS SOMETIMES BEEN SAID THAT US MISSIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE TENDED TO EXAGGERATE THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF US MILITARY AND OTHER TYPES OF ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND THAT IN THE ACTUAL EVENT WE HAVE ALWAYS MANAGED TO LIVE THROUGH THE ARAB REACTIONS. IN FACT, WE HAVE USUALLY ESCAPED THE TYPE OF EXTREME REACTION THAT LED THE ARABS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO BREAK WITH THE FRG WHEN THE GERMAN TANK DEAL LEAKED IN EARLY 1965. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS NO ESCAPING THE CONCLUSION THAT EACH TIME THERE HAS BEEN SUCH A DEAL WE HAVE LOST SUPPORTERS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND DEEPEENED THE CONVICTION OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF ARABS THAT THE US IS BASICALLY UNSYMPATHETIC TO ARAB INTERESTS. WHATEVER THE DEGREE OF EPHEMERALITY OR SUPERFICIALITY OF PREVIOUS ARAB REACTIONS TO US ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL, CERTAINLY NO ONE WOULD ARGUE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN GOOD FOR OUR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. TODAY THERE IS A MUCH DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST THAN HAS EXISTED AT THE TIME OF OUR PREVIOUS ARMS DEALS WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL IS IN OCCUPATION OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF ARAB TERRITORY, PEOPLED BY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF ARABS. LEAVING ASIDE THE MERITS OF THE JUSTIFICATION ADVANCED BY ISRAEL FOR REPRISAL RAIDS, THE FACT IS THAT ISRAEL OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS HAS USED ITS AIR POWER IN SEVERAL LARGE-SCALE RAIDS INTO JORDANIAN TERRITORY, LITERALLY WITHOUT AERIAL CHALLENGE OR RESPONSE ON THE PART OF EITHER JORDAN OR THE OTHER ARAB STATES. THE SUPPOSED ARAB AIR SUPERIORITY TO WHICH ISRAELI AMBASSADOR RABIN REFERRED IN HIS RECENT STATEMENTS IS WHOLLY MEANINGLESS AS REGARDS JORDAN. IN NOT A SINGLE INSTANCE SINCE THE JUNE WAR HAS AN ARAB AIRCRAFT RISEN TO CHALLENGE THE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT THAT HAVE REGULARLY USED JORDANIAN AIR SPACE, NOT ONLY FOR RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES, BUT, AS IN THE SALT RAID,

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PAGE 03 STATE 217122

TO DROP BOMBS, ROCKETS, AND NAPALM ON VARIOUS JORDANIAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TARGETS. THE LOCAL PRESS HEADLINED THE FACT THAT "AMERICAN-SUPPLIED SKY HAWKS" WERE USED IN THIS LAST RAID. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THERE ARE SOME JORDANIANS WHO RECOGNIZE THE FEDAYEEN AS THE CAUSE OF THESE ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS, THE VOICES OF SUCH PEOPLE ARE LESS AND LESS TO BE HEARD IN JORDAN. THE GENERAL REACTION IN JORDAN HAS BEEN HUMILIATION, DESPAIR, ANTI-PATHY TOWARDS THE HASHEMITE REGIME, AND TRANSFERRED HATRED OF THE US BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

4. AT THE SAME TIME THE US AND THE MORE INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE SC HAVE CONTINUED TO GIVE STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT TO THE NOV 22 SC RESOLUTION AND THE EFFORTS OF AMB JARRING AND OTHERS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS. AMB JARRING HAS JUST BEGUN RENEWED EFFORTS TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS IN HIS MISSION BEFORE THE AUTUMN UNGA SESSION. WE GATHER BOTH FROM PUBLIC MEDIA AS WELL AS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLACED SOME LIMITS ON ITS WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY ADDITIONAL ARMS TO THE UAR AND HAS INDICATED IT EXPECTS THE UAR TO WORK TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

5. IT IS IN THIS GENERAL CONTEXT THAT WE FEEL OBLIGED TO PUT ON RECORD THAT WE BELIEVE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A DECISION TO SUPPLY PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL WILL HAVE A SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH JORDAN. SPECIFICALLY, IT WILL DO DAMAGE TO THE CREDIBILITY OF BOTH OUR STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE HASHEMITE REGIME AND OUR STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE JARRING MISSION.

6. IT WOULD BE RASH TO TRY TO PREDICT THE VARIOUS FORMS THAT JORDANIAN REACTIONS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE, MIGHT TAKE. WE SIMPLY DO NOT KNOW. WHILE WE HOPE THAT PUBLIC DISORDER IN JORDAN COULD BE HELD IN CHECK, WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ARMED FEDAYEEN IN THIS COUNTRY. SIMILARLY THE EFFECTS ON JORDAN'S OFFICIAL POLICY ARE PROBLEMATIC. AS DEPT IS AWARE, JORDAN IS NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH OUR ARMS PACKAGE. WHETHER JUSTIFIED OR NOT, THERE CONTINUES TO BE WIDESPREAD GRUMBLING THAT THE US ARMS PACKAGE IS GREATLY INFERIOR TO WHAT JORDAN MIGHT OBTAIN FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE REGIME'S

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PRESENT DEPENDENCE ON SUBSIDIES FROM SAUDI ARABIA, LIBYA AND KUWAIT, PLUS CONTINUING RESENTMENT (WITH CONSEQUENT EFFECTS ON OUR POTENTIAL LEVERAGE) OF THE WAY WE HANDLED THE LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AND THE SUSPENSION OF BUDGETARY SUPPORT COULD HAVE UNPREDICTABLE EFFECTS ON THE REGIME'S FREEDOM OF MANEUVER IN RESISTING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES TO TAKE A MORE ANTI-AMERICAN LINE OR TO RESIST POPULAR REACTION AGAINST THE US. WHERE THIS POTENTIAL SITUATION WOULD LEAVE US IN TERMS OF OUR ABILITY OF CONTINUE TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP IN POSITIVE DIRECTIONS TOWARD THE MAKING OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS OPEN TO QUESTION. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT OUR ALREADY SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED CREDIBILITY AND RECEPTIVITY IN JORDAN COULD BE DIMINISHED TO AN EVEN GREATER EXTENT.

7. WE THEREFORE FEEL OBLIGED TO RELATE THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO US NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN JORDAN. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT, AS FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED, OUR OBJECTIVE OF TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE PARTIES TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. SINCE OUR SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES IN JORDAN ARE ALL LINKED TO OUR LARGER OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING ABOUT AN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, IT SEEMS TO US THE SUPPLYING OF PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL REMAINS OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION.

8. IF, HOWEVER, THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF ISRAEL ARE CONSIDERED OVER-RIDING IN THIS INSTANCE, WE WOULD STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ACCOMPANY A DECISION TO SUPPLY THESE AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. CONSIDERING THE GROWTH IN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL'S POSITION, KEEPING SECRET A DECISION TO SUPPLY PHANTOMS MIGHT BE DIFFICULT, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE POSSIBILITY SHOULD AT LEAST BE EXPLORED. WHEN IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SHOWN THEY CAN KEEP SECRETS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, PRESSURES FOR ACTION NOW RPT NOW ON PHANTOMS ARE SAID TO BE JUSTIFIED BY LEAD TIMES INVOLVED, WITH THE PLANES THEMSELVES NOT EXPECTED TO BE ACTIVE IN ISRAEL'S INVENTORY UNTIL 1970-71 IN ANY EVENT. WE WONDER IF IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO TAKE SOME OF THE PRELIMINARY STEPS ON ITS OWN INCLUDING PRODUCTION PLANNING OR ORDERS, PERHAPS TAKING ACCOUNT OF ISRAELI CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS, IN ORDER TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE SIGNIFICANT LEAD TIME LOSSES. WITH

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PAGE 05 STATE 217122

APPROPRIATE SECRET ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL ON FUTURE CONTINGENCIES FOR SUPPLY, WE WOULD HOPE PRESSURES BEING GENERATED FOR EARLY PUBLIC COMMITMENT COULD BE RELAXED.

9. IN THE EVENT THAT THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES ARE NOT PERSUASIVE AND COMPELLING, AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT PHANTOMS IS INEVITABLE, WE HOPE THE TIMING AND NATURE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT CAN BE SUCH AS TO LESSEN THE IMPACT IN JORDAN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

10. THE TIMING CERTAINLY SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EMOTIONAL RESIDUE OF THE AS-SALT RAID AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE, SIMILAR RAIDS. IT WOULD PUT THE US IN A VERY INVIDIOUS POSITION IF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WERE MADE WITHIN, SAY, THE NEXT THIRTY DAYS; OR IF THE ISRAELIS USED HEAVY AIRPOWER IN A SIMILAR RAID SHORTLY AFTER SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT. WE WOULD HOPE WE COULD GET SOME ISRAELI GUARANTEES ON THE LATTER ASPECT.

11. FOR SIMILAR REASONS, THE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT, IF ANYTHING, DEVELOPS FROM A SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION OR DEBATE ON THE AS-SALT AFFAIR.

12. SEVERAL KEY PERIODS BETWEEN NOW AND THE UNGA CHRISTMAS RECESS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY UNSUITABLE FOR SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT (E.G., (A) WHILE JARRING IS CONFERRING WITH THE ARABS IN THE AREA; (B) WHILE RIAD OR RIFAI, OR BOTH, ARE IN NEW YORK, WHEN OPPORTUNITIES FOR SPECIAL NEGOTIATIONS OR TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS ARE AT LEAST A REMOTE POSSIBILITY; (C) NOVEMBER 22 RESOLUTION ANNIVERSARY DATE AND THEREABOUTS; OR (D) FOR THAT MATTER, AS LONG AS JARRING HAS NOT ADMITTED DEFEAT.)

13. AS FOR THE NATURE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, ASSUMING TIMING PROBLEMS SOMEHOW COULD BE RESOLVED, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF IT WERE ACCOMPANIED BY SOME COMBINATION OF THE FOLLOWING:

- A) A UNILATERAL ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF JORDAN;
- B) A STATEMENT OF US INTENTIONS AS REGARDS JERUSALEM (E.G., WE WOULD FAVOR INTERNATIONALIZATION IF SATISFACTORY

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ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT OFFERED HUSSEIN);
C) A TOKEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL;
D) A US INTERPRETATION OF ANY UNDERSTANDING WE HAD GOTTEN
FROM ISRAEL AS TO MODALITIES OR AIMS IN A SETTLEMENT
(WHICH COULD BE REGARDED AS ISRAELI "GIVE")
E) A DIPLOMATICALLY PHRASED US EXPLANATION THAT ISRAELI
STUBBORNNESS ON THE ROAD TO A SETTLEMENT WOULD CAUSE US
TO REVIEW OUR DECISION; OR
F) A PUBLIC REITERATION OF US SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY AND CONTINUING INDEPENDENCE OF THE JORDANIAN
REGIME; PLUS
G) ISRAELI ADHERENCE TO THE NPT AND IRONCLAD GUARANTEES
ON INSPECTION OF DIMONA.
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

DEF 12-5 ISR

KA POK 27 ARAB-ISR

SECRET 182

PAGE 01 PARIS 09809 011638Z

ACTION EUR 20

INFO NEA 13, ACDA 16, MC 01, GDP 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07,
L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03,
AID 28, IO 13, MM 01, RSR 01, 162 W

R 011615Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9132
AMEMBASSY TELAVIV 325

SECRET PARIS 9809

MAURICE SCHUMANN, WHOM I SAW TODAY AT LUNCH, TOLD ME THAT DE GAULLE'S POLICY TOWARDS THE DELIVERY OF ARMS TO ISRAEL WAS BASED ON PRINCIPLE IN THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT RPT NOT DELIVER ANY ARMS TO ANY COUNTRY WHICH WERE NOT FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES; THAT IN THE JUNE WAR THE ISRAELIS HAD TAKEN THE OFFENSIVE AND HAD VIOLATED THIS PRINCIPLE AND THAT THEREFORE THERE COULD BE NO DELIVERY OF ARMS TO ISRAEL UNTIL THERE WAS A COMPLETE PEACE SETTLEMENT.

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 9809 SECRET
I TOLD MAURICE SCHUMANN, WHOM I KNOW WELL, THAT I THOUGHT THIS WAS A MOST ELEGANT BIT OF SOPHISTRY; THAT ALL HAD TRIED, INCLUDING THE U.S. TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR BUT THAT AFTER THE ARAB ACTIONS I THOUGHT IT WAS RATHER A TECHNICAL POINT CONSIDERING ISRAEL'S GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION TO CHARGE THEM WITH OFFENSIVE WAR IN THE TRUE SENSE OF THE WORD.

SCHUMANN WAS OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO SUPPORT GENERAL DE GAULLE'S POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST AND DID NOT ARGUE THE POINT WITH

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PAGE 02 PARIS 09809 011638Z

ANY CONVICTION;
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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1-17-68

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : NEA - Lucius D. Battle

SUBJECT: Messages to the Field on Israeli Aircraft
Request - ACTION MEMORANDUM

The telegram at Tab A is designed to serve two purposes: (1) it will provide talking points to assist our Ambassadors in Arab countries in placing in perspective our position on Israel's requests for aircraft, which have received considerable publicity since the Eshkol visit; and (2) it will lay the groundwork for an intensive effort on arms limitation with the Egyptians and possibly other Arabs. We will shortly submit follow-up messages for this purpose for your approval.

You have already cleared a companion piece to the telegram at Tab A, dealing with an approach to the Soviets on arms limitation, and we understand that the White House staff wants to put these two messages to the President at the same time.

The telegram at Tab B would inform key Ambassadors on an FYI basis of the size of our new A-4 commitment to Israel, about which there has been speculation in the press.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached telegrams.

Clearances:

AF - Mr. Root ((subs))

DOD - Mr. Schwartz ((subs))

IO - Mr. Sisco (subs)

SOV - Mr. Toon

SECRET

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
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BY S/S: CMS

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DEF 12-5-ISK
DEF 19-8-25-ISK

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Cleared White House (Saunders)
1/19/68 -

January 17, 1968

Telegram sent 1/19/68, 11:30 am, HNB

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

**CircTel re Promises to Prime Minister
Eshkol**

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~~CLASSIFICATION~~

0084

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 356

PAGE 01 STATE 101372

41
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01, 026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
NEA-MR. BATTLE, NEA-MR. DAVIES, AF-MR. ROOT (INFO), DOD-MR.
SCHWARTZ (DRAFT), SOV-MR. TOON, S/S-MR. WALSH, WHITE HOUSE-MR.
SAUNDERS

P 191722Z JAN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0590
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0759
CAIRO 1198
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0453
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0219
AMEMBASSY ADEN 0246
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0165
AMEMBASSY RABAT 0502
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0841
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0247
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0220
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0648
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2707
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2460
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0940
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1774
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

SECRET STATE 101372


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DEF 12-5 ISR
NR DEF 19-8 US ISR

DEF 12-5 ISR NR DEF 19-8 US-ISR

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 101372

EXDIS

REF: 101371.

FYI: UNDER EXTENSION 1966 AGREEMENT REFERRED TO IN REFTEL, OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL IS FOR SALE OF 30 SUBSONIC A-4 SKYHAWKS (INCLUDING SIX TRAINERS), IN ADDITION TO 48 BEING DELIVERED UNDER BASIC AGREEMENT. NO OTHER MILITARY SUPPLY COMMITMENT S
MADE DURING ESHKQL VISIT. END FYI.

GP-3. RUSK

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		Amembassy JIDDA	"
		Amembassy KUWAIT	"
		Amembassy ADEN	"
		Amembassy ALGIERS	"
		Amembassy RABAT	"
		Amembassy TUNIS	"
		Amembassy TRIPOLI	"
		Amembassy KHARTOUM	"

INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy MOSCOW
USUN NEW YORK
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

STATE

EXDIS

REF: 101371

FYI: Under extension 1966 agreement referred to in reftel, our commitment to Israel is for sale of 30 subsonic A-4 Skyhawks (including six trainers), in addition to 48 being delivered under basic agreement. No other military supply commitments made during Eshkol visit. END FYI

(17)

GP-3

End

RUSK

Drafted by:	1/16/68	Tel. Ext.	2942	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	The Secretary
NEA:IAI:ALatherton,Jr:fah:					
Clearance:					
NEA - Mr. Battle	<i>[initials]</i>	SOV - Mr. Toon	<i>[initials]</i>		
NEA - Mr. Davies	<i>[initials]</i>	S/S - Mr. Walsh	<i>[initials]</i>		
AF - Mr. Root (Info)		White House - Mr. Saunders			
DOD - Mr. Schwartz (draft)	<i>[initials]</i>	SECRET			

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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DEF 12-5 JSR

DEF 1718 45-2 SR

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M ✓ 6		OUTGOING 101372 XXXXXXXX		
S/S Chron. File - No's 8 and 9		DATE 1/17/68		
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S/AH		EXCOM		
ACDA		CIA 16		
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Pol 7: Ser

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SECRET 322

42 Def 12-5 Ser

PAGE 01 LONDON 00567 191700Z

41
ACTION SS 70

INFO MM 01, /071 W

R 191600Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1291
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 379
DOD WASHDC

S E C R E T LONDON 5677

LIMDIS

DOD FOR ISA/OSD

SUBJ: ESHKOL'S LONDON VISIT

REF: LONDON 5676 - Pol 7 Ser
for Pol 27 Zeman

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 5677 S E C R E T
1. BRIG. GENERAL ZAMIR, ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE,
PROVIDED EMPROFF TODAY WITH DEBRIEF ON ESHKOL'S
STOPOVER HERE ON 17 JANUARY. ZAMIR SAID THAT WHILE
ATMOSPHERICS WERE GENERALLY GOOD, SHORT DURATION OF
VISIT, COMBINED WITH GOVT'S PREOCCUPATION WITH DEBATE
ON BUDGETARY CUTS, HAD NOT PERMITTED TIME FOR EXTENSIVE
SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGES.

2. ZAMIR, WHO SAID THAT HE PARTICIPATED IN ESHKOL
SCHEDULE THROUGHOUT, CONTENDED THAT MILITARY HARDWARE WAS NOT
TOUCHED UPON BY ESHKOL IN VIEW OF FACT THAT
BRITISH, WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF CHIEFTAN TANK, HAVE
LITTLE NEW OF INTEREST TO GOI. ON MATTER OF CHIEFTAN,

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London - 5677
1-19-68

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BY JAC NARA Date 12/5/05

37-

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~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

STATE

EXDIS

1. According NYTimes January 13, (a) President Johnson promised Prime Minister Eshkol QTE more American Skyhawk A-4 fighter-bombers to help Israel maintain her military superiority over the Arab states UNQTE, (b) details not yet worked out but additional planes would probably number about twenty, (c) no commitment made on Israeli request for fifty F-4 Phantoms, QTE most advanced

Drafted by: 1/16/68
NEA:IAI:ALatherton, Jr:fah:

Tel. Ext. 2942

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

The Secretary

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Battle
NEA - Mr. Davies
AF - Mr. Root (info)
DOD - Mr. Schwartz (draft)
S/S - Mr. [unclear]
IO - Mr. Sisco (subs)
White House - Mr. Saunders
SOV - Mr. Toon
U.S.

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

0090

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
DATE 12/5/05

101371

DEF 12.5 JSE

XPOL 27 APR 68 JSE

Page 3 of telegram to AMMAN, etc

CONFIDENTIAL
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restraint on part of Soviets and those countries which receive arms from them. We hope Soviets can be brought to understand full weight and significance of this fact. Whether situation remains stabilized will also depend on whether there is movement toward peaceful settlement as envisaged in November 22 Security Council resolution and Jarring Mission, or retrogression toward view that countries of area must prepare for another military round.

D. In talks with Eshkol, while putting aside for time being question of significant new arms supply to Israel, we emphasized need to explore, flexibly and imaginatively, all paths to peace. Joint statement at conclusion visit expressed Israeli as well as USG support for Nov. 22 Security Council Resolution and Jarring Mission. We shall continue use our influence with Israel to give top priority to search for peace. We count on Arab Governments similarly to make constructive use of present opportunity to help Jarring Mission develop momentum toward peaceful settlement.

GP-3

End

RUSK

FORM DS-322A
8-63
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 791

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03080 230621Z

ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

ACTION COPY

R 221645Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4433

CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN 3080

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY FOR MRN ONLY

SUBJ: SKYHAWKS FOR ISRAEL

REF: STATE 101371-6412.5 Jan

1. IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN. KHAMMASH AND POSSIBLE CONTACTS WITH JORDANIAN AMB SHARAF, DEPT SHOULD KNOW THAT I HAVE DECIDED FOR PRESENT IT INADVISABLE TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH GOJ OFFICIALS HERE RE OUR DECISION SUPPLY ADDITIONAL SKYHAWKS TO ISRAEL. I WILL OF COURSE DRAW ON REFTEL IF SUBJECT RAISED WITH ME BY GOJ OFFICIALS.

2. PLEASE ADVISE IF SUBJECT DISCUSSED WITH KHAMMASH OR SHARAF.

3. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT OTHER ADDRESSEES REFTEL.
GP-3

SYMMES

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Amman 3080
1-22-68

DEF 12.5 JSR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 23 AM 3 28
DC/1

0093

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O		SUBJECT		
G		Skyhawks for Israel		
G/PM				
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S/AH				
ACDA		CIA	✓ 18	
E		SEC'Y DEFENSE	✓ 19	
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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1369

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

SECRET

TREAT AS EXDIS

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to the Minute of a Meeting between Deputy Secretary of Defense Dinstein of Israel and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance of the United States Government of 2 June, 1966 referring to the supply of A-4 Aircraft, Materiel, Equipment and Services.

The Ambassador of Israel has the honor further to refer to the conversations between His Excellency, the President of the United States and His Excellency, the Prime Minister of Israel on 7 and 8 January, 1968.

Pursuant to these conversations, the Ambassador of Israel has the honor to request that an additional 40 A-4 aircraft of the type now being delivered to Israel be added. Of these it is requested that 28 be one-seater models and 12 two-seater models.

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration and esteem.

Washington, D.C.
January 26, 1968.

DEF 12-5 ISR

Deftel 101372
DEF 12-51SR
XR DEF 19-845-ISR

0095

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BY JAC INARA Date 12/5/05

9/2
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EXDIS

2-2-68

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel and has the honor, in reply to the Ambassador's note of January 26, 1968, to state the following.

DEF 12-5 ISR
XK DEF 19-8 US-ISR

Pursuant to the conversations between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel on January 7 and 8, 1968, and to the agreement for the sale of A-4 aircraft, support equipment, and services, embodied in the Minute of the Meeting on June 2, 1966, between Deputy Minister of Defense Dinstein of Israel and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance of the United States, the Government of the United States agrees to sell Israel an additional 40 A-4 aircraft of the type now being delivered. For the Government of the United States, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations has responsibility for negotiating the detailed terms of sale and delivery with representatives of the Government of Israel.

DEF 12-5 ISR

Department of State,
Washington,

Drafted by:

Cleared by:

NEA/IAI:GBLambrakis:cr:1/30/68 NEA/IAI: Mr. Atherton

NEA: Mr. Davies
OSD/ISA:Mr. Schwartz
OSD/ISA/ILN: Mr. Manolas
OSD/GC: Mr. Hero
NEA/RA: Mr. Sober(info)
S/S -

Cabled
FEB 2 1968 AM

0096

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BY 161 NARA Date 12/5/05

SECRET

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel and has the honor, in reply to the Ambassador's note of January 26, 1968, to state the following.

Pursuant to the conversations between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel on January 7 and 8, 1968, and to the agreement for the sale of A-4 aircraft, support equipment, and services, embodied in the Minute of the Meeting on June 2, 1966, between Deputy Minister of Defense Dinstein of Israel and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance of the United States, the Government of the United States agrees to sell Israel an additional 40 A-4 aircraft of the type now being delivered. For the Government of the United States, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations has responsibility for negotiating the detailed terms of sale and delivery with representatives of the Government of Israel.

Department of State

Washington

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DEF 12-5 15R

Handwritten signature

0097

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3. Transmitted by: Wend
Date: 1968 FEB 2 PM 5 41
4. Received by: _____
Date & Time: _____
5. Description: Note from Amb. of Israel dtd Jan. 26 and our reply
6. Clsfn & Controls: SECRET/EXDIS
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57 Def 12-5 ISR
Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 174

PAGE 01 281128Z

7

ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01, FILE 01, /032 W

R 271435Z JAN 68
FM CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4323

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 1476

EXDIS

STATE 101371

1. I GAVE HIGHLIGHTS REFTEL TO EL AISSY OF FONOFF ON JANUARY 22 WHEN I WENT TO SEE HIM ON ANOTHER MATTER.

2. ON JANUARY 27 I REVIEWED POINTS CONTAINED IN PARA 2 REFTEL AT SOME LENGTH WITH HASSAN SABRI EL KHOLI OF PRESIDENCY AND LEFT WITH HIM PARAPHRASE OF POINTS A AND D. EL KHOLI WAS QUITE RECEPTIVE TO THIS APPROACH. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD RELUCTENCE USG INTRODUCE TO ME SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SUCH AS PHANTOM JET. HE SEEMED TO SEE WISDOM IN U.S. READINESS BRING ABOUT A PAUSE IN AREA ARMS RACE IF SOVIETS AND COUNTRIES SUPPLIED BY THEM WERE OF LIKE MIND.

3. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IN MAKING ITS COMPUTATIONS OF MILITARY BALANCE IN AREA, USG SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 1476 C O N F I D E N T I A L
ISRAEL EMERGED FROM JUNE WAR WITH ITS MILITARY MACHINE VIRTUALLY INTACT. MOREOVER, ISRAELIS HAD CAPTURED LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARAB MILITARY EQUIPMENT. ARABS, ON OTHER HAND, WERE STARTING FROM VIRTUALLY ZERO. HE SAID THAT UAR ALONE

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1968 JAN 28 AM 7 27
DC/T

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1/31
Cairo 1476
1-27-68

0100

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BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 281128Z

HAD LOST THIRTEEN THOUSAND VEHICLES IN SINAI.

4. HE SAID HE HOPED USG COULD CONVINCE ISRAEL THAT FOR FIRST TIME IN ITS TWENTY YEARS OF EXISTENCE IT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH THE ARABS. HE FELT THAT IF ISRAELIS COULD BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THIS, PROGRESS THROUGH JARRING TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT COULD BE FAIRLY QUICKLY ACHIEVED.

BERGUS

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By JEA NARA Date 12/5/05

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

120230

24 Feb 68 02 03z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

PRIORITY

Info:

INFO: Amembassy BEIRUT
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK
Amembassy LONDON
CAIRO
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy ADEN
Amembassy KUWAIT
Amembassy PARIS

STATE

EXDIS

REF: Amman 3547 (NOTAL - being repeated info addressees)

SUBJ: Beirut Newspaper Story - Phantoms for Israel

1. Situation re aircraft for Israel remains as outlined

STATE 101371 Jan 19 and you may privately assure GOJ

accordingly.

2. If queried re Beirut press story, Dept will reply as follows and posts may do the same: QTE USG position on arms to Israel remains as stated in January 8 Joint Statement.

Beirut press story entirely speculative UNQTE. If queried re allegations about Dayan visit, we will reply QTE We understand

that DefMin Dayan had planned a private visit to the US but

Drafted by: NEA:IAI:JHB:hti:
ALATHATON, Jr: fah: 2/23/68

Tel. Ext. 2942

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearance:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Wiley

IO/UNR - Mr. Day (info)

S/S - J. Davis

NEA/UAR - Mr. Bovis

USIA/IAN - Mr. Kennedy (subs)

NEA/ARP - Mr. Brewer

NEA/P - Mr. Brown

DOD/ISA

Cmdr. C. E. (subs)

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P/ON - Mr. C. Patch

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8-65

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120230

DEF 12.5 JSR
XRPOL 7 JSR

0103

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DATE 12/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to AMMAN PRIORITY

SECRET
Classification

that he has now decided not to come at this time UNQTE.

3. Dept feels issuance public denial at this time will be in neither USG nor GOJ interests, as flurry caused by announcement resumption arms sales to Jordan has diminished and this could again agitate entire issue. Further, Beirut story has not yet surfaced here.

GP-3

End

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
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DEF 12-5 ISR

153468

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

DEF 19-16 USSR
UAR

26 APR 68 01 10z

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Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

INFO.: USUN NEW YORK

STATE

LIMDIS 013

1. Evron called Davies 25th on instructions to register protest at appearance of information concerning Israeli missile contract with Dassault included in New York Times story on Near East arms by Hedrick Smith which appeared 24th. Noted information which considered in sensitive category by GOI attributed American officials.
2. Davies replied Department concerned at this reference as well as information on Soviet resupply operation and on alleged provision surface-to-surface missile to UAR which Smith attributed to U.S. ~~sources. Said~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ such reports created problems for USG domestically and with respect relations both Arabs and Israel.
3. Davies said on reading Smith article he had strongly imparted Bureau's concern to other sections of Department and to other agencies of government. Because Israel as open society shared similar problem with press, GOI would appreciate difficulties both of preventing tendentious leaks of this nature and of tracing them down.

153468

Drafted by: NEA:RPDavies:lab 4/25/68 Tel. Ext. 2107 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:
IAI - Mr. Atherton (info)
DOD/ISA (info)
S/S - Mr. Shepard

INR (info)
P (info)

White House
Mr. Saunders
(info)

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0106

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DATE 12/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy TEL AVIV

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4. Davies said such information very closely held within Department and other agencies and that Evron could assure GOI Department deplored and would continue attempt to prevent leakage.

END

GP-3

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BY JAC NARA Date 12/5/05

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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165386
22082
16 MAY 68 21 29z
USE ONLY

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV

Info:

EXDIS

STATE

REF: Tel Aviv 3570

Subj: Anti-Infiltration and Mines

1. In absence any Israeli Embassy follow-up to report Israel withdrawing its request for mines contained reftel, Department officer (Atherton) raised question with Counsellor Yaish in course latter's call at Department on another matter May 15. Deptoff said we assume Bitan's remark to Ambassador Barbour constitutes withdrawal of request. Yaish reacted with surprise, saying he had heard nothing along this line from Jerusalem. He said he would check into it. (Deptoff did not mention that he had learned earlier from DOD that in telephone conversation previous day Military Attache General Geva had ducked issue with statement his Embassy simply not pushing request for mines at this time).

2. Short time after departure of Yaish, Minister Evron called Deptoff to register ~~concern~~ ^{concern} ~~something in the air~~ ^{concern}. He asked if we specifically refuse to make decision on mines until Embassy Tel Aviv has been given briefing

Drafted by: NEA/LAI:GBLambrakis:cr:5/15/68

4967

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

NEA/LAI - Mr. Atherton *GBL* (draft)
DOD/ISA - Mr. Evans (subs) *GBL*
IO/UNP - Mr. Day (info) *GBL*
L/NEA - Mr. Wehmeyer (info) *GBL*

s/s - Mr. Meehan *fm*

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DEF 12-5 JSR

0108

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Page 2 of telegram to TEL AVIV

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requested (State 150845). Deptoff confirmed this was our position, since we felt
on
we needed more information/which to base decision. He said he wished to emphasize
that we continue favor principle of static anti-infiltration defense. There are
many ways to apply this principle, and we would like to look at way GOI has chosen.
He read Evron last substantive sentence of instructions contained State's 150845
which stressed that our request was QUOTE purely exploratory to enable us make
decision UNQUOTE. Evron then stated that to best his knowledge GOI has not rpt
not lost interest in obtaining these anti-personnel mines, but could not accept
that request for mines should be linked to briefing. He indicated he would report
conversation and seek instructions.

3. In view uncertainty that has developed, request Embassy obtain clarification
this matter from GOI. In case there is doubt, Embassy may reconfirm that we continue
to desire thorough briefing about Israeli border anti-infiltration program and are
grateful for Bitan's assurance that GOI will be pleased to arrange it.

GP-3

END

RUSK

0109

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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SECRET

Classification

165725

23248

B

16 MAY 68 23 16z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Info:

STATE

EXDIS

Minister Evron informed DeptOff today that, in response to Israeli Embassy report of conversations with DeptOff May 15 re Israeli request for mines, he had received comment from Bitan making following points:

A. GOI has not withdrawn request for mines; it is simply not prepared to link that request to USG request for detailed ~~XXXXXX~~ briefing on how mines and other anti-infiltration devices and equipment will be used.

B. GOI will be happy to buy mines from US and request should be considered still pending.

GP-3

End

RIISK

Drafted by: NEA:IAI:ALAtterton,Jr:fah:

Tel. Ext. 2942

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances: 5/16/68

S/S - Mr. Shepard

DOD/ISA - Mr. Murray (info)

IO/UNP - Mr. Day (info)

L/NEA - Mr. Wehmeyer (info) SECRET

Classification

FORM DS-322 8-65

Row

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S/S-S-CMS	<u>29-30</u>	Serial No.	<u>165725</u>	Dpty
S/S-O	<u>11</u>	Date	<u>May 16, 1968</u>	
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS		
S	<u>✓</u> <u>4</u>	AF		
U	<u>✓</u> <u>5</u>	ARA		
M	<u>✓</u> <u>6</u>	EA		
G	<u>✓</u> <u>7</u>	EUR		
G/PM		NEA <u>✓✓</u>	<u>14, 15</u>	
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES		
S/AL		White House <u>✓✓</u>	<u>2, 3</u>	
S/C		Vice President		
S/P		Defense <u>✓</u>	<u>16</u>	
		CIA		
		NSA		
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		Treasury		
E		State Rep <u>✓</u>	<u>17</u>	
H		ACDA		
INR		AID		
IO <u>✓✓</u>	<u>10, 12</u>	AID/VN		
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167085

USE ONLY

20 MAY 68 21 03z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Info:

STATE

EXDIS

During conversation with Battle May 17, Ambassador Rabin raised question of Israeli request for anti-personnel mines, asking when Israel might expect USG response. Was our request for briefing on Israeli anti-infiltration plans a condition did not like putting our relationship on this basis and for response on mines? Battle said he preferred different formulation; we needed information on how mines were to be used in context overall anti-infiltration plans to enable us reach decision. This did not seem to us to be unreasonable request. Rabin said he unable to understand our point and commented that it seemed to him IDF was best judge of precise way mines would be used. He could assure us mines would be used only on West Bank of Jordan, including occupied territory. Evron reiterated position stated earlier that Israel could not agree that briefing we had requested should be condition for decision on mines. Evron passed off without answering

Drafted by: *PM*
NEA:IAI:ALAtherton, Jr:fab.

Clearances:

5/18/68

Tel. Ext. 2942

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Lucius D. Battle

S/S - Mr. Meehan *fm*

IO/UNP - Mr. Day (info)

DOD/ISA - Mr. Schwartz (info)

L/NEA - Mr. Wehmeyer (info) SECRET

FORM DS-322
8-65

Classification

167085

DEF 12-5 JSR

REL 27 APR 68 JSR

0114

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DATE 12/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to TEL AVIV

SECRET
Classification

Dept officer's question whether decision on mines was Israeli
condition for providing briefing.

GP-3

End

RISK

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

SECRET
Classification

0115

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S/S-O	11	Date <i>5/20/68</i>	
<i>cmn. Rep 35</i>			
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	4 24	AF	
U	5 23	ARA	
M	6 22	EA	
C	7 21	EUR	
G/PM	10	NEA <i>16-17</i>	
S/AH	1A	OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AL		White House <i>2+3</i>	
S/C		Vice President	
S/P		Defense <i>18</i>	
		CIA <i>19</i>	
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S/S-S-CMS	<i>29-30</i>	Serial No. <i>167085</i>	<i>Secy</i>
S/S-O	<i>11</i>	Date May 20, 1968	
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	<i>/ 4</i>	AF	
U	<i>/ 5</i>	ARA	
M	<i>/ 6</i>	EA	
G	<i>/ 7</i>	EUR	
G/PM	<i>/ 10</i>	NEA <i>16-17 / /</i>	
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 556

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03810 221140Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 221100Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3893

SECRET TEL AVIV 3810

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BATTLE

SUBJECT: ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES ETC

REF: STATE 167085: TEL AVIV 3799

1. I EARNESTLY SOLICIT YOUR INTERCESSION INTO THE PROBLEM WHICH HAS ARISEN AND IS APPARENTLY STALLING SOMEWHERE PROGRESS ON OUR SUPPLY TO THE ISRAELIS OF ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES, ETC.

2. THE SITUATION IS SET FORTH IN SOME DETAIL IN TEL AVIV 3799 BUT THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO INDICATE THAT MY OWN FEELING IN THE MATTER IS CONSIDERABLY STRONGER THAN REFLECTED THERE.

3. SUMMARIZED BRIEFLY WE DEVOTED A LOT OF EFFORT OVER A LONG PERIOD TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO RELY INCREASINGLY ON STATIC DEFENSE TO COUNTER INFILTRATION TO REPLACE THEIR SINGLE MENDED RELIANCE ON EVER INCREASING LARGE SCALE RETALIATORY EXCURSIONS INTO JORDAN. WE SUCCEEDED TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY AGREED TO CONSULT WITH US ON FEASIBLE ANTI-INFILTRATION SYSTEMS, A LONG SERIES OF COMPLICATED TECHNICAL STUDIES AND REPORTS ENSUED, AND AS A RESULT THE ISRAELIS CAME UP WITH THREE TYPES OF DEVICES THEY WERE PREPARED TO BUY. FINAL APPROVAL OF SALE HAS HOWEVER BEEN STYMIED. I RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS WE CONTINUOUSLY CITED RESERVATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT JOINT STUDIES DID NOT COMMIT THE US TO MAKE ANYTHING AVAILABLE. HOWEVER THE FACT OF OUR INITIATIVE IN THE PROJECT AND THAT THE STUDIES

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Authority NND 96900
By J6 NARA Date 12/3/05



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TELEGRAM

26

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 03810 221140Z

HAVE REVEALED MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON THE UTILITY OF CERTAIN DEVICES SEEMS TO ME TO JUSTIFY ISRAELI EXPECTATION THAT THEY WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.

4. NOW IN RECENT WEEKS THE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAS ALSO REQUESTED A NUMBER OF MINES WHICH WOULD ALSO BE USED AGAINST INFILTRATORS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN LATCHED ONTO AS AN EXCUSE TO POSTPONE APPROVAL OF THE WHOLE WORKS, AND THE DEVICE BEING UTILIZED IS THAT WE WANT A BRIEFING ON THE WHOLE ANTI-FILTRATION DEFENSE PICTURE BEFORE ACTING ON ANYTHING. SUCH A BRIEFING IS OF ITSELF REDUNDANT. OUR MILITARY CAN ON THE BASIS OF THEIR OWN RECONNAISSANCE PROVIDE ANY ESSENTIAL INFORMATION WE MIGHT NEED AS TO THE SITUATION ON THE CEASEFIRE LINES. ALSO THIS IS KNOWN TO THE ISRAELIS AND MAKES THE REQUEST FOR A FORMAL BRIEFING IN THE ABSENCE OF APPROVAL FOR THE SALE OF THE HARDWARE TRANSPARENTLY SUSPECT AS A DEVIATION TACTIC.

5. ALL THIS INEVITABLY RAISES QUESTIONS IN THE ISRAELI MINDS OF OUR GOOD FAITH WHICH COULD, I DON'T SAY WILL, ADVERSELY AFFECT AT LEAST THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING SEVERAL OTHER PROJECTS, WHICH WILL BE KNOWN TO YOU, IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS ARE FULLY COOPERATING TO OUR GREAT BENEFIT.

GP-3. BARBOUR

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S/S-O	11	Date	MAY 22, 1968
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
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U	5 /	ARA	
M	4 /	EA	
G	7 /	EUR	
G/PM	10 /	NEA	13-14 /
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AL		White House	2 + 3
S/C		Vice President	
S/P		Defense	24 per mechanism
		CIA	15
		NSA	
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 290

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 03799 221930Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

PROJECT EGG ROLL

R 220820Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3890
OFF SEC DEF
DIA
DEPT ARMY
CINCSRIKE

SECRET TEL AVIV 3799

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CORRECTED COPY

SUBJECT: "EGG ROLL" ANTI-INFILTRATION AND MINES

- REF: 1. DIACO-60231 DTG 152214Z MAR 68 (NOTAL)
- 2. USDAO TEL AV 0861 DTG 091335Z MAY 68
- 3. SEC DEF 009051 DTG 151329Z MAY 68 (NOTAL)
- 4. STATE 165386
- 5. STATE 142978
- 6. STATE 150846
- 7. USDAO 0179 250712 JAN 68 (NOTAL)
- 8. USDAO 0751 241121Z APR 68

OSD FOR ISRAELN AND ARPA/AGILE DIA FOR DIACO
DA FOR DCSLOG

JOINT EMBASSY/DAD

1. EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO RELUCTANT ISRAELI AGREED TO PROCEED WITH PROJECT EGG ROLL ONLY AFTER QUOTE: BIG SELL UNQUOTE BY EMBASSY, USDAO AND ARPA/AGILE. WE WERE AT THAT TIME CONVINCED THAT STATIC BORDER DEFENSE SYSTEM WAS PREFERABLE TO ACROSS-THE-BORDER RETALIATORY EXCURSIONS. WITH CURRENT CHANGED BORDER SITUATION SUBSEQUENT TO SIX DAY WAR AND INCREASED BORDER VIOLATIONS, WE ARE EVEN MORE

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TEL AVIV 3799
5-22-68

DEF 125 JSR

VOL 27 HRAB JSR

0121

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DATE 12/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 03799 221930Z

FIRMLY CONVINCED OF SAME. ACCORDINGLY, WE REGRET DELAY IN APPROVAL OF SALE OF ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES TO ISRAEL AS DECIDED BY C/S BAR LEV (SEE REF 2) AND CONFIRMED BY REF 3. (REF 1 HAD LED US TO BELIEVE THAT ALL WAS PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY.)

2. CONTINUED DELAY IN SALE OF THESE DEVICES CAN BECOME DELETERIOUS TO ISRAEL'S PLANS FOR STATIC DEFENSE SYSTEM, AND IT WOULD BE CAUSE OF SOME EMBARRASSMENT TO US TO HAVE TO PUSH REQUEST FOR BRIEFING (REF 4) WITHOUT SOME INDICATION OF FAVORABLE DECISION ON SALE OF DEVICES. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WE SUGGEST FOLLOWING PROCEDURE:

A. USG INTEREST IN GOI INTENDED USE FOR MINES BE HANDLED AS SEPARATE MATTER FROM GOI REQUEST TO PURCHASE FIFTY STARLIGHT SCOPES, FIFTY MGID AND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY BREAK WIRE SETS AND THAT LATTER BE APPROVED FORTHWITH.

B. EVRON'S STATEMENT REPORTED IN REF 5 THAT MINES BE USED SOLELY IN CONNECTION WITH BORDER SEALING PROJECT AND WEIZMAN'S STATEMENT TO ME (REF 6) THAT MINES ARE INTENDED TO BE USED BETWEEN DOUBLE FENCING ON WEST BANK OF JORDAN, BE ACCEPTED.

3. IDF BRIEFING REPORTED IN REF 7 GAVE US SUMMARY OF EXTENSIVE US COOPERATION WITH GOI IN ANTI-INFILTRATION PROJECT EGG ROLL. FINAL REPORT OF EGG ROLL HAS BEEN FORWARDED BY DOD (ARPA) AND PASSED TO IDF. IT ALREADY CONTAINS MUCH SPECIFIC INFORMATION. ARPA/AGILE IN DOD CAN AMPLIFY GOI INTENDED USE OF EGG ROLL EQUIPMENT. IF, AFTER REVIEWING INFORMATION ALREADY HELD ON GOI ANTI-INFILTRATION PROGRAM, MORE INFORMATION IS REQUIRED, WE WILL ASK FOR BRIEFING.

GP-3. BAROUR

NOTE: HANDLED AS EXDIS PER SS/D

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 689

PAGE 01 TEL AV 03799 221027Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 220820Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3890
OFF SECDEF
DIA
UFPT ARMY
CINCSRIKE

SECRET TEL AVIV 3799

SUBJECT: "EGG ROLL", ANTI-INTEGRATION AND MINES

REF: 1. DIA (#) MAR 68 (NOTAL)
2. USDAO TEL AVIV 0861, DTG 0913351 MAY 68
3. SEC DEF 01051, DTG 151329Z MAY 68 (NOTAL)
4. STATE 165036
5. STATE
6. STATE 1508
7. USDAO 0179, 050712 JAN 68 (NOTAL)
8. USDAO 0751, 241121 APR 68

OSD FOR DIA AND ARPA/AGILE. DIA FOR DIACO.
DA FOR DCS/DA

JOINT EMBASSY/DAO

1. EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO RELUCTANT ISRAELI AGREED TO PROCEED WITH PROJECT EGG ROLL ONLY AFTER QUOTE EGG SELL UNQUOTE BY EMBASSY, USDAO AND ARPA/AGILE. WE WERE AT THAT TIME CONVINCED THAT STATIC BORDER DEFENSE SYSTEM WAS PREFERABLE TO ACROSS-THE-BORDER RETALIATORY EXCURSIONS. WITH CURRENT CHANGED BORDER SITUATION SUBSEQUENT TO SIX DAY WAR AND INCREASED BORDER VIOLATIONS, WE ARE EVEN MORE FIRMLY CONVINCED OF SAME. ACCORDINGLY, WE REGRET DELAY

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 03799 221027Z

IN APPROVAL OF SALE OF ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES TO ISRAEL AS DECIDED BY C/S BAR LEV (SEE REF 2) AND CONFIRMED BY REF 3. (REF 1 HAD LED US TO BELIEVE THAT ALL WAS PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY.)

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3. IDF BRIEFING REPORTED IN REF 7 GAVE US SUMMARY OF EXTENSIVE US COOPERATION WITH GOI IN ANTI-INFILTRATION

PROJECT EGG ROLL. FINAL REPORT OF EGG ROLL HAS BEEN FORWARDED BY DOD (ARPA) AND PASSED TO IDF. IT ALREADY CONTAINS MUCH SPECIFIC INFORMATION. ARPA/AGILE IN DOD CAN AMPLIFY GOI INTENDED USE OF EGG ROLL EQUIPMENT. IF, AFTER REVIEWING INFORMATION ALREADY HELD ON GOI ANTI-INFILTRATION PROGRAM, MORE INFORMATION IS REQUIRED, WE WILL ASK FOR BRIEFING.

GP-3. BARBOUR

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S-0.

AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
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H	5 / a	ARA	
M	6 /	EA	
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G/PM	10 /	NEA	13-14 / a
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AL		White House	2-3 //
S/C		Vice President	
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Classification

172728

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USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV

Info:

28 MAY 68 23 22z

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BATTLE

REF: Tel Aviv 3799 and 3810

SUBJ: Anti-Infiltration Devices

1. I understand your concern with regard to anti-infiltration equipment ordered by the Israelis as result of Project Eggroll and have been looking into the matter ~~(system)~~ with a view to reconciling our continuing priority interest in assisting Israel's anti-infiltration efforts with our concern over the status of the West Bank, as well as the separate Israeli request for a large number of anti-personnel mines, a type of weapon which was not involved in Eggroll testing and the exact Israeli use for which we have hoped to clarify. Our needs in this ~~regard~~ ^{regard} appeared to have been understood and accepted by the Israelis in their initial readiness to provide the briefing communicated to you by Bitan (Tel Aviv 3570) at which time he also indicated the GOI would drop its request for the mines.

2. Acting on that basis, we have approved, in concert with the Department of Defense, the release of detection devices and related equipment. We have

172728

DEF 12-5 JSR

Drafted by: NEA/IAI:GBLambrakis:cr:5/28/68

Tel. Ext. 4967

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA: Lucius D. Battle

Clearances:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

OSD/ISA - Mr. Schwartz (draft)

NEA/RA - Col. Fredericks (info)

G/PM - Mr. Junior (info)

S/S - Mr. Shepard

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

0127

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Page 2 of telegram to TEL AVIV

SECRET

Classification

also indicated our desire to have tests completed under the Eggroll agreement and our hope that the agreement can be extended to include testing of airborne detection devices if Defense finds this feasible.

3. The question of the mines has been complicated by our uncertainty, in the events which followed Bitan's statement above, as to whether the Israelis wished to pursue the matter or not (State 153158, 165386, 165725 and 167085, inter alia). Your latest messages would indicate that the Israelis wish to pursue this request for the mines, but are reluctant to provide the full-scale briefing we requested. You should make clear that we still wish the briefing, but in the meantime we have taken action to release the Eggroll devices ordered and to review the issue of mines as a separate matter, which indeed it is, on the assumption that they will not be used on the East Bank.

GP-3

END

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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S/S-S-CMS <i>29-30</i>		Serial No. <i>172728</i>	Dpty
S/S-O		Date <i>5/28/68</i>	
<i>Mr. Reed 24</i>			
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	<i>4</i>	<i>22</i>	AF
U	<i>5</i>	<i>21</i>	ARA
M	<i>6</i>	<i>20</i>	EA
G	<i>7</i>	<i>19</i>	EUR
G/PM <i>10</i>		NEA	<i>13-14</i>
S/AH <i>34</i>		OTHER AGENCIES	
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S/C		Vice President	<i>25</i>
S/P		Defense	
		CIA	<i>15</i>
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

91

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05147 031251Z

43
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 031210Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5663
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 5147

EXDIS

REF: STATE 172646

SUBJ: ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES

1. EMBASSY FULLY CONCURS WITH DEPT'S POSITION THAT ISRAELI STRENGTHENING OF ITS STATIC DEFENSES IS FAR PREFERABLE POLICY TO REPRISALS OR COUNTER-TERRORISM. GOJ LEADERSHIP PRIVATELY HAS SPOKEN TO US APPROVINGLY OF THESE ANTI-FEDAYEEN MEASURES INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION OF FENCES AND EVEN LAYING OF MINE FIELDS ON WEST BANK.

2. WE ALSO AGREE THAT STATIC DEFENSE LINE CAN HAVE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, GOI REQUEST FOR OVER 400,000 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES RAISES QUESTION WHETHER SOME OF THESE MINES MIGHT BE SOWN ON EAST BANK. IN SUCH CASE USG COULD BE ACUTELY EMBARRASSED. JAA INFORMATION IS THAT IDF PATROLS ARE PERIODICALLY ATTEMPTING CROSS RIVER PROBES. THESE PATROLS IN PAST HAVE DONE SOME MINE LAYING. MOREOVER, EVEN IF MINES ARE LAID ONLY ON WEST BANK, MINE FIELDS ONCE LAID ARE NOT ALWAYS EASILY LOCATED FOR SUBSEQUENT REMOVAL. THIS COULD POSE PROBLEM IN GETTING AGRICULTURE IN A SUBSTANTIAL AREA OF WEST GHOR EVEN AFTER PEACEFUL CONDITIONS RETURN.

GP-3 SYMMES

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POL 27 ARAB-JSR XR DEF 12-5 JSR

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177708

6 JUN 68 20 03z

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV
INFO: Amembassy MOSCOW
Amembassy PARIS
USUN *NP*

STATE

EXDIS

1. During June 4 call on Rostow, Battle and Sisco (septel),
Ambassador Rabin raised Israeli request for F-4 Phantoms.

Asserting that Arab-Israel ratio in supersonic aircraft was now
4.5:1, as compared to 3:1 before June 1967 war, Rabin said GOI
unable to understand why it had not yet received positive reply
on Phantoms.

2. Rostow said we had again weighed in with Soviets on arms
limitation problem and had received vague reply to effect that
USSR might consider this question following Israeli withdrawal
from occupied territories. Phantom request now under active
review in USG.

3. Battle asked whether GOI thought recent developments in
France would have favorable effect on Mirage deal. Rabin

Drafted by: NEA/IAI:ALatherton, Jr.:mob

2942

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA Mr.-Eugene V. Rostow

Clearances:

NEA - Lucius D. Battle
S/S - Mr. Meehan *fm*

IO - Joseph J. Sisco *gg*

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8-65 DS-322

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177708

DEF 12-5 JSR

0132

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DATE 12/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Tel Aviv, Moscow, Paris, USUN

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expressed firm view that Mirages would not be delivered while DeGaulle remained in power. Israel had not canceled Mirage order because of questions re DeGaulle tenure and because cancellation would have freed Mirages for delivery to Iraq. Present situation was that Israel is now taking delivery of Mirages but cannot export them from France. French Government for its part had pressed Israel to cancel order, even offering to repay with interest full amount deposited by Israel.

GP-1

END

RUSK

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S/S-O	11	Date <i>6/6/68</i>	
<i>Mr. Reed 25</i>			
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	4 24	AF	
U	5 23	ARA	
M	6 22	EA	
G	7 21	EUR 15	
G/PM	10	NEA 16-17	
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G/PM	10	NEA	16-17
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AL		White House	2+3
S/C		Vice President	
S/P		Defense	18
		CIA	19
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DEF 12-5 LSR

177605

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6 JUN 68 17 16 Z

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Info:

INFO : Amembassy ROME

STATE

SUBJ : Helicopters for Israel

1. During June 4 call at Department, Israeli Ambassador Rabin referred to Israeli purchases of helicopters from Agusta-Bell, stating Israel had ordered 25, of which 21 already delivered, and was now seeking additional 20. GOI had information from Agusta that Department pressing it not rpt not to make sale. Department officer stated that there is problem of possible licensing irregularity which presently under review. Problem at this point between USG and Agusta-Bell and should not be interpreted as indication USG has taken decision against helicopter sales.
2. Counselor Yaish called at Department next day to clarify matter. He was told root of problem is that Department does not have record of ever having given assent to Agusta sale of 21 or 25 helicopters to Israel as Bell licensing agreement with Agusta requires. In fact, Bell representatives acting on Agusta's part had contacted Department last fall and had subsequently sent letter requesting such permission, but had then let the matter drop. It had not been revived after our blanket suspension on arms to the area was lifted in October, and next thing we heard was that helicopters arrived in Israel later in the year. Our Consulate in Milan presently seeking to clarify

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI:GBLambrakis:AIAtherton,Jr:piw 4967

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved NEA - Stuart W. Rockwell

Circulation:

G/PM-MC - Mr. Bowie (subs) GAC

EUR/AIS - Mr. Dozier (info) GAC

OSD/ISA - Mr. Evans (info) GAC

NEA/RA - Col. Fredericks (info) GAC

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BY JAC NARA Date 12/5/05

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situation with Agusta but so far unsuccessful in attempts contact responsible Agusta official. Perhaps Consulate will succeed in pinning/down soon. Otherwise, Israelis may wish to urge cooperation on Agusta in their own interest.

3. Yaish stated Israel has strong need for helicopters and helicopter equipment. GOI had not been aware of Agusta licensing difficulty or its connection to pending equipment requests. On other hand, he was gratified to learn that possible violation of license by Agusta is basis of our problem, rather than question of helicopters for Israel per se. He said Israel had placed order for 20 more helicopters with Agusta.

4. Department officers said Department has received no rpt no licensing request in connection with further 20 helicopters. Also reiterated to Yaish that no rpt no decision on question of helicopters and helicopter equipment for Israel had yet been taken, and nothing we are doing so far should be interpreted as US decision against helicopter sales to Israel.

5. When Yaish asked how GOI might assist in overcoming present difficulty, Department officers said it ^{would} be useful if GOI would provide us with dates on which the 21 helicopters arrived in Israel, and route they had followed to get there. Department has approximate idea of dates, and information which indicates third country was used as intermediary after Italian Government export license was granted. In addition, we might later want to suggest Israeli approach to Agusta if our own efforts unproductive.

RUSK

GP-3

END

~~xxxxxWhenYaishaskedxxxxxpossiblexxxxxsequencexxxxxdispleasurexxxxxmightxxxxx~~

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
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0137

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BY JEA DATE 12/5/05

Def 12-5 Jsr

183902

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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14 JUN 68 23 33z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS

Info

INFO : Amembassy TEL AVIV

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~~XXSAB~~
~~XXVNEED HOUSE~~

STATE

~~XXXXXX~~ EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. As pressure for sale of F-4 Phantoms to Israel mounts, French intentions re delivery of 50 Mirage 5s become increasingly important. Israelis are using non-delivery of Mirage 5s as major argument for early decision on F-4s. We believe (as obviously do the Israelis) that Mirage 5 is particularly well suited to Israel's need for a high performance aircraft with strike capability under conditions prevailing in the Near East. On the other hand, F-4 is one of most sophisticated strike aircraft in the world, introduction of which into Arab-Israel equation could have far-reaching repercussions.

2. Our impression is that Israelis and their supporters in France have of necessity accepted French embargo on delivery of Mirage 5s but have not abandoned belief it will be lifted at some point. It is ~~also possible~~ ~~also possible~~ ~~also possible~~

Drafted by: NEA/IAI: ~~GL~~ Lambrakis:pjw Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and
OSD/ISA: DPEvans ~~GL~~ classification approved by: NEA - William J. Handley ~~HA~~
Clearances: NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton ~~GL~~ Beigel ~~GL~~ INR - Miss Tait (draft) ~~GL~~
EUR/IBX - Mr. Anderson/Mr. ~~Reyd~~ (draft) CIA - Mr. Torrey (draft) ~~GL~~
G - Ambassador Bohlen (info) S/S - Mrs. ~~GL~~ Davis

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

0138

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS

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that one reason French Government willing and able to maintain embargo is awareness that Israel under no imminent air threat from Arabs.

3. Meanwhile, we understand fifty Mirage 5s paid for and production continues. Problem therefore involves (a) whether GOF under continuing domestic pressure to release aircraft; (b) how hard Israelis are currently pressing French (in view of their strong desire for F-4s); (c) whether French will release Mirage 5s if later Israeli need appeared urgent and real; and (d) whether French are hoping supply from elsewhere, such as US, will eventually relieve them of onerous decision.

4. As part of current, intensive review of this problem in State and DOD, we would appreciate best ^{Embassy} ~~XXXXXX~~/CAS estimate of status and possibilities of release of Mirages to Israel, including all information available on following points:

- A. In view of conflicting reports about number of Mirage 5s for Israel already produced, what is our best estimate status of production?
- B. Are training and test flights by Israeli personnel continuing?
- C. In view of pressures and/or technical considerations, is it feasible for French to maintain embargo for another 6-12 months without breach of contract, diversion, or other difficulties?
- D. Is current internal situation likely to affect French policy on this matter?
- 5. It would also be helpful if Embassy could provide available information on arrangements under which Australia assembles Mirage III, particularly whether French Government retains veto on Australian third country resales.
- 6. Finally, request Embassy comment on the advisability and possible timing of a high-level approach to French Government on release of Mirage 5s. Should we emphasize

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[trouble US having with F-4 request, dangers of an escalated Near East arms race, and
fact that US has no desire to replace France as principal supplier of Israeli Air
Force? Would French find persuasive the arguments that continued embargo gains them
little in the Arab world since Arabs have probably already assumed eventual release
of Mirages, and that Arabs probably need French more at present than vice versa?
7. While we appreciate problem caused by present situation in France, we would
nonetheless like reply ASAP.

GP-3

END

RUSK

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S/S-O	<i>Mr. Read 25</i>	Date <i>6/14/68</i>	
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	<i>4</i>	AF	
U	<i>5</i>	ARA	
M	<i>24</i>	EA	
G	<i>7 23</i>	EUR <i>13</i>	
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G/PM	✓ 10	NEA ✓ 14-15	
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PAGE 01 TEL AV 04250 251322Z

44
ACTION SS: 30

INFO: /030 W

R 251011Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4108

S: E C: R E: T TEL AVIV 4250

EXDIS: 7

SUBJECT: PHANTOMS FOR ISRAELI

1. DURING CONVERSATION YESTERDAY IN WHICH HE COVERED A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS REPORTED SEPARATELY FONMIN EBAN TOOK OCCASION TO REITERATE ISRAEL'S CONTINUING INTEREST IN OBTAINING F4 PHANTOMS. HE REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT WITH ESHKOLI LAST JANUARY AND COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH AS PROMISED ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENT C1 STILL BEING KEPT UNDER US REVIEW, SIX MONTHS HAVE PASSED. MEANWHILE HE STRESSED INCREASED SOVIET SUPPLIES TO EGYPT, SOVIET STEPPED UP PILOT TRAINING OF EGYPTIANS AND THAT FRENCH EMBARGO ON MIRAGES REMAINS AS FIRM AS EVER.

2. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INFORMATION BEYOND THAT CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSION WITH ESHKOL IN JANUARY AND WAS CONSEQUENTLY NOT IN POSITION TO ADD ANYTHING TO STATEMENT IN COMMIQUE AT THAT TIME THAT ISRAEL'S NEEDS WOULD BE KEPT UNDER STUDY.

3. EBAN CONCLUDED THAT HE RAISED THE MATTER AT THE REQUEST OF PRIMIN ESHKOL WHO IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY EGYPTIAN-SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS WHICH ARE WIDENING DISPARITY BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI CAPABILITIES.

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28 JUN 68 00 07z

1. According preliminary transcript submitted Department for correction Paul Warnke (ASD/ISA) made following statements in June 20 appearance before Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

a. QUOTE Up to the present time the evaluation (of the threat facing Israel) has been that Israel has the military capability to defeat and, hopefully, to deter any renewal of aggression from its neighbors. Were that situation to change at any time, we certainly would be vitally interested in seeing to it that they regained or retained their military capability. UNQUOTE

b. QUOTE We still hope that France will supply those (50) Mirage Vs (which Israel has ordered from France and paid for). We think it would be desirable for France to continue as a major supplier to Israel, so that we avoid a polarization of the area between those who are customers of the Soviet Union alone and those who are customers of the United States alone. UNQUOTE

c. QUOTE (The supply of the Mirages)...is a factor which we will continue to study and review in determining ourselves what

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Drafted by:

AF/AFN:WLloyd:gr 6/27/68

Tel. Ext.

3543

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

AF/AFN - John F. Root

Clearances:

NEA/IAI:Mr. Lambrakis
(subs)

DOD/ISA:Miss White
(draft)

DOD/ISA:Mr. Bader
(draft)

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sort of equipment we should furnish Israel. UNQUOTE
wish to exclude
2. In response to question as to reason for ~~excluding~~ training
from sales and grant ceiling for Africa, Warnke said his thought
in that regard was that there might be requirements for countries
such as Morocco and Libya that would make it desirable to have the
further flexibility afforded by excluding training from the \$40
million ceiling.
3. Mr. Warnke's statements made in open session.
END. GP-

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

01

R 100725Z JUL 68
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4947

S E C R E T CAIRO 2880

EXDIS

1. THUS FAR GUAR PRESS REACTION TO HAWK MISSILE SALE TO ISRAEL HAS BEEN RELATIVELY RPT RELATIVELY RESTRAINED.
2. I DID GET A FIFTEEN MINUTE LECTURE ALONG PREDICTABLE LINES FROM OSMAN OF FONOFF YESTERDAY.
3. IT QUITE OBVIOUS PREOCCUPATION HERE IS OVER POSSIBILITY OF US MAKING PHANTOMS AVAILABLE TO ISRAEL. WE WOULD BE ILL ADVISED TO ASSUME ANYTHING LESS THAN A MAJOR DIFFICULTY FOR US INTERESTS IN THE UAR AND THE AREA IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.
4. I HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT MOST LIKELY SOVIET REACTION WILL BE PRESSURE ON UAR FOR MORE FACILITIES FOR DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR SURVEILLANCE AND NEUTRALIZATION OF US/ISRAELI FORCES IN THE AREA.
5. AS FOR UAR REACTION, IT WILL BE ONE OF TRYING TO STAY AHEAD OF AND TO EXPLOIT WAVE OF FEELING WHICH WILL ARISE IN ARAB WORLD.
6. THROUGHOUT THE YEARS I HAVE CONSISTENTLY SHUNNED THE "CHAMBER OF HORRORS" APPROACH TO US-UAR RELATIONS. PERHAPS I HAVE BEEN WRONG. IN 1956 I PARTICIPATED IN A DEPARTMENTAL GROUP WHICH LISTED ONLY AS NO. 3 THE POSSIBILITY THAT NASSER MIGHT TINKER WITH THE SUEZ CANAL IF WE WITHDREW THE ASWAN DAM OFFER. IN LATE 1966 - EARLY 1967, DURING THE STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN SOME KIND OF FOOD PIPELINE TO EGYPT, I AND OTHERS PROBABLY OVERLY-DISCOUNTED NASSER'S DESPERATION AND READINESS TO TAKE INCREDIBLE RISKS. I HAVE NO CERTAIN DIRE PREDICTION TO

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MAKE AT THIS TIME. BUT A PHANTOM DEAL WILL CREATE WIDESPREAD IF EVANESCENT WRATH IN ARABDOM AND NASSER WILL DO HIS BEST TO MAKE SOMETHING OF IT.

7. TROUBLING PRECEDENT WHICH KEEPS RECURRING TO MY MIND IS NASSER'S ACTION IN RE-NATIONALIZING SHELL OIL IN 1964 AFTER R.A. BUTLER'S SPEECH IN CANADA. HE COULD BE JUST FOOLISH ENOUGH TO DO SOMETHING TO US OIL INTERESTS IN UAR AND CHALLENGE OTHER ARABS DO LIKEWISE. THERE ARE MANY REASONS INDICATING SUCH AN ACTION WOULD BE IRRATIONAL, SELF-DESTRUCTIVE AND PERHAPS INEFFECTUAL. THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR NOT YIELDING TO BLACKMAIL, PARTICULARLY BEFORE IT HAS EVEN BEEN ATTEMPTED. FINALLY, THERE IS RECOGNITION THAT USG NO LONGER SO CONCERNED ABOUT PROTECTION OF PRIVATE AMERICAN INVESTMENT ABROAD AS IN PAST.

8. BUT FACT REMAINS THAT US PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN UAR IS THE ONLY MEANINGFUL AREA OF COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES AT PRESENT AND FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE. ONCE THIS GONE, SOVIETS WILL PRETTY MUCH HAVE IT ALL.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 12, 1968

SUBJECT: (1) Humphrey Statement (2) Hawk Missiles (3) Jarring Mission

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, Minister, UAR Interests Section, Embassy of India
Mr. Richard B. Parker, Country Director, NEA/UAR

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Note: The following is a summary of a number of conversations on the above subjects during the week of July 7-13.

HUMPHREY STATEMENT:

Ghorbal called on July 11 to say that he had heard on the radio reports that Vice President Humphrey was advocating the supply of F-4 jets to Israel. Was this a statement of USG policy or was it merely a campaign statement?

Parker said he had not seen the statement in question and would be unable to comment on it until he had. On the following day he informed Ghorbal that our public position on the statement was one of "No Comment". Privately, however, he could assure Ghorbal that our policy on the question of F-4's remained as set forth in the communique issued at the end of the Eshkol visit last January, i.e., we were continuing to review Israel's needs in the light of developments in the area. He could assure Ghorbal categorically, (a) as yet no decision had been taken to supply F-4's and (b) there was absolutely no truth to allegations that F-4's had already been delivered to Israel. With regard to the nature of the Humphrey statement, he would only point out that the Vice President had used the first person singular throughout and that the statement had been prepared for delivery at a campaign rally in California. Finally, it should be noted that the

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Vice President had talked in terms of jet aircraft without specifying type.

Ghorbal said he wished it made part of the record that he had again warned that a decision to supply F-4's would be a disaster. He hoped that if such a decision was taken we would give him a few hours warning so he could alert Cairo rather than having the UARG read about it in the newspapers. Parker promised to take this request into consideration.

HAWK MISSILES:

On July 7 Ghorbal called to express concern about reports we were supplying more Hawks to Israel. He noted that, coming at the time of Nasser's meeting in Moscow, this would be interpreted as a sign that we were defying the Soviets and rewarding the Israelis for their intransigence.

Parker said the missiles in question were purely defensive and rather unexciting. The UAR was well aware of the nature of these missiles, and had a large supply of similar missiles from the Soviets. They could be used only for anti-aircraft defense and could not be used as surface-to-surface missiles. He did not know why we had agreed to supply them at this particular juncture; timing was not one of the stronger points of the USG. Nevertheless, the supply of such missiles did not in any way represent a change in our arms policy. Nor did it affect our position on the F-4's. Our position remained as stated in the Eshkol visit communique.

JARRING MISSION:

On July 12 Parker noted that in our luncheon conversation with Muhammad Riad on July 8 the latter had been very careful in his phrasing of his response to Joe Sisco's question about the UAR's readiness to negotiate with the Israelis at some stage. At one point Muhammad had said categorically that the UAR would not agree to negotiate directly under any conditions. Subsequently, however, he had said, when Sisco posed the question differently, that he could not go beyond what Mahmoud Riad had told Jarring in Stockholm. Was there any particular significance to this latter remark?

Ashraf said we should not read anything special into Muhammad's phrase. The latter had been talking at great length and was getting fatigued. He had wanted to shut off the discussion and had therefore referred to Mahmoud Riad's statement which had been categorical that there could be no direct negotiations.

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Parker said that there seemed to be some confusion in this regard. According to the Israelis, Jarring had told Eban that Riad had said the possibility of direct negotiations at some later point was not excluded, depending on the progress Jarring made. Ghorbal said the Israelis were simply trying to throw dust in our eyes by making us think the Egyptians had begun to soften under their pressure. He could assure us categorically and unequivocally that no UAR government could accept negotiations with the Israelis. He had told us this before. He would tell us again. We should put it out of our minds. Forget it. Not mention it. Disregard all rumors to the contrary. It was an absolute impossibility.

Ghorbal subsequently called to read the text of Mahmoud Riad's report of his talk with Jarring. On this point, Riad had said direct negotiations were "impossible". (wa ashara ila istihalat...)

Ghorbal noted that the Egyptians had followed our advice and shown their willingness to talk substance with Jarring. Mahmoud Riad had made specific proposals which were now up for discussions. The Israelis had yet to come forward with anything specific in the way of substance. Were we putting pressure on them to do so?

Parker said we had been using our influence with both sides to get off their sterile discussion of procedures and get down to substance. We had said the same thing to the Israelis we had said to the Egyptians. As yet the Israelis had not been willing to get down to substance. They were stuck on direct negotiations and a peace treaty. He thought there was reason to hope, however, that there might be some movement in this regard.

Ghorbal asked about the Ball-Sisco-Atherton trip to the area. Was it Ambassador Ball's idea or had it been taken at the initiative of the White House? Parker said he did not know whose idea it had been. The idea had been in the air, as it were. In any event, someone as important as Ambassador Ball would not be going to the area without White House approval.

Ghorbal said he had urged that Mahmoud Riad agree to meet Ambassador Ball in Beirut. He had no indication as yet whether Riad would do so.

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SECRET 395

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12
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 080700Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6100

SECRET SECTION ONE OF TWO AMMAN 6066

EXDIS

SUBJECT: NEW JET AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAEL

SUMMARY: THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO EVALUATE PROBABLY CONSEQUENCES ON US INTERESTS IN JORDAN OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SALE OF PHANTOM JETS TO ISRAEL AND TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVES FOR THE HANDLING OR THE TIMING OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT IF A DECISION TO SELL IS INESCAPABLE. END SUMMARY

1. WE APPRECIATE THAT IN ANY ARMS SUPPLY SITUATION THERE ARE VARIOUS FACTORS OF TIMING, ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY OR NON-AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SUPPLY THAT MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. WE ARE AWARE OF HOW THESE FACTORS ARE INVOLVED IN THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR PHANTOM AIRCRAFT. WE RECOGNIZE THE ISRAELI REQUEST IS BASED ON A STATED NEED TO MEET ANTICIPATED QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MILITARY AIRCRAFT DEFICIENCIES IN THE 1970-71 TIME FRAME. WE ARE AWARE OF THE UNLIKELIHOOD THE FRENCH GOVT WILL RELAX ITS EMBARGO ON SUPPLYING MIRAGE AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. MEANWHILE, WE HAVE READ VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES WITH REGARD TO SOVIET SUPPLY AND TRAINING OF UAR AND OTHER ARAB AIR FORCES INDICATING POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN ARAB CAPABILITIES TO EXPLOIT THEIR QUANTITATIVE SUPERIORITY.

2. IT HAS SOMETIMES BEEN SAID THAT US MISSIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE TENDED TO EXAGGERATE THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF US MILITARY AND OTHER TYPES OF ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND THAT IN THE ACTUAL EVENT WE HAVE ALWAYS MANAGED TO LIVE THROUGH THE ARAB REACTIONS. IN FACT, WE HAVE USUALLY

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ESCAPED THE TYPE OF EXTREME REACTION THAT LED THE ARABS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO BREAK WITH THE FRG WHEN THE GERMAN TANK DEAL LEAKED IN EARLY 1965. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS NO ESCAPING THE CONCLUSION THAT EACH TIME THERE HAS BEEN SUCH A DEAL WE HAVE LOST SUPPORTERS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND DEEPENED THE CONVICTION OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF ARABS THAT THE US IS BASICALLY UNSYMPATHETIC TO ARAB INTERESTS. WHATEVER THE DEGREE OF EPHEMERALITY OR SUPERFICIALITY OF PREVIOUS ARAB REACTIONS TO US ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL, CERTAINLY NO ONE WOULD ARGUE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN GOOD FOR OUR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. TODAY THERE IS A MUCH DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST THAN HAS EXISTED AT THE TIME OF OUR PREVIOUS ARMS DEALS WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL IS IN OCCUPATION OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF ARAB TERRITORY, PEOPLED BY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF ARABS. LEAVING ASIDE THE MERITS OF THE JUSTIFICATION ADVANCED BY ISRAEL FOR REPRISAL RAIDS, THE FACT IS THAT ISRAEL OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS HAS USED ITS AIR POWER IN SEVERAL LARGE-SCALE RAIDS INTO JORDANIAN TERRITORY, LITERALLY WITHOUT AERIAL CHALLENGE OR RESPONSE ON THE PART OF EITHER JORDAN OR THE OTHER ARAB STATES. THE SUPPOSED ARAB AIR SUPERIORITY TO WHICH ISRAELI AMBASSADOR RABIN REFERRED IN HIS RECENT STATEMENTS IS WHOLLY MEANINGLESS AS REGARDS JORDAN. IN NOT A SINGLE INSTANCE SINCE THE JUNE WAR HAS AN ARAB AIRCRAFT RISEN TO CHALLENGE THE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT THAT HAVE REGULARLY USED JORDANIAN AIR SPACE, NOT ONLY FOR RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES, BUT, AS IN THE SALT RAID, TO DROP BOMBS, ROCKETS, AND NAPALM ON VARIOUS JORDANIAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TARGETS. THE LOCAL PRESS HEADLINED THE FACT THAT "AMERICAN-SUPPLIED SKY HAWKS" WERE USED IN THIS LAST RAID. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THERE ARE SOME JORDANIANS WHO RECOGNIZE THE FEDAYEEN AS THE CAUSE OF THESE ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS, THE VOICES OF SUCH PEOPLE ARE LESS AND LESS TO BE HEARD IN JORDAN. THE GENERAL REACTION IN JORDAN HAS BEEN HUMILIATION, DESPAIR, ANTI-PATHY TOWARDS THE HASHEMITE REGIME, AND TRANSFERRED HATRED OF THE US BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

4. AT THE SAME TIME THE US AND THE MORE INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE SC HAVE CONTINUED TO GIVE STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT TO THE NOV 22 SC RESOLUTION AND THE EFFORTS OF

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AMB JARRING AND OTHERS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS. AMB JARRING HAS JUST BEGUN RENEWED EFFORTS TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS IN HIS MISSION BEFORE THE AUTUMN UNGA SESSION. WE GATHER BOTH FROM PUBLIC MEDIA AS WELL AS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLACED SOME LIMITS ON ITS WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY ADDITIONAL ARMS TO THE UAR AND HAS INDICATED IT EXPECTS THE UAR TO WORK TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

5. IT IS IN THIS GENERAL CONTEXT THAT WE FEEL OBLIGED TO PUT ON RECORD THAT WE BELIEVE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A DECISION TO SUPPLY PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL WILL HAVE A SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH JORDAN. SPECIFICALLY, IT WILL DO DAMAGE TO THE CREDIBILITY OF BOTH OUR STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE HASEMITE REGIME AND OUR STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE JARRING MISSION.

6. IT WOULD BE JRSH TO TRY TO PREDICT THE VARIOUS FORMS THAT JORDANIAN REACTIONS, OFFICAL AND PRIVATE, MIGHT TAKE. WE SIMPLY DO NOT KNOW WHILE WE HOPE THAT PUBLIC DISORDER IN JORDAN COULD BE HELD IN CHECK, WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ARMED FEDAYEEN IN THIS COUNTRY. SIMILARLY THE EFFECTS ON JORDAN'S OFFICIAL POLICY ARE PROBLEMATIC. AS DEPT IS AWARE, JORDANI IS NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH OUR ARMS PACKAGE. WHETHER JUSTIFIED OR NOT, THERE CONTINUES TO BE WIDESPREAD GRUMBLING THAT THE US ARMS PACKAGE IS GREATLY INFERIOR TO WHAT JORDAN MIGHT OBTAIN FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE REGIME'S PRESENT DEPENDENCE ON SUBSIDIES FROM SAUDI ARABIA, LIBYA AND KUWAIT, PLUS CONTINUING RESENTMENT (WITH CONSEQUENT EFFECTS ON OUR POTENTIAL LEVERAGE) OF THE WAY WE HANDLED THE LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AND THE SUSPENSION OF BUDGETARY SUPPORT COULD HAVE UNPREDICTABLE EFFECTS ON THE REGIME'S FREEDOM OF MANEUVER IN RESISTING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES TO TAKE A MORE ANTI-AMERICAN LINE OR TO RESIST POPULAR REACTION AGAINST THE US. WHERE THIS POTENTIAL SITUATION WOULD LEAVE US IN TERMS OF OUR ABILITY OF CONTINUE TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP IN POSITIVE DIRECTIONS TOWARD THE MAKING OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS OPEN TO QUESTION. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT OUR ALREADY SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED CREDIBILITY AND RECEPTIVITY IN JORDAN COULD BE DIMINISHED TO AN EVEN GREATER EXTENT.

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INFO /030 W

R 080700Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6101

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF TWO AMMAN 6066/2

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: NEW JET AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAEL

7. WE THEREFORE FEEL OBLIGED TO RELATE THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO US NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN JORDAN. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT, AS FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED, OUR OBJECTIVE OF TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE PARTIES TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. SINCE OUR SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES IN JORDAN ARE ALL LINKED TO OUR LARGER OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING ABOUT AN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, IT SEEMS TO US THE SUPPLYING OF PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL REMAINS OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION.

8. IF, HOWEVER, THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF ISRAEL ARE CONSIDERED OVER-RIDING IN THIS INSTANCE, WE WOULD STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT NO PUBLIC ACCOUNCEMENT ACCOMPANY A DECISION TO SUPPLY THESE AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. CONSIDERING THE GROWTH IN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL'S POSITION, KEEPING SECRET A DECISION TO SUPPLY PHANTOMS MIGHT BE DIFFICULT, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE POSSIBILITY SHOULD AT LEAST BE EXPLORED. WHEN IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SHOWN THEY CAN KEEP SECRETS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, PRESSURES FOR ACTION NOW RPT NOW ON PHANTOMS ARE SAID TO BE JUSTIFIED BY LEAD TIMES INVOLVED, WITH THE PLANES THEMSELVES NOT EXPECTED TO BE ACTIVE IN ISRAEL'S INVENTORY UNTIL 1970-71 IN ANY EVENT. WE WONDER IF IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO TAKE SOME OF THE PRELIMINARY STEPS ON ITS OWN INCLUDING PRODUCTION PLANNING OR ORDERS, PERHAPS TAKING ACCOUNT OF ISRAELI CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS, IN ORDER TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE SIGNIFICANT LEAD TIME LOSSES. WITH

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
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ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT OFFERED HUSSEIN):
C) A TOKEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL;
D) A US INTERPRETATION OF ANY UNDERSTANDING WE HAD GOTTEN
FROM ISRAEL AS TO MODALITIES OR AIMS IN A SETTLEMENT
(WHICH COULD BE REGARDED AS ISRAELI "GIVE")
E) A DIPLOMATICALLY PHRASED US EXPLANATION THAT ISRAELI
STUBBORNNESS ON THE ROAD TO A SETTLEMENT WOULD CAUSE US
TO REVIEW OUR DECISION; OR
F) A PUBLIC REITERATION OF US SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY AND CONTINUING INDEPENDENCE OF THE JORDANIAN
REGIME; PLUS
G) ISRAELI ADHERENCE TO THE NPT AND IRONCLAD GUARANTEES
ON INSPECTION OF DIMONA.
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ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,1070 W

R: 031422Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6284
INFO DIA
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OSD/ISA

S E C R E T AMMAN 6446

LIMDIS

SUBJ: KING'S INTEREST IN REPORT OF U.S. 175MM GUNS IN ISRAEL

REF: USDAO AMMAN 0349 SEP 68

KING HUSSEIN ASKED ME TO REPORT URGENTLY TO WASHINGTON HIS INTEREST IN KNOWING WHETHER US HAS AGREED TO SUPPLY 175 MM ARTILLERY TO ISRAEL. HE SAID WHILE IN PAKISTAN HE OBTAINED INFORMATION THAT 175 MMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN RECEIVED BY ISRAEL. I TOLD THE KING GENERAL KHAMMASH HAD ALREADY RAISED THIS MATTER WITH DATT AND THAT WE HAD REQUESTED COMMENTS FROM WASHINGTON, WHICH I WOULD PROMPTLY PASS ON.

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0163

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
DATE 12/5/05

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DEF 12-5 25R
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

58 SEP 68 16 46z
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

INFO: CINCSTRIKE
Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE

REF: AMMAN 6446 (NOTAL)

L I M D I S

You may inform King Hussein that USG has not rpt not supplied
and has no rpt no agreement to supply 175mm artillery to
Israel. To the best of our knowledge, Israel does not rpt
not have 175mms in its inventory.

GP-3

END

MICROFILMED BY 65/4

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:MMWiley:dmg 9/5/68

3236

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA/ARN-Talcott W. Seelye

Clearances:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Leonard
NEA/RA - Col. Bunte
DOD/ISA - Col. Wix

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Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0164

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AUTHORITY: NND 96900
DATE: 12/5/05

44
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XR POL 27 AMAB-ISR
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification XR POL ISR-45

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Info

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN, USINT CAIRO, Amembassy LONDON, JIDDA
USUN NEW YORK

STATE

SUBJECT: Allon Visit

Following summary FYI only and NOFORN. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

SUMMARY:

Deputy Prime Minister Allon called on Secretary September 10 and urged USG decision soonest sell F-4 Phantoms to Israel as means deterring possible Soviet-inspired Arab aggression. Military deterrent only way to force Arabs talk peace. Asked about Israeli nuclear intentions Allon said Israel did not have nuclear weapons and he was authorized reiterate PriMin Eshkol's assurances that Israel would not be first to introduce new weapons into Middle East. Declared GOI had not yet signed NPT in order keep Egyptians uncertain as to Israel's capability. Allon said Israeli hopes for an SSM had vanished, declared MD-620 program dead and denied Israel currently making an SSM. Secretary suggested Israelis settle USS Liberty claims soonest and evacuate Tiran Island. According Allon, Liberty matter should be resolved in a few days. END OF SUMMARY

Drafted by

NEA/IAI: J. Leonard:pz

Tel. Ext.

4967

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

The Secretary

Clearances

NEA - Mr. Battle

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

S/S - Mr. Brown

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

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BY JKA NARA Date 12/5/05

52

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Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ROME

Info

STATE

REF: Rome 8360 /

1. Embassy may pass Presidency following in response request reported reftel.
2. UAR-Israeli Situation. Ambush incident on Canal August 26 and artillery exchange September 8 appear to have left Israel with feeling it came off second best in these actions and that it "owes" UAR reprisal. Israel nevertheless decided hold its military hand for time being and go Security Council route. We think several considerations figured in this decision. Probably among them was Czech crisis and GOI conclusion Israeli military reprisal at that time would divert world attention from Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. Also, Israelis ran into heavy criticism for excessiveness of their raid on Salt in August. Finally, Israelis aware importance that USG and other governments attach to continued progress Jarring's efforts and may have decided it best forego action which would clearly not have advanced his mission.
3. However, in Israeli eyes resolution that has emerged from Security Council "cannot be regarded as satisfactory outcome

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI:MStern:RParker:ks

Tel. Ext.

4523

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA-Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

IAI-Mr. Atherton

INR - Mr. Austin

AIS - Mr. Johnson

(subs)

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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BY J4 NARA Date 12/3/05



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

12978

SEP 24 1968

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: ~~The Under Sec.~~ S/S *GA*
FROM: NEA - William J. Handley *WJH*
SUBJECT: Recommendation of Approval of Israeli Request
for 12 Additional A-4H Skyhawk Aircraft -
ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

In our June 2, 1966 agreement for the sale of A-4H Skyhawks to Israel there is provision that the Government of Israel will have the further right to purchase A-4H aircraft to replace those lost in normal peacetime training. The agreement provides that these purchases will be the subject of separate arrangements. On August 5, 1968 the Israel Embassy, Washington, submitted a note formally requesting purchase of 12 A-4H aircraft in order to compensate for normal attrition requirements and in view of the expected cessation of the A-4H production line by April, 1970. (Douglas Aircraft Corporation has informed us that the order must be placed by the end of September 1968 to avoid a break in the production line which will add considerably to the cost.)

Under the terms of the June 2, 1966 agreement, subsequently amended, the Israel Government will have received a total of 88 A-4H aircraft in-country by January, 1970. Given this figure, the request for 12 additional aircraft for attrition requirements is not considered excessive.

Aside from its technical justification, the sale of these additional A-4H aircraft would not be expected to pose any new political problems for us in the Middle East and would avoid what could otherwise become a new if minor irritant in our relations with Israel.

SECRET

Group-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED BY 6582

① NEA/IAI: J D LEONARD
9-24-68

0167

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AUTHORITY NND 96700
BY *JK* NARA Date 12/5/05

SECRET

2

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum recommending that the President approve the sale of the 12 additional A-4H Skyhawk aircraft to Israel.

Concurrences:

NEA - Mr. Davies *rmD* NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton *JA*
NEA/RA - Mr. Sober *JA* G/PM - Mr. Chapman
OASD/ISA/NESA - Mr. Murray *JA*

Attachment:

1 - Draft Memorandum to the President

SECRET

NEA/IAI: JDLLeonard:cr:9/24/68 Ext. 4967

0 1 6 8

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BY *JA* NARA Date 12/3/05

DEF

12-5

ISR

10/1/68

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3/7/96 - [initials]

(Date and Reviewer's Initials)

The remaining material was declassified as of that date.

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/3/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin: ACTION: Amembassy ADEN IMMEDIATE
Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
Info: Amembassy BEIRUT "
Amembassy USINT CAIRO "
Amembassy JIDDA "
Amembassy KUWAIT "
Amembassy TEL AVIV "
Amembassy RABAT "
Amembassy ALGIERS "
Amembassy TUNIS "
Amembassy TRIPOLI "
Amembassy KHARTOUM "
Amembassy LONDON "
Amconsul DHAHRAN "
Amconsul JERUSALEM "
Amconsul BENGHAZI "
Amconsul CASABLANCA "

State

EXDIS

Deliver at opening of business December 27 to Chief of Mission:

1. There is a possibility that confirmation of an agreement to ~~sell~~ ^{sell} fifty Phantom F-4 aircraft to Israel may be made as early as noon December 27.
2. While we do not anticipate announcement will trigger violent reaction against American targets in Arab countries, you should be alert for any eventuality. Department believes worldwide attention focussed on return of Apollo astronauts may minimize press and radio play of Phantom story.
3. When timing is ~~determined~~ ^{determined}, you will be advised by Flash message.

END

GROUP 3

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA:RPD Davies:awi 12/26/68

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

P - Mr. McCloskey
DOD - Mr. Schwartz
USIS - Mr. Nalley
AFN - Mr. Root

S/S - Mr. Parker

SECRET

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 BY JKA NARA Date 12/5/05

37

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Classification

DEF 12-5 JSR

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DEF 19-8 US-JSR

7 DEC 68

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FOR ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN

Info:

Amembassy BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO

Amembassy JIDDA

Amembassy KUWAIT

Amembassy LONDON

Amconsul JERUSALEM

US MISSION USUN, NEW YORK

Amembassy TRIPOLI

Amembassy RABAT

Amembassy ALGIERS

Amembassy KHARTOUM

CINCSTRIKE

Amembassy TUNIS

STATE

EXDIS

1. During meeting with Israeli Ambassador Rabin December 4, Assistant Secretary Hart noted continuing press speculation that US-Israeli agreement for sale of F-4 Phantoms had been concluded. Hart said we wished for now to withhold official confirmation, inter alia because official announcement at this time that agreement had been reached could have adverse impact on atmosphere of Governor Scranton's current visit to Arab capitals. There was no objection, however, to GOI's responding to press inquiries about status of negotiations along lines

Drafted by:

NEA/IAI:ALatherton,Jr:mob

Tel. Ext.

2942

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Mr. Schwartz

XXAFN - Mr. Post

S/S - G-KELLY

AFNE - Mr. Schaefer

SECRET

Classification

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BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy TEL AVIV

SECRET

Classification

[of December 4 New York Times story this subject (septel). FYI: Present]
situation is that exchange of letters constituting basic agreement has
been signed but technical negotiations are still in progress. END FYI.

2. Rabin said GOI would of course abide by USG wishes. He personally
doubted, however, that this was best course. President had announced
two months ago that he had instructed Secstate to open negotiations.
Failure announce conclusion of agreement therefore inevitably generated
speculation about reasons for protracted delay. Hart said we could not
stop speculation but were addressing ourselves to question of official
confirmation which we wished to postpone for time being.

GP-3

END

RUSK

SECRET

Classification

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

0173

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DATE 12/5/05

NEG - LDBattle:eae
(DB Office and Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S/S
6/3/68

Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET/

8110

DATE: May 28, 1968

SUBJECT: Israeli Arms

PARTICIPANTS: Minister Ephraim Evron, Embassy of Israel
Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, NEA

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During a conversation on other subjects, Mr. Evron brought up the question of F-4 Phantom jets. He expressed the deep concern that Israel felt for its security and the hope that we would be forthcoming in providing the security Israel needed and that the Arabs must see. I said that at the same time the Arabs witnessed such a decision by us, so would the Soviets, and that the arms race might well be accelerated, which we wanted to avoid. So far the Russians have not gone above the armaments level of June 5 in any substantial (or qualitative) way. I doubted that any understanding could be reached with the Soviets concerning arms supply except in a de facto way. Consistent with the President's decision in January, I believed that we must wait to have a clear reading on the intentions of others. Mr. Evron said that if I meant the French it seemed clear that the Mirages on order would not be delivered. I said to Mr. Evron that I would be interested in knowing about the missiles, on which I did not believe they had come clean with us. Moreover, these missiles had a direct bearing on security problems in the area and I would be grateful for clarification. Mr. Evron replied that he had no knowledge of this matter and simply could not clarify the issue.

FORM DS-1254
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SECRET/

NEA: LDBattle:eae

GPO 908992

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~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

February 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Note in Reply to Israeli Request
for Additional A-4 Aircraft

In response to Mr. Saunder's request of
February 12 enclosed for White House clearance
is the revised draft of the proposed diplomatic
note responding to Ambassador Harman's note of
January 26 which requested additional A-4 air-
craft.

Mr. Saunder's memorandum of February 12
is enclosed for your files.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~

NEA/IAI:GBLambrakis:cr:2/14/68 Cleared by: NEA/IAI -
Mr. Atherton
NEA - Mr. Davies
Retyped in S/S-S:RHoudek:ej:2/14/68

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② PW for
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2/15/68

DEF 12-5 ISR

0177

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AUTHORITY NND 96000
DATE 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1369

שגרירות ישראל
ושיקגון

SECRET

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to refer to the Minute of a Meeting between Deputy Secretary of Defense Dinstein of Israel and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance of the United States Government of 2 June, 1966 referring to the supply of A-4 Aircraft, Materiel, Equipment and Services.

The Ambassador of Israel has the honor further to refer to the conversations between His Excellency, the President of the United States and His Excellency, the Prime Minister of Israel on 7 and 8 January, 1968.

Pursuant to these conversations, the Ambassador of Israel has the honor to request that an additional 40 A-4 aircraft of the type now being delivered to Israel be added. Of these it is requested that 28 be one-seater models and 12 two-seater models.

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration and esteem.

Washington, D.C.
January 26, 1968.

REF-12-5-ISR

*Ack: 1/30/68
via 1/41/68*

ASL

0178

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BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

21
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EXDIS

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel and has the honor, in reply to the Ambassador's note of January 26, 1968, to state the following.

Pursuant to the conversations between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel on January 7 and 8, 1968, and to the agreement for the sale of A-4 aircraft, support equipment, and services, embodied in the Minute of the Meeting on June 2, 1966, between Deputy Minister of Defense Dinstein of Israel and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance of the United States, the Government of the United States ^{has} agreed to sell Israel an additional 40 A-4 aircraft of the type now being delivered. [For the Government of the United States, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations has responsibility for negotiating the detailed terms of sale and delivery with representatives of the Government of Israel.]

DEF 12-5 ISR

Department of State,
Washington,

Drafted by:

Cleared by:

NEA/LAI:GBLambakis:cr:1/30/68 NEA/LAI: Mr. Atherton

NEA: Mr. Davies
OSD/ISA:Mr. Schwartz
OSD/ISA/ILN: Mr. Manolas
OSD/GC: Mr. Hero
NEA/RA: Mr. Sober(info)
S/S -

FEB 2 1968 AM

0179

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AUTHORITY NND 9600
BY JAC NARA Date 12/5/05

SECRET

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel and has the honor, in reply to the Ambassador's note of January 26, 1968, to state the following:

Pursuant to the conversations between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel on January 7 and 8, 1968, and to the agreement for the sale of A-4 aircraft, support equipment, and services, embodied in the Minute of the Meeting on June 2, 1966, between Deputy Minister of Defense Dinstein of Israel and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance of the United States, the Government of the United States has agreed to sell Israel an additional 40 A-4 aircraft of the type now being delivered. An agreement covering detailed terms of sale and delivery was concluded on January 31 between the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations acting on behalf of the Government of the United States and representatives of the Government of Israel.

Department of State,
Washington,

DEF 12-5 ISR

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BY JKA NARA Date 12/5/05

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1968

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR BEN READ

THROUGH: WALT ROSTOW OK

Before John Walsh left, he had passed the attached to me for clearance. Since the President had some question about the number of aircraft involved a week ago yesterday, we held off until that was resolved. Now I think it has been.

Since Defense has already signed the contract, I should think you would want to clear your response to Ambassador Harman's note.

I would have done this with John by phone, but in his absence, thought it might be easier to send this to you in writing.



Harold H. Saunders

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0181

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AUTHORITY: NND 96900
BY: J64 NARA Date: 12/5/05

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Category S/S 7

SECRET/

July 26, 1968

10585

MEMORANDUM FOR: S - The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: M - Eugene V. Restow

SUBJECT: Phantoms for Israel INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(Tab A)

Reading Luke's pro-con memorandum on the difficult problem of Phantoms for Israel, I come down on the side of acting now, perhaps in the form of the last sentence of the memorandum. I should add that we should start the training part of the exercise at once, to eliminate factors of delay if actual deliveries in 1970 do prove to be necessary.

(at clip) Since Luke wrote, several things have happened. To me, they reinforce the argument for acting now.

I'm afraid that the newspaper publicity about George Ball's trip, and some of our diplomatic conversations about it, may have given the Arabs (and the Russians) the sense that we are pushing the Israelis' hand, so that they can sit back and wait. Indeed, according to the last report we got from Amman (Amman 5865), Nasser has raised the ante again.

(Tab B)

In that perspective, and taking into account the hijacking episode and Soviet preoccupation in Czechoslovakia, the Phantoms should be a good signal to the UAR to proceed at once towards a settlement. It is indispensably important that the Arabs (and the Soviets) understand our firm intention to support a fair and evenhanded settlement, and a fair and evenhanded process of negotiation required to achieve it. Miscalculation on this point could in itself produce precisely the blow up we want to prevent.

(1) On the Israeli side, I think the Phantoms make sense as well. It is very likely that we shall have to commit the

SECRET/

M - Eugene V. Restow

0182

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BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

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-2-

planes anyway in connection with the military assistance bill. It is better to make the decision without coercion, and as part of the process of our overall cooperation with Israel. If we lose Israeli confidence, or create unnecessary suspicions, we may find it increasingly difficult to influence Israel towards moderation in the months ahead.

The Phantoms should be a factor for moderation in another sense as well. When the arms balance is precarious, Israel feels easily threatened, and tempted by the idea of a preemptive strike. It is our interest to avoid another blowup. With confidence in our support derived from an early decision on Phantoms, the Israelis might be less trigger-happy when the next round of episodes occurs.

The military situation is genuinely serious. The Arabs have too many planes, and too many modern planes. Their airfields are no longer easy targets. Too many of the Israeli planes are old and patched together. If a war does come, it will again be in our interest for Israel to win, and to win decisively.

It might conceivably be worth another round with the Soviets on the subject, on a pretty blunt "Phantoms or talks-with-Jarring" basis. I doubt it myself, but I wouldn't object to telling the Russians once more that we're tired of UAR stalling and double talk. The time has come to move.

Attachments:

Tab A - Mr. Luke's memorandum.

Tab B - Amman 5865.

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0183

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05

(21) 7/5/68
SECRET/EXDIS

F-4 Phantoms for Israel - The Pros and Cons.

THE REQUEST

Israel's request to purchase 50 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers from the U.S. is based on a present disparity in high-performance aircraft vis-a-vis the Arabs, which is expected to increase. Counting only their 50-55 presently serviceable French Mirage 3 aircraft as of a caliber to match MIG-21s and SU-7s, the Israelis say they have an alarming inferiority approaching 4-1 in high-performance interceptors compared to the Arab states around them. They point out that this disparity will grow much higher if Soviet deliveries continue to the Arabs while Israel is denied both the F-4s and the 50 Mirage-5s being built for them in France but under indefinite embargo.

OUR MILITARY ASSESSMENT

While not seriously disputing Israeli arithmetic, our intelligence and military estimates point out that account must also be taken of (a) the other aircraft in the Israeli inventory which were used effectively in the June Six-Day war, (b) the new A-4 Skyhawk strike craft we are providing Israel, which will total 88 by January 1970, and (c) the substantial qualitative superiority of the Israeli air force. The conclusion reached is a) that Israel is secure in all air force categories with the exception of high-performance fighter interceptors; b) that even in that category the disparity will not significantly affect Israel's ability to defend itself for at least another 18 months; and c) that the disparity would lose significance if during that time France lifted its embargo on the 50 Mirages currently being produced for Israel.

DEF 12-5 ISR

TIMING OF DELIVERIES

Based on these factors, arrangements have been made to assure delivery of 50 Phantoms beginning in January 1970 if a decision to provide them is made in December of this year.

SECRET/EXDIS

0184

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

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
This involves advance purchase of long lead-time components and could require borrowing of up to 1/4 to 1/3 of these aircraft from new production destined for U.S. inventories. All 50 would be delivered in 1970. A decision to begin deliveries earlier than January of 1970 probably would involve substantially more diversion from U.S. resources.

THE PROS FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW OF A DECISION NOW TO PROVIDE F-4s.

1. It is in the U.S. interest that Israel maintain a clear military capability to defend itself at all times. Whether 50 F-4s would help deter the Arabs from another military miscalculation such as last year's is problematical. At a minimum, however, it should convince the Arabs and the Soviets of the firmness of U.S. policy in support of Israel's security and signal our determination not to compromise on the essential principles of a just, durable and agreed peace settlement to assure such security.
2. Israel does face a growing gap in high-performance interceptors, and the U.S. will almost certainly need to help it replenish and modernize its present aircraft inventory eventually.
3. The French embargo could last a very long time.
4. A commitment now to provide the aircraft will provide Israel important psychological reassurance. By relieving Israeli doubts about the constancy of our support for them, it might make for less rigidity in their approach to a peace settlement.
5. The Soviets and Arabs may already have assumed that we shall be providing F-4s to Israel and privately discounted it.

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6. A decision will ease Congressional and public concern in the United States.

THE CONS

1. There has been no quantitative or qualitative jump on the Arab side so far to require F-4s for Israel, and our agreement in January to an increased number of A-4 Skyhawks (from 48 to 88) was intended to help meet Israel's short-term quantitative and modernizing needs.

2. A decision now would almost certainly become known and could adversely affect the outlook for peace through Ambassador Jarring, for a number of reasons:

a) it would reinforce Arab suspicions that Israel is not seeking peace but instead girding for more war. The Arabs already tend to see Israel as militarily stronger and expansionist-minded, and a further strengthening of its military capacity could engender a fatalistic pessimism among the Arabs about the prospects for a settlement to which they could agree.

b) it would reduce the credibility of our support for a peaceful settlement in Arab eyes; and

c) particularly in view of Premier Kosygin's July 1 proposal on Middle Eastern arms limitation, it would lend itself to exploitation by Soviet, Arab, and other information media - i.e., as the U.S. "warlike" response to the USSR's "peaceful" initiative. We would appear in the incongruous light of talking peace while being the first to introduce a new generation of aircraft into the Arab-Israeli area. For whatever reasons the Soviets have levelled off

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their shipments to the area, and such a move by us would have the appearance of starting a new cycle in the arms race.

3. The F-4 is known to be superior to the MIG-21 and the SU-7 both as a fighter and as a bomber; thus its presence in Israeli hands would set off new demands from the Arabs which the Soviets would eventually have to meet in some way, even though the Soviets do not now have available aircraft comparable to the F-4.

4. The French embargo might be lifted after the F-4 decision was made; once lifted, the Mirage 5s could become operational in Israel almost immediately, thus giving Israel a temporary "overkill" capacity and reinforcing escalatory demands from the Arabs. This would become even more alarming to the Arabs (and Soviets) if the French simultaneously lifted the embargo which we assume now applies also to the MD-620 medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic missile being developed for Israel by the same French company which produces the Mirages.

5. Judging by Nasser's foolhardy moves in May and June 1967, 50 F-4s more or less are unlikely to deter the Arabs from another threatening military move against Israel if less rational political factors lead in that direction.

6. For the foreseeable future, there is nothing the Israelis are likely to want from us more badly than these aircraft. We cannot of course bargain with Israel's security. While we are convinced that Israel's security is not in jeopardy, however, we have an opportunity to reach a decision on aircraft as part of a broader political strategy designed to advance the chances of a peaceful settlement. To make a

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commitment on F-4s outside of the context of such a peace strategy would deprive us of a potential inducement to Israel to demonstrate greater flexibility and imagination in the search for peace.

CONCLUSIONS

There are clearly compelling arguments pro and con a decision now on F-4s. Unpredictable psychological and political factors make it virtually impossible to judge whether, in the circumstances under which a decision was made and became public, the pros would outweigh the cons or vice versa. On the heels of Kosygin's disarmament "initiative", while Nasser's success in obtaining further arms commitments from the Soviets remains uncertain, and with the Jarring Mission at a critical stage, the present moment would appear particularly unpropitious for a decision in terms of Arab and world reaction. On the other hand it could, properly manipulated, be useful vis-a-vis Israel and domestically.

[In this connection, point number 4 under the pros and number 6 under the cons, while seemingly contradictory, are not necessarily mutually exclusive and suggest a possible solution to the dilemma. That solution would be to tell Israel now we are prepared in principle to go ahead on F-4s while deferring a decision on timing and the signing of contracts and seeking to minimize and obfuscate publicity.]

NEA/IAI:ALatherton,Jr:GBLambrakis:mob

Clearance: NEA - Rodger P. Davies (draft)

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,1070 W

R 241230Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6008
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USUN 1060

S E C R E T AMMAN 5865

LIMDIS

SUBJ: RIFAI REPORT ON DISCUSSIONS WITH NASSER AND RIAH

I. ON 24TH FONMIN GAVE ME BRIEF SUMMARY OF HIS MEETINGS WITH PRES NASSER AND FONMIN RIAH IN CAIRO AND PROMISED A MORE EXTENSIVE REVIEW IN NEXT FEW DAYS. RIFAI HAD HAD FIVE MEETINGS WITH RIAH AND A DETAILED TALK WITH NASSER. THE BASIC POINT THAT EMERGED FROM THESE DISCUSSIONS IS THE UAR'S INSISTENCE THAT NOT A SINGLE INCH OF ARAB TERRITORY CAN BE LOST TO THE ISRAELIS IN ANY SETTLEMENT. THIS APPLIES TO EVERY PIECE OF OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY, INCLUDING JERUSALEM AND GAZA. HE SAID BOTH NASSER AND RIAH FEEL THE UAR HAS ALREADY GONE TOO FAR IN PUBLIC POSITIONS IT HAS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO ACCEPTING THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION AND AGREEING TO IMPLEMENT IT. IN SPITE OF UAR ACCEPTANCE AND OTHER INDICATIONS OF UAR "MODERATION," ISRAEL HAS NOT MOVED ONE STEP FORWARD. ISRAEL IS STILL BARGAINING ON MODALITIES AND FORUMS OF AGREEMENT AND THE UAR FEELS IT CANNOT GO ANY FURTHER THAN IT HAS GONE. RIFAI SAID HIS TALKS IN CAIRO LED HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE OVER-OPTIMISM ON THE PART OF BOTH JARRING AND THE US WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE UAR ENGAGING IN JOINT MEETINGS AT SOME POINT. (AT THIS POINT I READ TO RIFAI FROM THE JULY 12 MEMCON OF PARKER'S CONVERSATION WITH GHORBAL ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. RIFAI SAID RIAH HAD TAKEN EXACTLY THE SAME LINE WITH HIM AND THAT, IN FACT, HE HAD LITTLE HOPE OF

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THE UAR AGREEING TO ANY FORM OF JOINT MEETINGS.)

2. I ASKED RIFAI IF THE UAR POSITION ON NOT GIVING UP "A SINGLE INCH OF ARAB TERRITORY" WAS NOT A RETROGRADE STEP IN HIS VIEW. I SAID I HAD EARLIER UNDERSTOOD THE UAR HAD INDICATED JORDAN WOULD BE FREE TO WORK OUT ITS OWN SUBSTANTIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL AND IN ARRIVING AT SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THERE MIGHT BE BORDER RECIFICATIONS INVOLVING SOME LOSS OR GAIN OF TERRITORY. RIFAI REPLIED THE DIFFERENCE WAS THAT AGREEMENT ON BOUNDARIES WOULD BE MUTUAL WHEREAS WHAT RIAD WAS REFERRING TO WAS JERUSALEM AND THE GAZA STRIP, OVER BOTH OF WHICH ISRAELI WAS ASSERTING SOVEREIGNTY UNILATERALLY. RIAD WAS EMPHASIZING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE "UNITY OF SOLUTIONS." THE RESOLUTION WAS A PACKAGE, NONE OF WHICH COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY ANY ARAB STATE IF THE ISRAELIS WERE LEFT IN OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES. (IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION RIFAI SAID THIS INCLUDED THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.)

3. RIFAI SAID ISRAEL'S PROCLAMATION OF THE UNIFICATION OF JERUSALEM AND WHAT HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO JORDAN BY BALLI WITH REGARD TO THE ISRAELI POSITION ON JERUSALEM ARE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO ALL ARABS. I COMMENTED THAT RIFAI HAS BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT IF ISRAELI INSISTS ON ITS PRESENT JERUSALEM LINE, JORDAN AND THE OTHER ARABS WOULD INSIST UPON INTERNATIONALIZATION AS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE. WAS THIS POSITION ON INTERNATIONALIZATION CONSISTENT WITH RIAD'S POSITION ON NOT GIVING UP ANY ARAB TERRITORY? RIAD REPLIED THAT OF COURSE IT WAS CONSISTENT BECAUSE THE OTHER ARAB STATES HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM AND, THEREFORE, THIS WOULD NOT MEAN GIVING UP OF ARAB TERRITORY.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE TWO QUESTIONS THAT EBANI HAD ASKED JARRING TO PUT TO THE UAR, RIFAI SAID THAT EVEN IF JARRING PUTS THEM TO THE UAR, HE DOUBTS THAT ANY PROCESS OF DISCUSSION WILL MATERIALIZE.

5. I TOLD RIFAI THAT I FOUND HIS SUMMARY OF THE CAIRO TALKS MOST DISCOURAGING. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT WHEN HE HAD A CHANCE TO BRIEF ME ON THE DETAILS I MIGHT BE EVEN MORE DISCOURAGED.

6. COMMENT: ON THE OTHER HAND, BRITISH AMB ADAMS, WHO SAW RIFAI EVEN MORE BRIEFLY THAN I IN CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER MATTER, SAID RIFAI HAD TOLD HIM THE TALKS IN CAIRO HAD GONE

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"PRETTY WELL" AND THAT HE WOULD BRIEF HIM IN A FEW DAYS. ADAMS.
AND I WILL COMPARE NOTES AS SOON AS WE GET DETAILS.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research
Memorandum

RAF-27, December 20, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject: The US Position in the Western Arab World

INR/RAF-27

The US has been heavily criticized in the Arab countries of Northern Africa because of its decision to sell F-4 Phantom jets to Israel. The advent of a new administration in Washington has, on the other hand, raised Arab hopes of a changed US attitude towards the Arab world. In this paper, we review the US position in Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and the Sudan) eighteen months after the Arab-Israel War of June 1967 and speculate on future prospects.

ABSTRACT

The Nadir. In the immediate aftermath of the Arab defeat in June 1967, US relations with the Arab countries of Northern Africa sank to their lowest point in the last decade. From the shock and disillusionment of defeat, North Africans awakened to a keener sense of their Arab identity, sharing the humiliation of their Eastern brethren. Like the Eastern Arabs they, too, looked for a scapegoat--and found one in the US. Our embassies in Tunis and Tripoli came under attack for several hours on June 5 while mobs demonstrated in the streets; in Benghazi the Embassy branch office was attacked and the staff narrowly escaped tragedy. Algeria and the Sudan broke diplomatic relations almost immediately--thus venting popular emotions. Of the moderate states, Libya was the most sorely tried. For several weeks law and order broke down, and the country seemed on the verge of widespread disorders, if not revolution. Operations at the US base at Wheelus Field had to be halted.

Ref 1 Arab-US

Ref 27 Arab-US
Ref 12-5 Arab-US
Ref 15 Arab-US

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GROUP 1

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DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State

TELEGRAM

DEF 12-5 JORDAN

SECRET 277

PAGE 01 AMMAN 07684 030714Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

R: 021429Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6859

S E C R E T AMMAN 7684

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

EXDIS

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: STATE 253744

1. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PALACE TO FORWARD FOLLOWING LETTER
FROM KING HUSSEIN TO THE PRESIDENT:
QTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I APPRECIATED RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE OF OCT 11, 1968.
UNFORTUNATELY IT CONFIRMED MY PREMONITION THAT THE UNITED
STATES WOULD DECIDE TO SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH (AIR SUPERIORITY)
PHANTOM JET AIRCRAFT.

IN YOUR MESSAGE, SIR, YOU EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I WOULD
UNDERSTAND THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED YOU TO TAKE THIS ACTION.
FRANKLY, I COULD NOT HELP BUT BE MORE DISILLUSIONED BY THIS
ACTION. AS YOU ARE AWARE, MR. PRESIDENT, I HAVE DONE, AND
WILL CONTINUE TO DO, ALL THAT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE IN THE HOPE
OF CLEARING THE WAY TO A JUST, HONOURABLE, AND THUS LASTING
PEACE IN OUR AREA. I AM WILLINGLY TAKING GREAT POLITICAL AND
OTHER RISKS IN MY ENDEAVOURS TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE. IF
WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARDS
PEACE, IT IS BECAUSE OF ISRAEL'S INTRANSIGENCE AND FAILURE TO
MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCESSIONS TOWARDS THAT
END, AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S OBVIOUS TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS WHICH
SHE OFTEN SHROUDS UNDER THE GUISE OF "NATIONAL SECURITY."

I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL

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I QUITE AGREE THAT OUR SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE AREA WILL BE FACILITATED IF A METICULOUS BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE STATES CONCERNED WERE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE, BUT I SUBMIT THAT JORDAN CONTINUES TO BE LEFT OUT WHEN CALCULATION REGARDING ARMAMENTS ARE MADE. JORDAN IS THE ONLY COUNTRY INVOLVED IN THE JUNE WAR WHICH HAS NOT YET SATISFACTORILY REPLENISHED HER MILITARY LOSSES IN THE WAR, AND JORDAN HAS BEEN THE ONLY COUNTRY TO BEAR THE FURY OF THE NEW AMERICAN AIRCRAFT THAT HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED TO ISRAEL SINCE THE WAR. SOME MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE EASTERN ARMAMENTS OF THE UAR AND OTHER ARAB STATES MAY WELL HAVE TIPPED THE BALANCE IN FAVOUR OF THE ARABS. I WISH TO ASSURE, SIR, AND IN ALL FRANKNESS, THAT AFTER STUDYING THE 1948 ARMED CONFLICT, WITNESSING AND NARROWLY MISSING ENTANGLEMENT IN THE 1956 CLASH AND LIVING THROUGH THE 1967 SO CALLED WAR, WHERE THE AIR FORCES OF THE UAR AND OTHERS WERE NEARLY ALL COMPLETELY WIPED OUT BY ISRAEL, WHICH HAS ALWAYS ENJOYED THE ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR PREPARATION IN EVERY RESPECT AS WELL AS THE ADVANTAGE OF STRIKING THE FIRST BLOW, I AM NOT CONSOLED BY ALL THIS SUPERIORITY IN ARMAMENT QUANTITY AND QUALITY THAT THE ARAB CAMP IS SAID TO ENJOY. IN FACT, I AM FAR WORRIED AND FAR MORE APPREHENSIVE REGARDING THE EVENTUAL FATE OF MY PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES WHO WILL BE EVEN MORE INADEQUATELY EQUIPPED AND THREATENED WHEN ISRAEL RECEIVES THE PHANTOMS. I BELIEVE IT IS ONLY FAIR THAT JORDAN SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE ITS SHARE OF ITS LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE FROM ITS TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF SUPPLY. I HOPE THAT OUR REQUESTS FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FAVOURABLY CONSIDERED. THE JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF, LT. GEN. AMER KHAMMASH IS READY TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON D.C., WHENEVER OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON ARE READY TO MEET WITH HIM FOR THIS PURPOSE.

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LEAST REFRAIN FROM HELPING ISRAEL TO CONTINUE HER VIOLATION OF OUR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

MR. PRESIDENT, I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT I VALUE OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP, AND I AM WELL AWARE THAT OUR ASSOCIATION IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. BUT WHAT WORRIES ME IS THAT AMERICAN ACTIONS AND POSITIONS REGARDING THE PROBLEMS OF OUR AREA ARE MAKING IT DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR ME AND FOR YOUR OTHER ARAB FRIENDS TO DEFEND OR JUSTIFY AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I TRUST AND PRAY THAT YOU WILL DO ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE TO HELP US CHANGE THIS IMAGE. WE ARE DOING OUR BEST, BUT WE NEED YOUR HELP, SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE. FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST IS AT STAKE, AND IF THERE IS NO JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THEN, UNFORTUNATELY, THERE CAN BE NO PEACE IN THE WORLD.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, MY SINCERE REGARDS AND BEST WISHES. SGD. HUSSEIN I. UNQTE

2. DEPT MAY WISH TO SEND THIS MESSAGE TO INTERMEDIATE POSTS ON GOV SCRANTON'S ITINERARY SO THAT HE MAY HAVE TIME TO READ IT PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL IN AMMAN.

3. SIGNED LETTER FOLLOWS BY POUCH. SYMMES.

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G	7	EUR	
* S/NL	10	NEA 14, 15	
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The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top left of the document. It features an eagle with a shield on its chest, holding an olive branch and arrows. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are written in a circle around the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is written at the bottom of the circle.

DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 799

PAGE 01 STATE 280510

84
ORIGIN SS: 10

INFO: /010 R.

DRAFTED BY: NH FRISBIE
APPROVED BY: NH FRISBIE
S/S: MR. BROWN

R 022315Z DEC 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

123407

S E C R E T STATE 280510

EXDIS:

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM AMMAN DATED DEC. 2,

QUOTE

AMMAN 7689

EXDIS

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: AMMAN 7684

1. IN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT, HUSSEIN PROPOSES GENL KHAMMASH PROCEED TO WASHINGTON FOR DISCUSSION. I HAVE FINALLY MANAGED TO ARRANGE MEETING WITH KHAMMASH AT NOON ON THIRD SPECIFICALLY TO DISCUSS INTERNAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. I ALSO INTEND, HOWEVER, TO RAISE SEVERAL OUTSTANDING MILITARY MATTERS WITH HIM.

2. IF POSSIBILITY OF KHAMMASH VISIT TO WASHINGTON IS RAISED, I WOULD PLAN TO RESPOND ALONG LINES OF RATIONALE IN PARA ONE OF STATE 258556 WHICH WAS PASSED ON TO KHAMMASH IN LONDON (LONDON 13640).

SYMMEE

UNQUOTE. RUSK

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G ✓ 7		EUR	
* S/NL ✓ 10		NEA ✓ 16/17	
G/PM		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AH		White House ✓ 2/3	
S/AL		Vice President	
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BY JET NARA Date 12/5/05

agreement... were complete and the Secretary reported... if I could be assured that I had been... if I could be assured that I had been...

-5-

DEF 12-5 ISR

November 7, 1968

TO: P - Mr. McCloskey
FROM: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
Subject: Phantoms - Queries from Ben Welles and Warren Unna

In the course of backgrounders on the general Arab-Israel situation, both Welles and Unna whom I saw on November 5 and 6 respectively, asked me about the Phantom negotiations. I responded that in accordance with the President's instructions, the Secretary had entered on discussions which were continuing. In answer to Welles' query as to why unlike previous negotiations these were begun in the Department, I responded that the usual pattern was for negotiations to be handled both by State and Defense.

On the evening of November 6, Phil Heymann called to say that Welles had a report that we had agreed in principle to sell 58 Phantoms and asked whether I thought it worth a try to try to turn Welles off a story that could only further inflame Arab resentment. I telephoned Welles and with reference to his talk with Heymann told him I thought this line misleading, that there had been no final decision, and that as far as I knew the Israeli request had been for fifty aircraft. Welles told me that and "impeccable American source" in the industry had given him the facts but that he would duly note what I had told him.

This afternoon, just before 1:00 o'clock, Unna called to ask whether I had misled him on this story since he was about to write his own. I told him that the situation was as I had told him on Wednesday. As far as I knew, the discussions were in process and the Secretary had not reported back to the President. Until this was done and the President made his decision in the light of all factors, there was no one in this building who could or should "second guess" Mr. Johnson. To his query as to how reports of an agreement in

DEF 12-5 1968

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Authority NND 96900
By JEA NARA Date 12/5/05

Subject: Munitions - Character from Ben
FROM: MEY - Roger L. Davies
TO: E - Mr. McClellan

-2-

principle were being given out I replied that from the fact of negotiations it could be assumed that we were giving serious consideration to the Israeli request and it was possible that it would be met. However, until discussions were complete and the Secretary reported back to the President, there was no agreement. He indicated that he was going to check further with the Israeli Embassy.

I called the Israeli Minister, Shlomo Argov, later this afternoon and told him that the Welles' story had brought several press queries and gave him the line I had used. He responded that the Embassy was "no commenting" questions as to whether there was agreement, that the Embassy was in no way responsible for the story, ^{and} that he was concerned that our line was being interpreted as a denial which would give them problems at home. He said that the Embassy had given a "general Briefing" to correspondents on the Phantom and that both Welles and Unna had called that afternoon to check what had been told them in the Department.

He agreed that it was in our mutual interest to try to low-key press interest as we could.

*Saunders suggests stopping with
"Secretary has not reported back."*

0202

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BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05



DEF 18-6

TELEGRAM

VIN DEF 15-5 ISR

SECRET 253

PAGE 01 USUN N 07558 050244Z

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R 050044Z NOV 68
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4355
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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EXDIS

SUBJECT: NPT/ISRAELI NUCLEAR INTENTIONS

(FOL SUMMARY BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON. NOFORN AND FYI.
SUBJECT TO REVISION UPON REVIEW.)

1. IN MTG WITH EBAN NOV 3 ON ME SETTLEMENT
AND JARRING MISSION,
SECTY RAISED NPT AND PHANTOM NEGOTIATIONS.

2. EBAN SAID PM'S LTR FROM PRESIDENT HEIGHTENED UNDERSTANDING OF ISSUES AND OF US ATTITUDES. DISCUSSION IN ISRAEL BOTH OF SECURITY ASPECT AND OF "PARLIAMENTARY ASPECT" BEING EXPEDITED.

2. SECTY SAID IT WOULD BE MISTAKE TO LOOK ON THIS AS NPT MATTER ONLY; IT ALSO QUESTION OF GOING NUCLEAR. EBAN SAID "WE HAVEN'T GONE NUCLEAR". BUT THERE ARE PROBLEMS OF INSPECTION WHICH ARISE IN RELATION WITH NPT. ISRAEL MUST EXAMINE WHAT PRECISELY ITS SECURITY IS BASED ON -- WHAT "ASSURANCES". CAN SECURITY BE BASED ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OVER LONG TERM. NATO AND AMERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM WILL BE POINTED TO AND ISRAELI LEADERSHIP WILL BE ASKED QUESTIONS. STUDY OF MATTER NOT FRIVOLOUS BECAUSE PARLIAMENT WILL BE ASKING QUESTION

ASKING QUESTION
S. EBAN SAID IT ONE THING NOT TO GO NUCLEAR AND
ANOTHER THING TO MAKE LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS WHICH AFFECTS
SECURITY.

4. EBAN SAID HE SURE US HAVING THIS SORT OF DISCUSSION WITH

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This document consists of 2 pages.

Number 1 of 7 copies, Series B

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ CHAIRMAN POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

14483

SECRET/NOFORN

MEMORANDUM

November 1, 1968

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: S/P - Henry Owen *NO*
SUBJECT: Quid Pro Quo for F-4 "Phantom" Fighters --
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. The President's decision of October 9 to open negotiations with Israel on the sale of supersonic jet aircraft offers an opportunity to influence Israel's policy on unconventional weapons. Unless the GOI comes through with another arms request in the near future to which it attaches comparable importance, we would be unlikely for some time to have any lever as effective as this one:

- (a) to induce the Israelis to sign the NPT promptly, and
- (b) to obtain a commitment that they will not develop or acquire a surface-to-surface missile capability for carrying nuclear weapons.

2. An excellent argument can be made to the Israelis that with the addition of F-4's they will no longer need to use the possibility of an Israeli nuclear weapons or ground-to-ground missile capability to deter the Arabs.

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S/P: W Dale

NODIS REVIEW	
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Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II	
Date: <u>7/24</u> 19 <u>76</u>	

DEF 12-5 ISR

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3. Failure to use the leverage of the F-4's to get commitments on the NPT and on missiles may cost us dearly.

a. If the Israelis succeed in developing an unconventional weapons capability and it becomes known, many influential groups in the Middle East would think the United States Government had connived secretly with the Israelis. This belief would reduce further the dwindling store of goodwill for the United States remaining in the Middle East. People in many other countries, particularly Moslem ones, would also be likely to suspect conniving, no matter how much we protested. And, unfortunately, this is the type of report which Communist propaganda can exploit most effectively.

b. Supply of F-4's, which are substantially superior to any planes now in the Middle East, would make it more difficult for us to discuss conventional arms control plausibly with the Soviets. However, this problem could be partially met if we could point to a significant gain in the arms limitations field.

4. The Israeli government will undoubtedly endeavor to keep its request for F-4's separate from any discussion of the NPT and related questions thus seeking to prevent us from attaching unpalatable conditions. However, we are now in as favorable a position to link the two as we are likely to be, since Israeli impatience may make them willing to pay a price for early action on the planes.

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S/P:WDale:sk

0205

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Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

November 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HART

Subject: Phantom Negotiations

The Secretary instructed me at 11:00 this morning to contact Mr. Nitze to ascertain who would handle technical discussions with the Israelis preparatory to conclusion of an agreement for sale of the Phantom aircraft. The Secretary asked that I provide this information to Ambassador Rabin adding that the United States was prepared in principle to agree to the Israeli request.

I telephoned Ambassador Rabin at 3:00 p.m. after a discussion with Mr. Nitze and told him that we were prepared in principle to accede to the Israeli request and that General Hod should get in touch with Mr. Warnke to set up technical discussions. The Ambassador said he had lunched with Mr. Warnke who had not mentioned this subject but that he was overjoyed at this development and would proceed immediately to get in touch with the Department of Defense.

Rodger P. Davies

cc: S/S - Mr. Walsh

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Date: 7/24/76	

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BY: J6 NARA Date: 12/5/05

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13467

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved as amended in S/S 10/8/70
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 25, 1970

SUBJECT: U.S. Sixth Fleet

COMPLETE DISTRIBUTION
MADE BY CMS 10/8/70.

PARTICIPANTS: H.E. Yitzhak RABIN, Ambassador of Israel
Major General Eliahu ZEIRA, Military Attache,
Embassy of Israel
Shlomo ARGOV, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Moshe RAVIV, Counselor, Embassy of Israel

Joseph J. SISCO, Assistant Secretary, NEA
Alfred L. ATHERTON, JR., Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
H. H. STACKHOUSE, Country Director, NEA/IAI
Mark C. LISSFELT, NEA/IAI

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U	C	WH - Mr. Saunders	EUR/SOV Amembassy TEL AVIV
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During the course of a discussion on the current Jordan crisis, Ambassador Rabin said that when the U.S. flew the mission into Israel from the Sixth Fleet to exchange information, the IDF was shocked at the limited information and intelligence the U.S. had. Israel had suggested many times better liaison between the Sixth Fleet and Israel. Rabin also recalled the last visit to the carrier Forrestal in 1964 when he, accompanied by General Yaariv and General Weizman, and IDF Navy Chief briefed U.S. military. General Zeira said he wanted to make one observation concerning the Sixth Fleet: the IDF has good contact with the Sixth Fleet concerning the Soviet fleet.

Mr. Sisco observed that the principal mission of the Sixth Fleet is the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. He is not surprised that the U.S. military had to seek detailed current information from Israel relating to possible U.S. military intervention in a friendly country, Jordan.

NEA/IAI:MCLissfelt:hml
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Date: 7/27 1978

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/NODIS Attachment

10/7/70

TO : S/S - Mr. Curran

FROM: James Carson *W*
Director, Secretariat Staff

The attached memorandum of conversation is submitted for approval of ~~content and~~ suggested distribution.

Approve RTL

Approve as amended

Attachment:

S/S 13467

SECRET/NODIS Attachment

PuBorg
S/S-S: PuBorg:las:10/7/70

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Ambassador Rabin retorted that it is high time that the U.S. sought this information. In Rabin's opinion, the mission of the U.S. Sixth Fleet is not the Soviet fleet. If war were to come between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., it would not be limited to the Mediterranean area. If the Sixth Fleet has any purpose, it is to give better credibility to the U.S. presence and influence vis-a-vis Soviet influence in the area. Many American military, as well as politicians, believe the aircraft carrier an obsolete weapon, but the U.S. needs such a capability to cope with the limited threat.

Mr. Sisco agreed with Rabin's observations concerning the Fleet, noting that its principal purpose is the effective application of local power. Without the Sixth Fleet, the Soviets would have a free hand locally to apply their power.

Ambassador Rabin noted that he first learned the importance of aircraft carriers during the Six-Day War. The IDF tried to analyze then what the Soviets would do and what were their capabilities against Israel. The IDF concluded that, because the Soviets did not have any air power in the Mediterranean, they could therefore do nothing of any importance. The Soviet navy could do nothing. This demonstrated that a big power like the Soviet Union had no military options in a limited time period, without using nuclear weapons, against a small power like Israel. The Soviets drew the lesson from the Six-Day War that they should be sure to have land bases for their planes in the Arab world. They now have such bases in Egypt.

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DEF 12-5 JORDAN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6620
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
USUN 1187

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S: E: C: R: E: T AMMAN 7237

EXD:IS:

REF: STATE: 253744 -

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN.

1. I CALLED ON KING HUSSEIN OCT 28 TO REVIEW WITH HIM MY RECENT CONSULTATIONS. I SAID I WISHED TO REITERATE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT MESSAGE TO HIM AND TO STRESS HOW IMPRESSED I HAD BEEN BY THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY FOR JORDAN THAT I HAD FOUND IN WASHINGTON. THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION IN HIS MIND THAT THE USG CONTINUES TO SUPPORT JORDAN AND ITS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL UNDER THE SC RESOLUTION OF NOV 1967. I NOTED THAT THESE ASSURANCES HAD ALSO BEEN GIVEN IN VARIOUS WAYS RECENTLY TO PRIMIN TALHOUNI, FONMIN RIFAI AND AMB SHARAF.

2. THE KING THANKED ME AND SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, " ESPECIALLY AT THE TIME IT WAS SENT". HE HAD CONTINUED TO DELAY RESPONDING TO THE MESSAGE BECAUSE OF " THINGS NOW GOING ON". DEPENDING ON HOW SOME OF THESE MATTERS WORKED OUT, HE WOULD WANT TO TAKE THEM UP IN HIS RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD KNOW BETTER IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WHAT HE MIGHT WANT TO PUT IN HIS RESPONSE.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

October 16, 1968

THE SECRETARY

The Israelis tell us Foreign Minister Eban wishes to return to Tel Aviv next week after he sees the President and you. The most convenient time for him would be next Tuesday or Wednesday, October 22-23. The President is willing to see him but no time or date has been set as yet.

NEA and the White House staff support Eban's request for appointments.

Recommendation:

Approve Disapprove

1. That we request the White House to attempt to schedule an Eban appointment with the President on October 22 or 23.
2. That you agree to see Eban on the day he sees the President.

NR

NR

(2)

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Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II

Date: 10/19/68

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh
Deputy Executive Secretary

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NR Pol ISK-415

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DEF 12-5 LSR

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EXDIS:

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 253744 AND LONDON 13455

1. SUMMARY - GIST OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO HUSSEIN GIVEN TO PRIMIN TALHOUNI OCT 12 ALONG WITH FURTHER EXPLANATIONS BASED ON DEPT'S GUIDANCE. PRIMIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION BUT REVIEWED US ACTIONS ON AID, ARMS, AND MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AT THE UN AS DEMONSTRATING LACK OF BALANCE IN US POSITION TOWARD JORDAN AS COMPARED WITH ISRAEL. ASSERTED THESE ACTIONS EMBARRASSED FRIENDS OF US AND STIMULATED HEAVY PRESSURES FROM THE PUBLIC AGAINST THOSE FRIENDS. THESE PRESSURES HAD BEEN WITHSTOOD BUT IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT.

2. I ACKNOWLEDGED SOME DELAYS AND PROBLEMS INHERENT IN OUR SYSTEM AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION BUT STRESSED THE GREAT STRENGTH OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES AND DETERMINATION TO CARRY THROUGH ON THEM. I ALSO SUGGESTED AS A PERSONAL OBSERVATION THAT CLEARING AWAY THE PHANTOM ISSUE MIGHT MAKE OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS EASIER. MEETING WAS CORDIAL AND OVERALL EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY REAFFIRMATION OF INTENTIONS CONTINUE WORK FOR A SOLUTION, SEEMED USEFUL. END SUMMARY R

3. I INFORMED PRIMIN TALHOUNI MORNING OCT 12 OF GIST MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN AS DELIVERED IN LONDON, DRAWING EXTENSIVELY ON COPY WHICH I EXCUSED MYSELF FROM GIVING TO HIM.

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DEPRIMIN TOUGANI PRESENT. I ALSO DREW ON STATE 252286 MAKING PARTICULARLY POINTS: (A) CLEAR EXPRESSION CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS; (B) NEGOTIATIONS MAY TAKE SOME TIME AND AGREEMENT NECESSARY ON RANGE OF POINTS BEFORE ANY AIRCRAFT WOULD ACTUALLY BE SENT TO AREA; (C) SOVIET DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS AND FACT THAT SO LONG AS SOURCE FOR REPLACEMENT OF HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT IN DOUBT, THIS IN ITSELF DESTABILIZING; AND (D) OUR REAFFIRMED INTENTION WORK FOR SOLUTION BASIC PROBLEM.

4. TOUGANI COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD THOUGHT OF CALLING ME IN YESTERDAY AND BOTH HE AND PRIMINI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND. TALHOUNI SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT KING'S REACTION MESSAGE WOULD BE, OF COURSE, HE WOULD GIVE THE PRESENT VIEWS OF THE KING'S GOVT. TALHOUNI THEN GAVE A LONG AND CLOSELY REASONED ACCOUNT OF EVENTS OF THE PAST YEAR, CULMINATING IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PHANTOM DECISION, WHICH HE SAID LED HIM TO FEEL THERE WAS A BASIC AND DISTURBING LACK OF BALANCE IN THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE US WITH ISRAEL AND WITH JORDAN. HE CITED THE SUSPENSION OF BUDGET SUPPORT, THE PROTRACTED BAN ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN, AND VARIOUS STANDS TAKEN BY THE US AT THE UN AS EXAMPLES OF THE KIND OF MOVES WHICH THE JORDAN PUBLIC COULD NOT UNDERSTAND AND WHICH WERE AN EMBARRASSMENT AND A SOURCE OF MOUNTING CRITICISM OF THE KING AND GOVT BY ALL WALKS OF LIFE IN JORDAN. HE EMPHASIZED HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR A RESUMPTION OF BUDGET SUPPORT BUT WAS ILLUSTRATING THE KIND OF THINGS WHICH HAD BEEN PILED ONE ON ANOTHER AND MADE IT HARD FOR ARAB FRIENDS OF THE US. DURING THE ARMS BAN JORDAN HAD BEEN UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE TO ACCEPT SOVIET ARMS AND THE SOVIETS HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY. THE JORDAN GOVT, HOWEVER, HAD DECIDED THAT THE WISEST COURSE WAS TO MAINTAIN ITS TIES WITH THE US. HE MENTIONED TOO THE DELIVERY OF SKYHAWKS TO ISRAEL WHILE JORDAN WAS STILL UNDER THE BAN. ALSO JORDAN HAD EXPECTED A MAJOR EFFORT BY THE US TO HELP CLEAR THE WAY FOR REAL PROGRESS AFTER LAST NOVEMBER'S SC RESOLUTION.

5. WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT, TALHOUNI SAID THIS OPENED THE WAY TO THE SOVIETS TO SUPPLY MORE AIRCRAFT WHICH WOULD TEND NULLIFY WHATEVER ADDITIONAL SECURITY THESE PLANES WERE EXPECTED TO GIVE ISRAEL. ALSO THERE WAS THE FACT THESE WOULD BE VIEWED BY THE ARABS IN THE LIGHT OF THE USE OF THE SKYHAWKS SUPPLIED WITH MODERN ROCKETS (SIC) IN THE ATTACK ON

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SALT IN WHICH INNOCENT CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED. HE SAID HE WAS DISTRESSED BY THE TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND DEEPLY CONCERNED FOR THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF SUCH ACTIONS ON THE US IMAGE IN THE AREA AND THE POSITION OF THE PEOPLE WHO CONTINUE CLOSE TIES WITH THE US. CERTAINLY UP UNTIL NOW KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN ABLE TO STAND OFF ALL PRESSURES AND ATTACKS ON HIS POLICY, BUT THIS WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT.

6. TALHOUNI SAID THAT WHILE IT WAS NOT FOR HIM TO SUGGEST WHAT US POLICY SHOULD BE, HE COULD NOT ESCAPE THE CONCLUSION THAT US INTERESTS HAD SUFFERED FROM VARIOUS ACTIONS IN THE PAST YEAR, MENTIONING IN THIS CONNECTION THE ENTRY OF ADDITIONAL SOVIET SHIPS INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR IMPLICATIONS OF THE DELAY IN RATIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS SYMPTOMATIC OF US PROBLEMS TODAY.

7. TALHOUNI SAID THE PRESS HAD ASKED HIM TO COMMENT ON THE AIRCRAFT NEGOTIATIONS ANNOUNCEMENT AND HE HAD REFUSED JUST AS HE HAD REFUSED BE DRAWN OUT ON THE EBAN SPEECH. TOUGAN SAID THAT THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM FARRA IN NEW YORK REPORTING A DECISION OF THE ARAB DELEGATES AT THE UN TO ASK THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO EXPRESS TO RESPECTIVE AMERICAN AMBASSADORS THEIR CONCERN AND DISPLEASURE FOR THE PHANTOMS ANNOUNCEMENT AND TO URGE TRADE UNIONS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS IN THE COUNTRY TO TELEGRAPH THEIR PROTESTS TO THE US AND THE UN. TALHOUNI SAID THAT JORDAN OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT GOING TO STIR UP THE LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STREET AGAINST THE US IN SUCH A WAY, BUT THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF PRESSURES THEY WERE UNDER. TALHOUNI ALSO DESCRIBED THE LATEST MEETING WITH NASSER IN WHICH NASSER HAD SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF HUSSEIN THAT HE HAD BEEN PERSUADED TO MAKE A PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE SC RESOLUTION. THIS DECISION HAD, NASSER SAID, GIVEN HIM COUNTLESS HEADACHES WITH HIS OWN PEOPLE AND HE MAINTAINED IT BECAUSE OF HUSSEIN.

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S: E I C I R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 7024

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8. AFTER HEARING TALHOUNI OUT, AS HE HAD ME, I SAID I WOULD REPORT FULLY HIS COMMENTS. I SAID I ALSO WISH TO REAFFIRM THAT I KNEW THAT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN THE USG ADMIRE AND APPRECIATED THE WISDOM AND COURSE HE AS WELL AS THE KING HAD FOLLOWED IN THIS LONG DIFFICULT PERIOD. WE KNEW THAT DELAYS AND SOMETIMES OUR ACTIONS RESULTED IN PROBLEMS FOR THEM. THESE ELEMENTS WERE INEVITABLE IN OUR SYSTEM AND THE COMPLEX SITUATION WITH WHICH WE WERE DEALING. WITH RESPECT TO BUDGET SUPPORT, THE FACTS OF THE FISCAL SITUATION HAD MADE THE ACTION INEVITABLE BUT WE HAD TRIED TO SHOW OUR SUPPORT FOR JORDAN IN OTHER WAYS. HE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK, HOWEVER, THE GREAT STRENGTH OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES AND OUR DETERMINATION TO CARRY THROUGH ON THESE. ONE OF THESE POLICIES WAS TO WORK FOR A BASIC SOLUTION WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF REAL PEACE IN THE AREA. THIS REQUIRED COOPERATION OF ALL. I NOTED THE REAFFIRMATION OF OUR INTENTIONS IN THE MESSAGE TO THE KING AND THE STATEMENTS OF AMB WIGGINS IN NEW YORK.

9. WITH RESPECT TO THE AIRCRAFT NEGOTIATIONS DECISION, I SAID THAT SPEAKING APART FROM INSTRUCTIONS AND AS AN OBSERVER, I SAW REAL VALUE IN HAVING CLEARED AWAY AN ISSUE WHICH HAD SERVED ONLY TO CONFUSE MORE BASIC PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. AGAIN STRESSING IT WAS MY PERSONAL VIEW I SAID THAT ENTRY INTO NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR US TO TALK WITH THE ISRAELIS ABOUT A SOLUTION OF THE BROADER PROBLEMS SO LONG AS ISRAEL HAD NO INDICATION OF SOURCE FOR REPLACEMENT OF ITS LOSSES WHILE SOVIET PLANES WERE BEING SUPPLIED TO ITS

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NEIGHBORS. ISRAEL'S PREOCCUPATION WITH ITS ULTIMATE SECURITY PROMPTED IT TO HANG ON TO EVERY TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IT HAD AND MADE IT UNRESPONSIVE TO OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVES WHICH IT CLAIMED MIGHT UNDERMINE THAT SECURITY. I STRESSED I DID NOT KNOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS MIGHT PLAY A PART BUT SAID I THOUGHT IT COULD BE IMPORTANT.

6. I CLOSED WITH A RENEWED REQUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEX FACTORS THAT HAD ENTERED INTO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. I SAID I BELIEVED THEY SHOULD SEE IN OUR GENUINE EFFORTS IN NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE EVIDENCES OF THE REAL AND FUNDAMENTAL SUPPORT WHICH WE HAD AGAIN REAFFIRMED TO JORDAN. I AGAIN REFERRED TO APPRECIATION OF THE WISDOM AND UNDERSTANDING TALHOUNI AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD SHOWN IN THEIR HANDLING OF SUCH MATTERS.

11. COMMENT: THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WAS OBVIOUSLY APPRECIATED. ALTHOUGH TALHOUNI EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THE EFFECT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, THE MEETING WAS VERY CORDIAL AND TALHOUNI'S AND TOUGAN'S PRESENTATIONS RELAXED AND THOUGHTFUL. COMMENTS AS TO TALHOUNI'S OWN WISE HANDLING OF AFFAIRS PRODUCED A PLEASED SMILE.

DUNCAN

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

37



Department of State

DEF 12-5 ISR
XR POL 27 ARAB-ISR

TELEGRAM

SECRET 536

PAGE 01 LONDON 13455 111856Z

51
ACTION SS 30

ACTION COPY

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, MM 01, CCO 00, /031 W

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O 111842Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6620
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USUN NEW YORK 1463

S E I C R E T LONDON 13455

EXDIS:

REF: STATE 253744- *12-5 Jan*
XR
pl 27 Arab Jan

1. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DELIVERED TO KING HUSSEIN AT 1915.
2. KING EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR MESSAGE. HE MADE NO COMMENT ON CONTENT EXCEPT TO SAY WITH SMILE THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVING SUBJECT MUCH THOUGHT. EMBOFF ELABORATED BRIEFLY ON BASIS PARA 3 STATE 252286 AND KING REPEATED APPRECIATION FOR CLARIFICATION US VIEWS.
3. KING SAID HE WILL SEND RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WITHIN TWO OR THREE DAYS. HE NOTED THAT CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH DUE IN LONDON IN TWO DAYS AND THAT HE WISHES DISCUSS RESPONSE WITH KHAMMASH BEFORE SENDING IT. BRUCE

2

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S	✓ 4 -	AF	
U	✓ 5 -	ARA	
M	✓ 6 -	EA	
G	✓ 7 -	EUR	
G/PM		NEA	✓ 12-13 -
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AL		White House	✓ 2-3 -
S/C		Vice President	
S/P		Defense	✓ 14 -
		CIA	✓ 15 -
		NSA	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		Treasury	
E		State Rep	✓ 16 -
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NODIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed;
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Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
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controlled by S/S

Cat. C - Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II

Date: 11/9/76

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TOP SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE

October 18, 1968

Structuring the Negotiations with the Israelis

The F-4 negotiations with the Israelis encompass very sensitive issues. Preliminary staff work in both State and Defense is essentially completed with participation severely restricted to a need-to-know basis. Documentation in each Department is captioned Top Secret/NODIS/Sensitive.

essentially
Defense has completed its work on the hardware and finance aspects of this matter and believes that very little discussion with the Israelis will be required. They do not wish, however, to discuss these matters with the Israelis until agreement has been reached between the two Governments on the missile/nuclear issues. Secretary Clifford apparently wishes to obtain very firm assurances from the Israelis in respect to the missile/nuclear issues. He thus differs with the views submitted by NEA to you.

In view of the sensitivity and gravity of this subject, it appears desirable for you now to deal directly with Secretary Clifford and the President. The staffs in Defense and State would stand aside.

Assuming the President agrees to see Eban on Wednesday, October 23, we believe you should see Eban on the same day after the Presidential meeting. We suggest that the President limit his comments on the negotiation to stating that you have his views and you will conduct the negotiations. The negotiations would then open when you see Eban. Participation would be strictly limited but would include Secretary Clifford or Paul Nitze.

Recommendation:

That you approve the indicated scenario.

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Prefer _____
See Me _____

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

Concurrence R.P.
NEA - Mr. Davies
DOD - Mr. Schwartz #1
White House - Mr. Saunders

TOP SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE

DEF 12-5 ISR

NR Pol ISR-45

0220

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37

DEF 12-5 ISR

XR

POL 27

253744

ARAB-ISR

ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TOSECRET/EXDIS
Classification

11 OCT 68 16 10Z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy LONDON I M M E D I A T E

Info: INFO Amembassy AMMAN I M M E D I A T E
USUN NEW YORK I M M E D I A T E

State _____

EXDIS _____

REF Amman 6999 (Notal)

1. Appropriate Senior Embassy Officer should deliver following oral message from the President to King Hussein soonest: quote Your Majesty, As you are aware, I have instructed the Secretary of State to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. I trust that you will understand the circumstances that led me to take this action, which in no way diminishes our full and unequivocal support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel crisis. Please be assured that it continues to be our policy to facilitate in every possible way Ambassador Jarring's important mission. I remain have been gratified by your cooperation with Ambassador Jarring and ~~xxxx~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ hopeful that our joint search for peace in the Middle East will come to a successful conclusion.
2. I would also like to assure you that our commitment to and support for your wise leadership, as affirmed in my messages to you of

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:TWSeelye/RPPaganelli:gvl

5617

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: U - Nicholas de Katzenbach

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Walsh
NEA - Mr. Davie
NEA/IAI - Mr. AthertonWhite House - Mr. Rostow
IO - Mr. Popper
Ambassador Symmes
NEA - Parker T. HartSECRET/EXDIS
ClassificationFORM DS-322
8-65

0221

DECLASSIFIED
AND/OR NND 96900
DATE 12/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LONDON

SECRET/EXDIS
Classification

February 11 and June 4, remains undiminished. I highly value our close relations as being in the joint interests of our two countries. You can rest assured that my government desires to maintain - and strengthen - this relationship and that we ~~are~~ are prepared to give full support to Your Majesty's efforts to find an honorable and equitable solution to the problems that beset you. Please accept my most cordial regards. End quote

3. In delivering this message you may wish to elaborate, drawing upon guidance contained in State 252286.

~~XXXX~~
~~XXXX~~

4. FOR AMMAN: Charge should inform Prime Minister of gist of message, after London XXXXX~~END~~ confirms delivery to King Hussein.

/END

GP-3

RUSK

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

0222

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DATE 12/5/05

(11)



DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 851

PAGE 01 STATE 252261

45
ORIGIN SS 20

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MR 01, /021 R

DRAFTED BY: S/S - MR. WALSH
APPROVED BY: S/S - MR. WALSH

084572

Z 091717Z OCT 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK ELASH

S E C R E T STATE 252261

EXDIS

FOR SISCO FROM WALSH

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION: SECSTATE, INFO AMMAN, CAIRO, LONDON,
TEL AVIV, OCT 1, FROM USUN RPTD TO YOU:

QUOTE: S E C R E T USUN 6788 ✓ DEF 12-5 ISR

EXDIS

SECTO 3

SUBJ: SECRETARY-EBAN MTG (11)-ARMS SUPPLY AND NRT

FOLLOWING BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON, NOFORN AND FYI SUBJECT TO
REVISION UPON REVIEW.

1. DURING MEETING WITH SECRETARY SEPTEMBER 30 (SEPTEL), EBAN
ALLUDED TO ISRAELI REQUEST FOR F-4 PHANTOMS. ISRAEL FOUND
FRIGHTENING POSSIBILITY THAT UAR MAY BECOME CONVINCED IT HAS
MILITARY SUPERIORITY. PROBLEM OF ARMS BALANCE BECOMING
AGGRAVATED AND, WHILE MILITARY IMBALANCE WOULD NOT BECOME SERIOUS
UNTIL 1970, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS WERE APPARENT NOW. EBAN
ADDED THAT ON BASIS HIS RECENT TALKS IN PARIS, IT WAS APPARENT
THAT HOPE OF OBTAINING MIRAGES HAD BECOME A MIRAGE.

2. SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT PROBLEM WAS NOT ONE OF MAINTAINING

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DATE 12/3/05

0224



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 252261

"BALANCE". PROBLEM WAS THAT EACH SIDE WANTED AN EDGE OVER THE OTHER. SECRETARY THEN ASKED IF ISRAELI CABINET HAD CONSIDERED QUESTION OF SIGNING NPT.

3. EBAN SAID NPT NOT CONSIDERED AT CABINET LEVEL BUT IN SPECIAL BODY ESTABLISHED FOR THAT PURPOSE. SECRETARY SHOULD NOT INTERPRET EBAN'S LETTER ON THIS SUBJECT AS REFLECTING ANY CHANGE IN ISRAELI POSITION. ISRAEL HAD NOT GONE NUCLEAR AND HAD NOT DECIDED NOT TO SIGN NPT. NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN ISRAEL WERE BEING CARRIED OUT ONLY AT TWO PLACES KNOWN TO USG.

4. EBAN CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL WISHED, HOWEVER, "TO SWIM IN INTERNATIONAL CURRENT". ISRAEL WANTED TO WORK WITH THOSE STATES SEEKING GREATER SECURITY ASSURANCES. IN FACT THIS CONSIDERATION APPLIED EVEN MORE TO ISRAEL THAN OTHERS. ISRAEL WAS CONSIDERING NPT IN POSITIVE SPIRIT BUT HAD TO TAKE LONG TERM VIEW OF ITS SECURITY. IN ADDITION, PROBLEM OF INSPECTION WAS ONE OF SPECIAL SENSITIVITY FOR ISRAEL GIVEN FACT ISRAEL HAD NEVER ENJOYED AN EVEN BREAK IN IAEA. ISRAEL WAS NOT RENEGING ON ITS ORIGINAL POSITION BUT WANTED TO TAKE LONG LOOK AT ALL IMPLICATIONS OF NPT SIGNATURE.

5. SECRETARY ASKED WHAT THE TIME FRAME WAS FOR FURTHER ISRAELI CONSIDERATION. EBAN REPLIED THAT MATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED FURTHER AFTER GENEVA CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR POWERS.

GP-3. SIGNED RUSK UNQUOTE. RUSK

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DATE 12/5/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 ARAB-ISR
POL 15-1 ISR
DEF 12-5 ISR
FOR RM USE ONLY

A-475

SECRET

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
INFO : USUN
Tel Aviv
Jerusalem
Beirut
FROM : Amembassy AMMAN
SUBJECT : Prime Minister Talhouni's Views on Arab-Israeli Problem,
the Internal Situation, West Bank Attitudes, Arab
Financial Support and Phantoms
REF : Amman 6877 (NOTAL)

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8 3 07 PM 1968
ANALYSIS BRANCH
DATE: October 3, 1968

On the eve of his departure for Washington for consultations, the Ambassador called on Prime Minister Talhouni for a review of the current situation. Some of Talhouni's remarks about the Jordanian and UAR position on negotiations with Israel have been reported separately (Amman 6877). The other parts of the discussion between the two men are reported in the enclosed Memorandum of Conversation.

The Prime Minister stressed, in familiar terms, the dangers of the possible sale of Phantoms to Israel and the need for the U.S. to take a greater initiative in resolving the Arab-Israeli problem.

Somewhat unexpectedly, the Prime Minister volunteered a good deal of comment on the internal situation in Jordan and on the attitude of West Bankers. We can only speculate that he probably is aware that rumors of growing dissension within Jordan have been reaching American ears, and that he wanted to reassure the Ambassador that the situation is under control. His remarks on the situation on the West Bank, we believe, were intended to convince the Ambassador that the Jordanian Government has a mandate from West Bank leaders to pursue its present policy in search of a peaceful solution.

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum of Conversation,
October 2, 1968

FORM 4-62 DS-323

SECRET

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Drafted by: POL:MDraper/clc 10/3/68

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM:ESDuncan

Clearances:

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BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

Amman A-475

S E C R E T

2

The Prime Minister confirmed, in part, the information we had garnered from other sources that Libya had agreed to supplement its Khartoum payments in the form of a contribution of five million dinars (see Amman 6858 and NJA-7065). We suspect that the Jordanian Government may have been surprised at its own success in securing this additional support in the aftermath of the September Arab League meeting.

SYMMES

5/10

S E C R E T

0227

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59

DEF 12-5 ISR

XR DEF13-6

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 765

PAGE 01 USUN N 06760 012004Z

83

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, FILE 02, /032 W

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P 011915Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3442
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T USUN 6760

EXDIS

SECTO 3

SUBJ: SECRETARY-EBAN MTG (II)-ARMS SUPPLY AND NPT

FOLLOWING BASED ON UNCLEAR MEMCON, NOFORN AND FYI SUBJECT TO REVISION UPON REVIEW.

1. DURING MEETING WITH SECRETARY SEPTEMBER 30 (SEPTEL), EBAN ALLUDED TO ISRAELI REQUEST FOR F-4 PHANTOMS. ISRAEL FOUND FRIGHTENING POSSIBILITY THAT UAR MAY BECOME CONVINCED IT HAS MILITARY SUPERIORITY. PROBLEM OF ARMS BALANCE BECOMING AGGRAVATED AND, WHILE MILITARY IMBALANCE WOULD NOT BECOME SERIOUS UNTIL 1970, PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS WERE APPARENT NOW. EBAN ADDED THAT ON BASIS HIS RECENT TALKS IN PARIS, IT WAS APPARENT THAT HOPE OF OBTAINING MIRAGES HAD BECOME A MIRAGE.

2. SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT PROBLEM WAS NOT ONE OF MAINTAINING "BALANCE". PROBLEM WAS THAT EACH SIDE WANTED AN EDGE OVER THE OTHER. SECRETARY THEN ASKED IF ISRAELI CABINET HAD CONSIDERED QUESTION OF SIGNING NPT.

3. EBAN SAID NPT NOT CONSIDERED AT CABINET LEVEL BUT IN SPECIAL BODY ESTABLISHED FOR THAT PURPOSE. SECRETARY SHOULD NOT INTERPRET EBAN'S LETTER ON THIS SUBJECT AS REFLECTING ANY CHANGE IN ISRAELI POSITION. ISRAEL HAD NOT GONE NUCLEAR AND HAD NOT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 USUN N 06760 012004Z

DECIDED NOT TO SIGN NPT. NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN ISRAEL WERE BEING CARRIED OUT ONLY AT TWO PLACES KNOWN TO USG.

4. EBAN CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL WISHED, HOWEVER, "TO SWIM IN INTERNATIONAL CURRENT". ISRAEL WANTED TO WORK WITH THOSE STATES SEEKING GREATER SECURITY ASSURANCES; IN FACT THIS CONSIDERATION APPLIED EVEN MORE TO ISRAEL THAN OTHERS. ISRAEL WAS CONSIDERING NPT IN POSITIVE SPIRIT BUT HAD TO TAKE LONG TERM VIEW OF ITS SECURITY. IN ADDITION, PROBLEM OF INSPECTION WAS ONE OF SPECIAL SENSITIVITY FOR ISRAEL GIVEN FACT ISRAEL HAD NEVER ENJOYED AN EVEN BREAK IN IAEA. ISRAEL WAS NOT RENEGING ON ITS ORIGINAL POSITION BUT WANTED TO TAKE LONG LOOK AT ALL IMPLICATIONS OF NPT SIGNATURE.

5. SECRETARY ASKED WHAT THE TIME FRAME WAS FOR FURTHER ISRAELI CONSIDERATION. EBAN REPLIED THAT MATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED FURTHER AFTER GENEVA CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR POWERS.

GP-3.


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G/PM		NEA	✓✓ 13-14
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AL		White House	✓✓ 2+3
S/C		Vice President	
S/P		Defense	✓ 15
		CIA	✓ 16
		NSA	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		Treasury	
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0230

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DATE 12/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 11, 1968

SUBJECT: The Middle East and Phantoms

PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Yitzhak RABIN, Israeli Ambassador
Mr. Shlomo ARGOV, Israeli Minister
Assistant Secretary Paker T. Hart, NEA
Mr. John D. Leonard, NEA/IAI

COPIES TO: 5
NEA NEA/IAI NEA/ARN NEA/UAR Embassy Tel Aviv

This was the first call of Ambassador Rabin upon the Assistant Secretary. After the introduction and an exchange of pleasantries the Israeli Ambassador said he hoped that the United States Government was satisfied with the October 8 United Nations General Assembly speech of Foreign Minister Abba Eban in which the Israeli statesman referred to Israel's readiness to withdraw troops within the context of a peace settlement and its willingness to continue the dialogue with the Egyptians through Ambassador Jarring. These were points that American officials had frequently emphasized, the most recent case being that of his final call on former Assistant Secretary Lucius D. Battle.

Commenting upon the present situation in the Middle East Ambassador Rabin said he thought Israel had reached an important stage with Jordan. It had found means of communicating with the GOJ. Unfortunately, the Jordanians have not yet found themselves free to move all the way to a real peace. The Egyptians, together with the Soviets, talk a great deal about a "political settlement" but this is different than a "real peace." The Israeli Ambassador expressed his own belief that Israel should continue its efforts to reach a settlement with the UAR, even though he was not optimistic. At the least, such efforts would serve to expose the ambiguity of the UAR position.

Ambassador Rabin said that there had been two significant Soviet moves in the past month directed at the Middle East. The first move involved the Soviet warning to Israel coupled with its "peace offensive." The second was Foreign Minister Gromyko's UNGA speech in which for the first time a Soviet leader spoke of the Middle East as being on the

NEA/IAI: Leonard:cr
(Dulles Office and Officer)

Group-3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals
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FORM DS-1254
2-65

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POL 27 ARAB-ISR

XR DEF 12-5 ISR

0231

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Ref 12-5 LSR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 515

PAGE 01 TUNIS 08240 010221Z

91
ACTION: NEA 15

INFO: AF 10, EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, SAH 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02,
INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28,
SA 01, RSR 01, 168 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7708
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JODDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USMISSION USUN

CONFIDENTIAL TUNIS 8240

SUBJ: PHANTOMS FOR ISRAEL

1. ANNOUNCEMENT CONCLUSION: NEGOTIATIONS ON SALE PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL ONLY MENTIONED FACTUALLY IN UNOFFICIAL LA PRESSE AND DURING NEWS BROADCASTS. FOLLOWING PRECEDENT OF LAST OCTOBER, OFFICIAL PARTY ORGANS L'ACTION AND AL AMALI DID NOT EVEN CARRY ANNOUNCEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENT AND VERY LITTLE PRIVATE DISCUSSION.

2. DURING SUNDAY NIGHT DINNER WITH PRESIDENT REPORTED SEPTEL (NOTAL), PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA SAID THE SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN THE ARAB WORLD WERE WRINGING THEIR HANDS OVER ISRAEL'S ATTACK ON THE BEIRUT AIRPORT AND WERE PREPARED TO FIND A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS ATTACK AND THE U.S. SALE OF PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL. QUOTE THEY ARE ALWAYS PREPARED TO BLAME THE U.S. BUT THEY SEE NO RELATION BETWEEN THE TENSIONS IN THE AREA

CONFIDENTIAL

47

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0232

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TUNIS 08240 010221Z

AND THE DELIVERY TO THEM OF THOUSANDS OF AIRCRAFT BY THE
RUSSIANS. UNQUOTE.

GP-3

RUSSELL

CONFIDENTIAL

0233

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AUTHORITY <u>NND 96900</u>
DATE <u>12/5/05</u>

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☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

Origin

ACTION: USINT CAIRO

Info

STATE

EXDIS

1. Ghorbal at his request called on Davies December 27 after week's absence in New York catch up on current state of play in Middle East. Davies reviewed your conversation with Mohamed Riad on Gromyko visit (minus protected section)
2. Davies informed Ghorbal of noon announcement of agreement with GOI for sale of Phantoms. Noted that all concerned with agreement regretted decision which would not have been made had there been movement toward peace or restraint on delivery of Soviet supersonic aircraft to area.
3. Ghorbal became increasingly emotional as he reacted. Described decision as "abhorrent" and most damaging action by Johnson Administration since war. Forecast that meeting Israelis request would make it even more intransigent and that timing of announcement was most inappropriate in view of recent progress of resumption US-UAR relations.
4. Davies noted again that US action had been taken after study of developments over past year and in light ratio of holdings supersonic aircraft on both sides. Pointed out further that by meeting some of Israel's security concerns decision could contribute to more flexible position in Cabinet as regards settlement

Drafted by:

NEA/UAR: J. Johnston 12/27/68

Tel. Ext.

5092

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davis

S/S - Bill Shepard

SECRET

Classification

FORM DS-322
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POL 1 UAR-US
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AMENDED NND 96700

BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

46

Case No. 540 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Request Involving the Purchase of Military
Equipment, Materials or Services under the
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968

DEF 12-5 ISR

Enclosed are eight copies of a note dated December 3,
1968, from the Embassy of Israel, submitting a request for
the purchase of:

1. .22 Type 1 Projectile for Armer Plate - 10,000 Each
 2. .22 Type 2 Projectile for Body Armor - 10,000 Each
- for use by the Israel Defense Forces.

The Department of State approves from an economic, legal,
and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request as a sale
under the legislative authority of the Foreign Military Sales
Act of 1968. This approval is subject to any patent or
proprietary rights as well as any security or disclosure
policy considerations that may apply to this material.

Robert J. Barnard
G/PM - Military
Assistance and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Mr. Baker NEA/IAI See Reference Slip of 12/5/68
Mr. Radford NEA/KNZ C.O. Burt
Mr. Gase G/PM-MC
Mr. Klein PAC/MPS DMK
Mr. Massey L/E ENM

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
DATE 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

שגרירות ישראל
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1968 DEC 6 AM 9 38

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ANALYSIS BRANCH

ACTION
is assigned to

[Signature]

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable Secretary of State and referring to the eligibility of the Government of Israel for reimbursable military assistance under the provisions of Section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1961, has the honor to submit a request for the purchase, under Dependable Undertaking financial arrangement, from the Department of the Army, of the following:

- 1) Caliber .22 Type 1 Projectile for Armor Plate - 10,000 Each.
- 2) Caliber .22 Type 2 Projectile for Body Armor - 10,000 Each.

(The above ammunition is described in MIL-P-46593 A (ORD) Publication dated 12 October, 1962).

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The above is requested for the Israel Defense Forces.

12-668

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DEC 3 - 1968

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DEF 12-5-1318

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96700
BY *[Signature]* DATE 12/5/05

46
Case No. 536 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Out-of-Channels Request from Israel

DEF 12-5 ISK
Attached is an out-of-channels request dated September 10, 1968, from the Embassy of Israel, expressing an interest in obtaining the material listed in the enclosed letter 2183/6-3. OASD/ISA/ILN requested Department of State approval on November 20, 1968.

The Department of State approves from an economic, legal, and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request as a cash sale under the legislative authority of Section 21 of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. This approval is subject to any patent or proprietary rights and security considerations that apply to this material as may be subsequently determined by the Department of Defense.

Robert J. Barnard
G/PM - Military
Assistance and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Concurrence:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Bahti (See Reference Slip) 12/19/68
NEA/RA - Mr. Padenford 12/19/68
G/PM-MC - Mr. Bowley
PPC-MAS - Mr. Klein (See Reference Slip) 12/19/68
L/E - Mr. Massey

RECORDED BY 85/8

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BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON

DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES ATTACHE



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

נספח צבא הנגד לישראל

10 September, 1968

2183/6-3.

Chief, Military Sales Division,
Mutual Security Office,
Hq. U.S. Army Material Command,
Washington, D.C. 20315.

Dear Sir:

It would be very much appreciated if you could provide us with a Letter of
Offer for the items as per enclosed list.

Thank you for your kind consideration.

Sincerely yours,

S. Goren

Shmuel Goren -- Lt. Colonel
Assistant Armed Forces Attache.

4712.

Encl.: List.

DET 12-5 TSK

#536

I-12753/68

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Authority NND 96900
By J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

SYMBOLIC CODE	GENERAL CODES	CHIEF ASSUMPTION DEVELOPMENT, US ARMY EDWARDS, ARSENAL	QTY
	TRAINING NO.	STUD. NO.	
1. AIR INJECTION APPARATUS GAS TEST METERING, q 95	B 136-41-600	136-300-1983 30.8.63	1
2. PNEUMOMETER, PULSER TESTING TOP, q 127	B 136-42-102	136-300-1983 30.8.63	1
3. HYDROSCOP, OVERLET VALVE IRRAWAY, H & A 1 (MODIFIED)	DES 136-45-202-0	136-300-224 15.4.57	1
4. HYDROSCOP, RESISTANCE INHIBITION AND EXHALATION q 43	B 136-14-62	136-700-173 8.11.63	1
5. INDICATOR, INLET AND OUTLET VALVE RESISTANCE, q 105	B 38-6-325	136-700-70 12.7.63	1

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By J6 NARA Date 12/3/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 2

DATE: 20 DEC 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: MC

FROM: _____ TO: _____

SUBJECT: U.S. & ISRAELI REQUESTS

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: _____ OTHER: ☒

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 3

DATE: Dec 18, 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: GC
FROM: Walsh, J.P. TO: The Secretary
SUBJECT: _____
DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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BY 66 NARA Date 12/5/05

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SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES* AND ISRAEL

AIR FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS AND SIX-MONTH PROJECTIONS THROUGH 1 JUNE 1970

ISRAEL/ARABS

	DECEMBER 1968		JUNE 1969		DECEMBER 1969		JUNE 1970	
	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio
<u>TRANSPORTS</u>								
Total aircraft	51/97	1:1.9	51/101	1:2	51/112	1:2.2	50/109	1:2.2
# Operationally assigned and combat-ready	43/65	1:1.5	43/71	1:1.6	43/83	1:1.9	42/95	1:2.3
<u>HELICOPTERS</u>								
Total aircraft	71/130	1:1.8	91/126	1:1.4	91/138	1:1.5	67/136	1:2
# Operationally assigned and combat-ready	60/75	1:1.3	77/77	1:1	77/87	1:1.1	57/88	1:1.5

MISSILES

Surface-to-air: The UAR currently has 38 SA-2 sites with an estimated 300 missiles; no significant change is expected over the next 18 months. Israel currently has 30 launchers and 171 Hawk missiles; this inventory will increase to 48 and 280, respectively, by June 1969.

* It is estimated that only the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed conflict with Israel. Algeria's high performance, 100 medium performance, and 38 bomber aircraft would probably be available for reinforcement within a few days. The airforces of Lebanon and Saudi-Arabia are incapable of making any significant contribution in renewed conflict.

** Israeli intelligence maintains this figure should be 384; the difference is derived primarily from Soviet deliveries reported by Israeli intelligence to have been accomplished within the past ninety days. US intelligence does not support these Israeli claims and Israeli intelligence authorities have been unable to furnish justifications for them.

*** This figure does not include 77 Fouga Magister jet trainers which were used in a ground-support role during the June 1967 war.

A readiness factor of 85% has been attributed to the Israeli inventory; this factor could be raised to 90% by stand-down. All aircraft are operationally assigned. The factor for Arab forces is a combination of a 65% readiness factor for aircraft assigned to operational units plus omission of aircraft still in crates or storage or otherwise not assigned. This gives an average availability figure of 54% for Arab air forces.

Enclosure C

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

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SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES* AND ISRAEL

AIR FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS AND SIX-MONTH PROJECTIONS THROUGH 1 JUNE 1970

ISRAEL/ARABS

	DECEMBER 1968		JUNE 1969		DECEMBER 1969		JUNE 1970	
	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio
<u>HIGH PERFORMANCE FIGHTERS</u>								
Total Aircraft	55/304**	1:5.5	55/378	1:6.9	54/445	1:8.4	73/525	1:7.4
# Operationally assigned								
and combat-ready	47/148	1:3.2	47/203	1:4.4	46/244	1:5.3	62/295	1:4.8
(w/Mirage 5s)	70/148	1:2.1	78/203	1:2.6	89/244	1:2.7	105/295	1:2.8
<u>MEDIUM PERFORMANCE FIGHTERS</u>								
Total aircraft	***126/270	1:2.1	144/265	1:1.8	179/255	1:1.4	184/239	1:1.3
# Operationally assigned								
and combat-ready	106/137	1:1.3	122/136	1:1.1	152/126	1:0.8	156/122	1:0.8
<u>TOTAL JET FIGHTERS</u>								
Inventory	181/574	1:3.2	199/643	1:3.2	233/700	1:3	257/764	1:3
# Operationally assigned								
and combat-ready	153/285	1:1.9	169/339	1:2	198/370	1:1.9	217/417	1:1.9
(w/Mirage 5s)	176/285	1:1.6	200/339	1:1.7	241/370	1:1.5	260/417	1:1.6
<u>BOMBERS</u>								
Total aircraft	2/68	1:34	2/74	1:37	2/78	1:39	2/82	1:41
# Operationally assigned								
and combat-ready	2/46	1:23	2/47	1:23	2/55	1:27	2/57	1:28

Enclosure C

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

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SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES* AND ISRAEL

NAVAL FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS/ESTIMATED STATUS 1 JUNE 1970

	<u>UAR</u>	<u>SYRIA</u>	<u>JORDAN</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>	<u>TOTAL ARAB</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>
PERSONNEL	15,000/15,500	1,000/1,000	150/150	400/1,000	16,550/17,650	3,000/3,500
SHIPS						
Destroyers	6/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	6/7	1/1
Submarines	13/13	0/0	0/0	0/0	13/13	4/4
Missile-Patrol	20/20	6/6	0/0	0/12	26/38	5/12

	<u>ALGERIA</u>	<u>POSSIBLE ARAB</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>
PERSONNEL	2,000/2,500	18,550/20,150	3,000/3,500
SHIPS			
Destroyers	0/0	6/7	1/1
Submarines	0/0	13/13	4/4
Missile-Patrol	9/11	35/49	5/12

* It is estimated that only the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed conflict with Israel. Algerian forces and/or equipment might be available for reinforcement within a few days.

Enclosure B.

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By 16 NARA Date 12/5/05

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SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES* AND ISRAEL

GROUND FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS/ESTIMATED STATUS 1 JUNE 1970

	<u>EGYPT</u>	<u>SYRIA</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>	<u>JORDAN</u>	<u>TOTAL ARAB</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>
PERSONNEL	175,000/200,000	55,000/58,000	80,000/82,500	50,350/50,500	360,350/391,000	65,000/65,000
Tanks						
Heavy	23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	23/23	0/0
Medium	900/1,450	515/570	606/620	240/300	2,261/2,940	1205/1400
Light	70/80	16/16	37/37	0/0	123/133	150/0
AP AF and Assault Guns	133/300	280/250	252/250	14/14	679/914	250/250
Artillery						
100mm and Over	464/650	435/450	404/450	26/45	1,329/1,595	200/250
Up to 100mm	975/1150	90/190	415/430	162/162	1,642/1,932	600/600
AAA						
57mm and Over	303/400	450/550	97/180	0/0	850/1130	200/250
Up to 57mm	537/650	946/1000	426/450	267/305	2,176/2,405	350/400
APC	913/1200	445/500	570/610	167/210	2,095/2,520	1,600/1,800
	<u>ALGERIA</u>	<u>LEBANON</u>	<u>SAUDI ARABIA</u>		<u>POSSIBLE ARAB</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>
PERSONNEL	61,000/62,000	13,000/13,000	28,000/29,000		462,350/495,000	65,000/65,000
Tanks						
Heavy	0/0	0/0	0/0		23/23	0/0
Medium	372/380	83/83	18/18		2,734/3,421	1,205/1,400
Light	5/0	40/40	75/75		243/248	150/0
Artillery						
100mm and Over	305/305	36/36	100/100		1,770/2,036	200/250
Up to 100mm	233/233	30/30	0/0		1,905/2,195	600/600
AAA						
57mm and Over	180/200	12/12	32/32		1,074/1,374	200/250
Up to 57mm	299/299	68/68	193/193		2,736/2,965	350/400
APC	540/570	20/20	104/304		2,759/3,414	1,600/1,800
AP AF and Assault Guns	99/105	0/0	8/8		786/1027	250/250

* It is estimated that only the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed conflict with Israel. Algerian forces and/or equipment would probably be available for reinforcement within a few days. In the event of a prolonged conflict, forces and/or equipment from Lebanon and Saudi Arabia might be made available to support the Arabs.

Enclosure A

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AUTHORITY NND 96700
BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Accelerated Delivery of F-4E Aircraft to Israel

Israel has asked that we significantly expedite deliveries of F-4 aircraft to begin preferably in April 1969 rather than January 1970. We have told Israeli representatives that, at your direction after the Prime Minister's last visit, we had already with considerable effort and expense cut the lead time for these aircraft in half, and that to cut it in half once again would present serious problems.

There are no insuperable technical obstacles to earlier delivery of the planes themselves; the serious problems involved stem from the time it takes to train maintenance personnel, particularly those concerned with electronic components of the aircraft which enable the plane to fire and release its variety of complicated weapons. In short, we can deliver aircraft in 1969 but they cannot be kept combat ready by the Israelis.

There are risks to the United States in delivering aircraft to Israel which the Israelis cannot fight. General Hod recognizes that these aircraft cannot fight before Israeli personnel are fully trained, which will be some time in early 1970. Nevertheless, they feel that their deterrent posture will be increased by the mere presence of the aircraft. If the Israelis are wrong on this score -- and where Egyptians are concerned, it is easy to be wrong -- they might at some point feel an urgent need to be able to fight the planes prior to the completion of the training of adequate maintenance personnel. The only way in which they could fight them under such circumstances would be for us to rush U.S. maintenance personnel to Israel to do the job. I do not believe we want to introduce U.S. Air Force personnel in such a capacity into the Middle East at a time of actual or near hostilities.

General Wheeler believes we should accede to the Israeli request for earlier deliveries, but without sending USAF personnel to Israel to help in their maintenance. In his recent assessment of the Arab-Israeli air balance (attached), General Wheeler recommends that F-4 deliveries begin in September 1969, "provided there are no unforeseen developments in the international situation which would preclude early release of these aircraft and there is reasonable assurance of Israeli ability at least to support flight operations (i.e., to fly, but not necessarily to fight) with the aircraft."

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In reply refer to:
I-36073/68

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NND 981088
142m/SHV 4-20-05

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Accelerated Delivery of F-4E Aircraft to Israel

Attached is a draft Memorandum for the President recommending earlier delivery of F-4s to Israel. General Wheeler's memorandum on this same subject is also attached.

If you approve the language, I will send the draft to State for Dean Rusk's concurrence.

Although I do not recommend that it be included in the Memorandum for the President, you should know that there is apparently an additional problem with respect to training the Israeli maintenance personnel. Although they were given clearly to understand in January of this year that maintenance training could be accomplished between January 1969 and January 1970 only if the 110 Israelis sent to the United States had a high proficiency in English, it appears that they do not. What proficiency they do possess is not yet known exactly, but the Israelis have requested language training for them. Depending on the level of proficiency, there could be a delay in the maintenance training of three to four months.

DEF 12-5 ISR

Paul R. Kirk

Attachment

17 DEC 1968

APPROVE

Clark M. Casper

SEE ME

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ Declassify with concurrence of ASD
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by *ms* Date: 3/6/96

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On balance, I recommend we agree to commence deliveries in September 1969. In agreeing to this action, we will make clear to the Government of Israel that (1) unforeseen developments could necessitate a change in this decision; (2) we cannot recommend that Israel take delivery of any F-4s prior to the time their personnel are adequately trained, but are willing to release the aircraft starting in September 1969, on the assumption that Israel accepts the risks involved; and (3) if Israel determines that they must have assistance in the maintenance of the aircraft, such assistance will be provided by U.S. contractor personnel, but not the USAF.

Attachment

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05




THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3824-68
11 December 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Arab-Israeli Military Balance (U)

1. (S) In my memorandum of 18 June 1968 on this subject, (CM-3411-68), I provided you an assessment of the relative military capabilities of Israel and the radical Arab states. This assessment was related to the then-pending decision on sale of F-4 aircraft to Israel. It contained the judgment that uncertainties regarding French delivery of MIRAGE V aircraft to Israel and the success of Soviet efforts to upgrade the qualitative aspects of the Arab Air Forces posed a possible danger period, early in 1970, when Israel could face a serious air threat.
2. (S) Subsequent to the US decision to proceed with the sale of the F-4s, I was visited by Israeli Ambassador Rabin, General Hod, Commander of the Israeli Air Force, and the Israeli Military Attache to the United States, General Carmon. The primary mission of the Israeli delegation was to press for delivery of F-4s earlier than the previously planned January 1970 starting date. The Israelis stated that their request was based on intelligence indicating a buildup of Arab Air Forces, particularly those of the UAR and Syria, at a rate higher than previously expected. They proposed that, for deterrence purposes, two F-4s per month be delivered starting in April 1969, even though the initial aircraft would not be combat ready and US technicians would be required in Israel for the first few months to perform maintenance. In view of this new development in the F-4 negotiations, I have prepared an updated assessment of Arab and Israeli capabilities projected through the first half of 1970, in an effort to evaluate the validity of the Israeli request and the intelligence which purportedly formed the basis for that request.
3. (S) Enclosure A shows current and projected inventories of Arab and Israeli ground force equipment. The ratio is essentially that obtaining at the start of the June 1967 war,



See Def Cont Hr. X-_____

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and little change is expected over the next 18 months. Even with the adverse equipment ratio, Israel, short of complete loss of air superiority, is considered for the period of this estimate to be capable of defending against the ground forces of any Arab country or combination of Arab countries. Despite the efforts of Soviet advisors, Arab ground forces are not expected during the next 18 months to reach the training level which they held at the start of the six-day war. Additionally, inadequacies in such areas as organization, command and control, logistics, and morale will still be present in the Arab armies.

4. (S) Enclosure B shows current and projected inventories of Arab and Israeli Naval equipment. Here, too, the ratio is expected to adhere closely to that of June 1967 throughout the period of the estimate. As with the ground forces, only a loss of air superiority would make Israel vulnerable to serious naval attack. Should this unlikely event occur, Arab naval activity would still be limited since the logistics system precludes sustained combat operations in Israeli waters. The qualitative inadequacies attributed to the Arab ground forces also apply.

5. (S) At Enclosure C is a portrayal of Arab and Israeli Air Force equipment inventories now and at six-month intervals out to June 1970. This more detailed estimate for the Air Forces has been attempted since it has a direct bearing on the F-4 delivery question and, as was noted above, air superiority is the keystone of the Israeli military strategy. Although the six-month projections are based on the best information available, they should be used with caution in the case of the Arabs since Soviet deliveries follow no fixed pattern. For example, it is known that since the June 1967 war, some Arab countries have had no aircraft deliveries for periods of up to 9 months. Israeli projections, on the other hand, are valid since they reflect known A-4 and assumed F-4 delivery rates. The figures are based on an estimate that only the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed hostilities with Israel. It is believed that Algerian aircraft might be made available for reinforcement within a few days after the start of hostilities; however, the limited air inventories of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are considered incapable of significantly contributing to a renewed conflict. To allow a more refined assessment, raw aircraft numbers have been modified as explained in Enclosure C to reflect combat-ready

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rates. A line has also been added to reflect availability to the Israelis of the French MIRAGE Vs. While there is no evidence that these aircraft will be released to the Israelis during the period of this estimate, the intelligence people continue to believe that chances are better than even that Israel will at some time acquire all 50 of these aircraft. Apropos of this, Ambassador Rabin, during his recent visit to my office, said that the Israelis had once again approached the French and had received a flat "no."

6. (S) The second footnote to Enclosure C shows the discrepancies which have recently developed between US estimates of the Arab aircraft inventories and the Israeli holdings. I think it is significant that the two intelligence agencies had been in close agreement on these estimates until early November 1968 when the Israeli Ambassador presented the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) with new figures at the start of the F-4 negotiations. Not only was this new evidence presented through a new channel, but, since its presentation, the established Israeli intelligence contacts have been unable to present the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with credible evidence to support the new figures. Also, the Israelis express concern that Soviet pilots are now flying UAR aircraft and might be expected to participate in future hostilities. While DIA acknowledges that the Soviets are flying UAR aircraft in training and supervisory capacities, it believes that the Soviets would assiduously avoid direct participation in any renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities.

7. (TS) Analysis of the data on Air Forces in Enclosure C shows that in high performance fighters, Israel will be at its greatest disadvantage from June 1969 until at least mid-1970. The June 1969 projection shows a raw ratio of 1:6.9 (1:4.4 when adjusted to reflect estimates of combat readiness), while the December 1969 projection shows a ratio of 1:8.4 (1:5.3 adjusted). As late as June 1970, the ratio will still be 1:7.4 (1:4.8 adjusted), assuming that F-4 deliveries start in January 1970 at the scheduled rate of four per month. In a previous memorandum to Walt Rostow on this subject (CM-3226-68), dated 17 May 1968, a copy of which was furnished your office, I stated my belief that the high performance aircraft ratio existing at the start of the June 1967 war, approximately 1:4, was still considered a valid benchmark. As shown above, the predicted adverse ratios for Israel significantly exceed the raw ratio of 1:4 heretofore considered the maximum safety level.

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BY XX NARA Date 12/5/05

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8. (TS) The data on medium performance aircraft in Enclosure C shows Israel to be at much better advantage in this area. The current raw ratio of 1:2.1 (modified to a combat-ready 1:1.3) represents the low mark in disadvantage to Israel, and as A-4 deliveries progress, the Israeli combat-ready inventory of this type aircraft will actually exceed that of the Arabs by December of 1969. This favorable situation will partially offset the high performance aircraft disadvantage, since the A-4 has a limited air defense capability.

9. (S) In my June memorandum, I listed a number of actions the Arabs were taking to improve their air defense posture. Information available now points to steady progress in these actions. The UAR has completed, or nearly completed, hangarages to provide protection for 400 fighter aircraft -- more than the number of such aircraft in UAR inventory. Many of these hangarages have blast doors for additional protection. Syria has hangarages for 70 fighters and construction is continuing. Although there is no evidence of construction of hangarages for bombers, the UAR has been rotating its bomber fleet between home fields and bases in Iraq and Algeria. Operational readiness levels at all installations have improved. The combat-ready rate for operationally assigned UAR aircraft has risen to between 65 and 70 percent. All of these improvements reinforce my belief that even with a strategy of preemption, Israel could not again gain air superiority with the ease and rapidity it did in June 1967.

10. (S) I believe that the Israeli proposal for delivery of a few noncombat-ready, US-maintained, F-4 aircraft in the spring of 1969 has implications which should be carefully considered. While I agree that these aircraft would probably contribute to Israel's deterrent posture, I believe that a large measure of that deterrence would lie in the US interest in Israel's security which would be conveyed to that country's enemies by our willingness to deploy a nonready weapons system and, especially, to deploy US personnel to maintain that weapons system. Given recent public statements by some Israeli leaders calling for a US commitment to Israel's defense, I believe we must be prudent in undertaking any action which could be construed as movement in this direction. In addition, I think there are political drawbacks attendant to placing US personnel in Israel. This action would add to

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0252

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DATE 12/5/05

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the already pronounced Arab/Soviet - Israeli/US polarization in the area, further inflame the few moderate Arab friends the US has remaining (although the US decision to sell Israel the F-4s has already done this), and possibly decrease chances for a political settlement. Should US personnel become involved in an accident or incident or become the target of Arab terrorist attacks, the United States could become embroiled in Middle East affairs to a degree unexpected and unwanted. For these reasons I would be particularly reluctant to see US military personnel deployed to Israel.

11. (S) I asked the US Air Force to look into the matter of F-4 availability to support the Israeli request for early deliveries. Considering hardware alone, their study shows that deliveries beginning in April 1969 would require an unacceptable drawdown on spares from the US Air Force inventory. Aircraft with proper supporting spares could be delivered starting in September 1969 without adverse effect on US operations, provided there is no drastic change in the international situation, particularly in Southeast Asia, and there are no downward adjustments in the US Air Force procurement program. Training the Israelis to support aircraft delivered as early as September 1969 presents problems. The Air Force believes that the training plan in support of January 1970 aircraft deliveries represents about the maximum in compression. Without the necessary training, the Israelis might expect to conduct small-scale flying operations before January 1970, but their ability to maintain the aircraft and assure proper functioning of its complicated systems and subsystems would be in grave doubt. The only way to insure proper support would appear to be deployment of US personnel to Israel to perform the necessary maintenance and instruction tasks until the Israelis become self-sufficient in this respect. It is my understanding that you share my concern over deployment of US personnel to Israel, especially military personnel, and have asked the Air Force to study the feasibility of having civilian contractor personnel perform the support functions attendant to the Israeli F-4 sales program.

12. (S) Based on the information presented above, it is my belief that, although there is no evidence to support Israeli allegations of accelerated aircraft deliveries to the Arabs, US projections of Arab aircraft inventories and

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readiness posture show that the Israelis will face a serious air threat from June 1969 until June 1970. I consider the threat sufficient to warrant start of F-4 deliveries in September 1969 provided there is reasonable assurance of Israeli ability to at least support flight operations with the aircraft. For military and political reasons, I do not believe US military personnel should be deployed to Israel in connection with the F-4 sales program. Rather, civilian contractor personnel should be used to meet any essential needs. If it develops that US contractor personnel will in any event be needed in Israel, I consider that Israel's need for aircraft is sufficient to warrant any increased risk which might be incurred by deploying such personnel in September 1969 rather than in January 1970. In this connection, I have long been impressed by the initiative, ingenuity and resourcefulness displayed by Israeli military personnel. I am confident that their in-country requirements for US assistance will be minimal in comparison to other customers for the F-4.

13. (S) It is my recommendation that F-4 deliveries to Israel begin in September 1969, provided there are no unforeseen developments in the international situation which would preclude early release of these aircraft and there is reasonable assurance of Israeli ability to at least support flight operations with the aircraft. If it develops that US personnel will be needed in-country to support the aircraft regardless of delivery date, I recommend that they be limited to civilian contractor personnel and that they be deployed as early as September 1969 if needed to obtain the required flight support assurance. (This memorandum has not been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures
A/S

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0254

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AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 5

DATE: 11 December 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: MG

FROM: Wheeler, EG TO: SECDEF

SUBJECT: Arab Israeli Military Balance

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: _____ OTHER: ☒

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 6

DATE: 9 December 1967 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: MC

FROM: _____ TO: _____

SUBJECT: Military Equipment vs. in Prepared to Release to Israel

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: _____ OTHER: ☒

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 967000
BY: 366 NARA Date 12/15/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 7

DATE: 9 December 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: MC

FROM: _____ TO: _____

SUBJECT: Military Equipment U.S. is prepared to release to Israel

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: _____ OTHER: ✓

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
____ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 96000
BY: JK NARA Date: 12/5/05

46
Case No. 539 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Request Involving the Purchase of Military
Equipment, Materials or Services under the
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968

DEF 12-5 JSK

Enclosed are eight copies of a note dated December 3,
1968, from the Embassy of Israel, submitting a request for
the purchase the two items on the attached list (EG/1808).

The Department of State approves from an economic, legal,
and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request as a cash
sale under the legislative authority of the Foreign Military
Sales Act of 1968. This approval is subject to any patent or
proprietary rights as well as any security or disclosure policy
considerations that may apply to this material.

Robert J. Barnard
G/PM - Military
Assistance and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Concurrence: NEA/IAI - Mr. Lambrakis *Baltz*
NEA/RA - ~~Mr. Padelford~~ *Bunte* (See Reference Slip) *12/19/68*
G/PM-MC - Mr. Bowie
PPC/MAS - Mr. Klein *mk*
L/E - Mr. Massey *mm*

MICROFILMED BY 85/4

①

DEF 12-5 JSK

0258

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
DATE 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

שגרירות ישראל
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1968 DEC 6 AM 9 01

EG / 1808

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

ACTION
is assigned to

G/PM

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and referring to the eligibility of the Government of Israel for reimbursable military assistance under the provisions of Section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1961, has the honor to submit a request for the purchase, under Dependable Undertaking financial arrangement, from the Department of the Army, of the following items:-

1. Design and manufacturing data for construction of Anti-Gas Infant Protectors V-815. Three hundred thousand (300,000) units of this item will be manufactured in Israel for domestic purposes only.
2. Three hundred thousand (300,000) units of Filtering Elements for

25592

Anti-Gas Infant Protectors manufactured by Pittsburgh, Coke and

Chemical Company, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The filtering

element is needed for the construction in Israel of the Infant

Protector, Anti-Gas.

The above is requested for the Israel Defense Forces.

DEC 3 - 1968

#539

DEF 12-5 ISR

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY J6 INARA Date 12/31/05

46

Case No. 541 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Request Involving the Purchase of Military
Equipment, Materials or Services under the
Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1968

DEF 12-5 FSR

Enclosed are eight copies of a note dated December 3, 1968, from the Embassy of Israel, submitting a request for the purchase of 144 Each M 906, 1310-B 40mm Cartridges for M79 (HE Grenade).

The Department of State approves from an economic, legal, and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request as a sale under the legislative authority of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. This approval is subject to any patent or proprietary rights as well as any security or disclosure policy considerations that may apply to this material.

Robert J. Barnard
G/PM-Military
Assistance and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Concurrences; NEA/IAI - Mr. Lambrakis
NEA/RA - Mr. Padeiford
G/PM-MC - Mr. Bowie
PPC/MAS - Mr. Klein
L/E - Mr. Massey

RECORDED BY RS/2

DEF 12-5 FSR

0260

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 967000
DATE 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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ושינגטון

1968 DEC 6 AM 9 40

EG / 1813

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

ACTION
is assigned to

6/PM

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable
Secretary of State and referring to the eligibility of the Government
of Israel for reimbursable military assistance under the provisions
of Section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1961, has the honor to
submit a request for the purchase, under Dependable Undertaking
financial arrangement, from the Department of the Army, of 144 each
M 906, 1310-B 568 40 mm. Cartridges for M79 (HE Grenade).

The above is requested for the Israel Defense Forces.

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Early delivery is required.

13-6-68

y.R

DEC 3 - 1968

#54)

DEF 12-5-68

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY 16 NARA Date 12/5/05

46

Case No. 537 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Request Involving the Purchase of Military
Equipment, Materials or Services under the
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968

DEF 12-5 JSR

Enclosed are eight copies of a note dated December 3,
1968, from the Embassy of Israel, submitting a request for
115,000 Each - 66650508529 Paper Chemical Agent, Detector
VGH, ABC-MS.

The Department of State approves from an economic,
legal, and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request
as a sale under the legislative authority of the Foreign
Military Sales Act of 1968. This approval is subject to
any patent or proprietary rights as well as any security
or disclosure policy considerations that may apply to this
material.

Robert J. Barnard
G/PM - Military
Assistance and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Concurrence: NEA/IAI - Mr. Lambakis
NEA/RA - Mr. Padelford
G/PM-MC - Mr. Bowie
PPC/MAS - Mr. Klein
L/E - Mr. Massey

State (See Reference Slip) Ofa 12/19/68
Burt
State (See Reference Slip) Ofa 12/19/68
JMM

MICROFILMED BY NS/R

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DEF 12-5 JSR

0262

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
DATE 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

שגרירות ישראל
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1968 DEC 6 AM 9 35

EG / 1811

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

ACTION
is assigned to

~~S/PM~~

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable
Secretary of State and referring to the eligibility of the Government
of Israel for reimbursable military assistance under the provisions
of Section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1961, has the honor to
submit a request for the purchase, under Dependable Undertaking
financial arrangement, from the Department of the Army, of 115,000
Each - 66650508529 Paper Chemical Agent, Detector VGH, ABC-MB.

The above is requested for the Israel Defense Forces.

25590

① 12-6-68

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DEF 12-6-68 ISR

DEC 3 - 1968

#537

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
EX-114 INARA Date 12/15/05

46
HST
December 23, 1968

Honorable Thomas E. Morgan
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of December 4, 1968 (which was apparently delayed in transit), in which you noted the current negotiations over the sale of supersonic aircraft to Israel and expressed concern that the survivors of the USS LIBERTY attack receive full and fair compensation.

The claims for compensation on behalf of the 167 men injured in the June 8, 1967 Israeli attack on the USS LIBERTY are currently in preparation and are expected to be ready in a very short time for presentation to the Government of Israel. Delay has resulted from the fact that in some serious cases therapy has continued for over a year after the injury and it has not been possible to determine the extent of lost earning capacity until therapy is concluded.

I can assure you that the Department will press these claims vigorously once they are submitted. I will be happy to keep you informed of further developments in this matter.

In the meantime, we are continuing negotiations with the Government of Israel over the sale of supersonic aircraft in light of Israel's defense requirements, which we believe it is in the U. S. interest to help meet.

Sincerely yours,

(S)
Cleared by:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
L/C - Mr. Kerley
NEA - Mr. McConnell
H - Miss Folger

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

NEA/IAI:JDLeonard:cr:12/18/68
RS/R - 16143 12/18/68 Ext. 4967

44

Honorable Thomas E. Morgan
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Morgan:

The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of December 4, 1968 (which was apparently delayed in transit), in which you noted the current negotiations over the sale of supersonic aircraft to Israel and expressed concern that the survivors of the USS LIBERTY attack receive full and fair compensation.

The claims for compensation on behalf of the 167 men injured in the June 8, 1967 Israeli attack on the USS LIBERTY are currently in preparation and are expected to be ready in a very short time for presentation to the Government of Israel. Delay has resulted from the fact that in some serious cases therapy has continued for over a year after the injury and it has not been possible to determine the extent of lost earning capacity until therapy is concluded.

I can assure you that the Department will press these claims vigorously once they are submitted. I will be happy to keep you informed of further developments in this matter.

In the meantime, we are continuing negotiations with the Government of Israel over the sale of supersonic aircraft in light of Israel's defense requirements, which we believe it is in the U. S. interest to help meet.

Sincerely yours,

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations
Cleared by: NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
L/C - Mr. Kerley
NEA - Mr. McConnell
H - Miss Folger

NEA/IAI:JDLeard:cr:12/18/68
RS/R - 16143 12/18/68 Ext. 4967

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY 164 NARA Date 12/5/05

FORM 12-63 DS-1563

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ACTION SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

DATE
HP
1/11

CONTROL NO.

S/S 16143

TO
NEA - Mr. Precht

DATE
December 17, 1968

SUBJECT
Ltr to the Secretary from Thomas Morgan, 12/4/68, regarding
current negotiations with Israel re the sale of jet aircraft

ACTION

*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

For appropriate action.

For direct reply. Comeback copy required _____.

XXX Prepare reply. A response for signature by ~~the~~ Mr. Macomber

Clear with _____

Prepare a _____ to _____

Refer to White House request of _____

XXX Due in ~~SSS~~ ^H by December 19, 1968

For your information.

REMARKS

December 4 letter apparently delayed in transit; Delivered to
Department December 17. H informed. Please reply quickly.

COPIES TO

S - Mr. Shlaudeman (w/att)
H - Mr. Briggs (w/att)

J. Hawley
SECRETARIAT STAFF
EXT. 4154

0266

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J64 NARA Date 12/5/05

46

THOMAS E. MORGAN, PA., CHAIRMAN

CLEMENT J. ZARLOCKI, WIS.
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 E. ROSS ADAIR, IND.
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 WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, MICH.
 J. IRVING WHALLEY, PA.
 H. R. GROSS, IOWA
 E. Y. BERRY, S. DAK.
 EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, ILL.
 F. BRADFORD MORSE, MASS.
 VERNON W. THOMSON, WIS.
 JAMES G. FULTON, PA.
 PAUL FINDLEY, ILL.
 JOHN BUCHANAN, ALA.
 ROBERT TAFT, JR., OHIO

BOYD CRAWFORD, STAFF ADMINISTRATOR
 ROY J. BULLOCK, SENIOR STAFF CONSULTANT

16143

Congress of the United States
 Committee on Foreign Affairs
 House of Representatives
 Washington, D.C. 20515

December 4, 1968

Hon. Dean Rusk
 Secretary of State
 Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is my understanding that the Departments of State and Defense are currently negotiating with the Government of Israel in connection with the sale of jet aircraft and other armament. I am in wholehearted accord with the objective of providing Israel with the arms necessary to at least partially offset the growing imbalance of weapons in the Middle East resulting from the tremendous influx of armament from the Soviet Union.

I am concerned, however, that in conducting any such negotiations we take care to ensure that the survivors of the LIBERTY receive full and fair compensation promptly.

I would appreciate your keeping me informed on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas E. Morgan
 Chairman

TEM/cl

DEF 12-5 ISK
 XR DEF 19-8 US-ISK
 XR DS 8-4 US-ISK

INTERFILED BY RS/R

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0267

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY NND 96900
 BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 8

DATE: Dec 12, 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: TM
FROM: Wahle, J P TO: Bowley Smith
SUBJECT: _____
DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY 66 NARA Date 12/5/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

9056

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1968

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : NEA - Lucius D. Battle
SUBJECT: Israel and the MD-620 Missile

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/class'n
☒ Declassify with concurrence of
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by AW Date: 3/6/96

FOIA(b)1

Withdrawal No. DEF Box 91-1967-69
Central File #9

DISCUSSION

In the general consideration of Israel's request for F-4s, I recall that the Israelis have never really been forthright with us in discussing their own planning on the introduction of the MD-620 surface-to-surface missiles that are being built under contract in France. Despite several probes last fall (e.g. our questioning of Brig. Gen. Ezer Weizman, Chief of Operations, Israeli Defense Forces, and a subsequent approach to Prime Minister Eshkol), all we have been told is that an Israeli decision on moving from development to production of the MD-620s was not imminent and that Israel had not determined the role SSMS might play in its overall military posture. A senior Israeli Foreign Ministry official told our Charge that Prime Minister Eshkol believed we were carrying our inquiries in this field too far. We were advised to ask again in "18-24 months" (Weizman) or "two to three years" (Eshkol). The US intelligence community, however, indicates that an initial operational capability of the MD-620 system, political considerations aside, is technically possible as early as 1969.

Up to now we have used our Ambassador in Tel Aviv as our main information channel out of respect for the wishes of Prime Minister Eshkol who, for his own reasons, did not want to involve the Israeli Embassy here in nuclear or missile questions. Ambassador Rabin, however, has a very special relationship with Eshkol, and as former IDF Chief of Staff, is familiar with the problem. I recently raised this question with Minister Evron who pleaded ignorance. It seems to me that an approach now by you to Rabin would emphasize the great weight we attach to the

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

Declassified

Authority: 2556

By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-18-2005

NEA - Lucius D. Battle

DEF 12-5 ISR

0269

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J4 NARA DATE 12/3/05

~~SECRET/EXD16~~

2

missile issue today in view of our pending decision on the F-4s. A personal approach by you might also reassure the Israelis about the security of information we are asking them to provide. They are particularly touchy on this score in view of recent leaks about the MD-620 program.

In view of the implications for the US of this decision and the highly secret nature of the Franco-Israeli missile contract, it seems to me that we deserve more forthright answers than we have so far had from the Israelis. Should we decide to grant the Israeli request for F-4s and actually deliver them, only to find out afterwards that missile production and deployment were proceeding in a predetermined fashion, the effect upon the Middle East arms balance would be grave.

FOIA(b)1

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to talk to Ambassador Rabin in quite specific terms (we will furnish suggested talking points) about his government's intentions and projected capabilities in acquiring short and medium range surface-to-surface missiles.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

FOIA(b)1

Clearances:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
INR - Mr. Austin (draft) *GBL*

GBL
NEA/IAI:GBLambrakis:INR/RNA:STTait:pjw

~~SECRET/EXD16~~

0270

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY *JK* INARA Date 12/5/05

FOIA(b)1

DEF 12-5 JSR

0271

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96800
BY JLR INARA Date 12/5/05

FOIA(b)1

0272

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96400
BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05

SANITIZED COPY ATTACHED

4-19-05

TAB9

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 9

DATE: June 29, 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: ME
FROM: Battle, L.D. TO: The Secretary
SUBJECT: Israel and the M.O.-620 missile
DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96400
BY 66 NARA Date 12/5/05

46

Case No. 538 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Request Involving the Purchase of Military
Equipment, Materials or Services under the
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968

DEF 12-5 TSK

Enclosed are eight copies of a note dated December 3, 1968, from the Embassy of Israel, submitting a request for the purchase of one (1) Radar Mortar AN/MPQ-4A to be used by the Israel Defense Force.

The Department of State approves from an economic, legal, and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request as a sale under the legislative authority of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. This approval is subject to any patent or proprietary rights as well as any security or disclosure policy considerations that may apply to this material.

Robert J. Barnard
G/PM - Military
Assistant and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Concurrence: NEA/IAI - Mr. Lambakis *Call to see Reference Slip Dtd 12/29/68*
NEA/RA - Mr. Padelford *Brnck 03*
G/PM-MC - Mr. Bowie *See Reference Slip Dtd 12/19/68*
PPC/MAS - Mr. Klein *pmk*
L/E - Mr. Massey *JMM*

REPRODUCED BY DS/A

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DEF 12-5 TSK

0274

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY JKA/NARA Date 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

1968 DEC 6 AM 9 30

ACTION
is assigned to

G/P/M

EG / 1810

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable
Secretary of State and referring to the eligibility of the Government
of Israel for reimbursable military assistance under the provisions
of Section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1961, has the honor to
submit a request for the purchase, under Dependable Undertaking,
financial arrangement, from the Department of the Army, of One Radar
Mortar AN/MPQ-4A.

The above is requested for the Israel Defense Force.

25591

① 12-6-68

J.R.

DEF 12-5 I.S.

DEC 3 - 1968

#538

0275

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY JAC NARA Date 12/5/05

46

Case No. 542 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Request Involving the Purchase of Military
Equipment, Materials or Services under the
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968

DEF 12-5 ISK

Enclosed are eight copies of a note dated December 3,
1968, from the Embassy of Israel, submitting a request for
the purchase of the optical sets listed on the enclosure
(EG/1816).

The Department of State approves from an economic, legal,
and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request as a sale
under the legislative authority of the Foreign Military Sales
Act of 1968. This approval is subject to any patent or
proprietary rights as well as any security or disclosure
policy considerations that may apply to this material.

Robert J. Barnard
G/PM - Military
Assistance and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Concurrence: NEA/IAI - Mr. Lambakis
NEA/RA - Mr. Padelford *Bunter*
G/PM-MC - Mr. Bowie
PPC/MAS - Mr. Klein *PMK*
L/E - Mr. Massey *SM*

MICROFILMED BY NS/R

(1)

DEF 12-5 ISK

Balta (See Reference Slip) Dfd 12/18/68

0276

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
DATE 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

DEC 6 AM 9 45

EG / 1816

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

ACTION
is assigned to

G/PM

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable Secretary of State and referring to the eligibility of the Government of Israel for reimbursable military assistance under the provisions of Section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1961, has the honor to submit a request for the purchase, under Dependable Undertaking financial arrangement, from the Department of the Army, of optical sets as follows:

- 1) 50 each - 12409801745 Telescope Articulated M 105 D w/equipment.
- 2) 350 each - 12407060794 Periscope M.28 C .
- 3) 60 each - 12406544572 Head Periscope M.3A .
- 4) 60 each - 12907364342 Indicator Azimuth M 28 . A 1 .
- 5) 40 each - 12208569454 Computer Ballistic M 13 A 2 .
- 6) 100 each - 12908569451 Quadrant Elevation M 13 A 3 .
- 7) 10 each - 12408757933 Finder Range M 17 A 1 .

25586

12-6-68

The above items are requested for the Israel Defense Force.

Early delivery is required.

y.R

DEC 3 - 1968 #542

DEF 12-6 ISR

0277

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
DATE 12/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

31

Def 12-5 Ser

SECRET 426

PAGE 01 LONDON 15301 191844Z

53

ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,1070 W

089196

R 191723Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7887
INFO DOD WASHDC
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET LONDON 15301

LIMDIS

DOD FOR ISA/OSD AND DIA

REF: LONDON 15272

1. COL AVNON, ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE, LET SMALL CAT OUT OF BAG LAST EVENING WHEN HE TOLD EMBOFF THAT BRIGADIER TAL, COMMANDER, ISRAELI DEFENSE CORPS, WILL BE IN UK FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS IN LATTER PART OF JANUARY. WE HAVE ARRANGED TO MEET WITH TAL WHILE HE IS IN LONDON IN EFFORT TO CONFIRM OUR VISCERAL SUSPICION THAT HIS VISIT MAY WELL BE ASSOCIATED WITH POSSIBLE GOI PROCUREMENT OF CHIEFTAIN TANKS.

BRUCE

*London - 15301
12-19-68*

SECRET

27

0278

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
DATE 12/5/05

L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

TOP SECRET

Screener

POST London

(Time Received)

SERIAL 15501

1968 DEC 19 PM 5 15

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 370

Secretariat

Geographic

Other

S/S-S 1
S/S-O 1
S/S-Screener 3
S/S-EX
S/S-CMS
S/S-O DIR
MilRep
Summary
Task Force

AF5
ARA9
EA11
EUR10
NEA8

ACDA5
AID/EXSEC3
AA/AFR2
AA/VN2
AA/EA3
AA/NESA2

Functional

Principals

ES2
S
U
M2
G
S/NL
SIG
S/AH3
S/AL
SA
S/CPR
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/R
S/FW
S/PM
M/WP
G/PM

CU
E2
H
IGA
INR6
IO4
L2
O3
OPR
OC
SY
WLG
P2
SCA
SCS
SCI

PC
VP
AEC3
AGR3
COM2
EXIM
FRB
LAB
NASA
NIC
STR
TRANS
TRSY6
JUS
IRS
INT
BOB
FBI
CEA
FAA

OTHER AGENCIES

WH10
CIA
DOD
USIA4
NSA

File
Burned

0279

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
DATE 12/5/05

46

December 18, 1968
Case No. 534 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Out-of-Channels Request from Israel

Attached is an out-of-channels request dated September 10, 1968, from the Embassy of Israel, expressing an interest in obtaining 1280 each Impregnating Set, Clothing, Field M3. OASD/ISA/ILN requested Department of State approval on November 20, 1968.

The Department of State approves from an economic, legal, and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request as a cash sale under the legislative authority of Section 21 of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. This approval is subject to any patent or proprietary rights and security considerations that apply to this material as may be subsequently determined by the Department of Defense.

DEF 12-5 ISK

RECEIVED BY NSA

Robert J. Barnard
G/PM - Military
Assistance and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Concurrence: NEA/IAI - Mr. Bahti
NEA/RA - Mr. Padelford
G/PM-MC - Mr. Bowie
AID/PPC - Mr. Klein
L/E - Mr. Massey

Dfk (See Reference Slip) 12/18/68

①

G/PM-MASP:RJBarnard:scb:11/5/68

0280

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
DATE 12/5/05



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

In reply refer to
I-12950/68
20 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS
MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES POLICY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (G/PM MASP)
ROOM 2408

SUBJECT: Out-of-Channel Requests from Israel

Attached are out-of-channel requests from Israel. State approval and the assignment of case numbers is requested.

John Doldt

JOHN DOLDT
Assistant
Near East Negotiations
International Logistics Negotiations

- 3 Atchs
1. Israeli Note #2169/6-3,
10 Sep 68
2. Israeli Note #2183/6-3,
10 Sep 68
3. Israeli Note #2303/6-3,
20 Sep 68

DEF 12-5 ISR

RECORDED BY IS/8

(1)
#5244 534

0281

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

46
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON
DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES ATTACHE



שגרירות ישראל
בשילוח
במסגרת תוכנית

10 September, 1968

2169/6-3

Chief, Military Sales Division,
Mutual Security Office,
Hq. U.S. Army Material Command,
Washington, D.C. 20315.

Dear Sir:

It would be very much appreciated if you could provide us with a Letter of Offer for the following:

1280 each - Impregnating Set Clothing, Field M3.

This request is in addition to the 1000 Impregnating Set Clothing offered to us under Case UP2.

Thank you for your kind consideration.

Sincerely yours,

S. Goren

Shmuel Goren - Lt. Colonel
Assistant Armed Forces Attache.

5457.

DEF 12-5 ISK

Z-12958/6P

0282

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 96800
EX-114 NARA Date 12/5/05

46

Case No. 535 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Out-of-Channels Request from Israel

Attached is an out-of-channels request dated September 10, 1968, from the Embassy of Israel, expressing an interest in obtaining the material listed in the enclosed letter 2303/6-3. OASD/ISA/ILN requested Department of State approval on November 20, 1968.

The Department of State approves from an economic, legal, and political viewpoint, the meeting of this request as a cash sale under the legislative authority of Section 21 of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. This approval is subject to any patent or proprietary rights and security considerations that apply to this material as may be subsequently determined by the Department of Defense.

Robert J. Barnard
G/PM - Military
Assistance and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Concurrence:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Bahti
NEA/RA - Mr. Padelford
G/PM-MC - Mr. Bowie
PPC/MAS - Mr. Klein
L/E - Mr. Massey

MICROFILMED BY RS/R

G/PM-MASP: RJBarnard; scb: 12/5/68

DEF 12-5 ISK

0283

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05

46
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON

DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES ATTACHE

2303/6-3.

Chief, Military Sales Division,
Mutual Security Office,
Hq. U.S. Army Material Command,
Washington, D.C. 20315.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינטון

נכדח צמח הננה לישראל

20 September, 1968

Dear Sir:

It would be very much appreciated if you could provide us with a Letter of
Offer for the following:-

30 pcs. -- Standard Ordnance Rigging Block
Block Rating 30000 lbs.
Single 10 in. Dia Sheave.
Type Fittings: Swivel Oblong Eye and Chain Shackle.
Rope Size: 3/4 In.
Ordnance Drwg. No. 8383238.

30 pcs. -- Standard Ordnance Rigging Block
Single 12 In. Dia. Sheave Block
Rating 50000 lbs.
Type Fitting: Swivel Oblong Eye & Chain Chackle.
BDP. Size: 7/8".
Ordnance Drwg. No. 8383239.

Thank you for your kind consideration.

Sincerely yours,

U. Yaron
Uri Yaron -- Lt. Colonel
Assistant Armed Forces Attache.

5679.

#535

I 12954/68
Atch 3

0284

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 96900
By J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

4/6
EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON

DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES ATTACHE



שגרירות ישראל

ושינגטון

המחלקה הצבאית לישראל

20 September, 1968

2303/6-9.

Chief, Military Sales Division,
Mutual Security Office,
Hq. U.S. Army Material Command,
Washington, D.C. 20315.

Dear Sir:

It would be very much appreciated if you could provide us with a Letter of Offer for the following:-

30 pcs. -- Standard Ordnance Rigging Block
Block Rating 30000 lbs.
Single 10 in. Dia Sheavy.
Type Fittings: Swivel Oblong Eye and Chain Shackle.
Rope Size: 3/4 In.
Ordnance Drwg. No. 8383238.

30 pcs. -- Standard Ordnance Rigging Block
Single 12 In. Dia. Sheave Block
Rating 50000 lbs.
Type Fitting: Swivel Oblong Eye & Chain Shackle.
BDP. Size: 7/8".
Ordnance Drwg. No. 8383239.

Thank you for your kind consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Uri Yaron
Uri Yaron -- Lt. Colonel
Assistant Armed Forces Attache.

5679.

7-12954/68

DEP 12-5-ISK

0285

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 96900
By J4 NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

68

PAGE 01 LONDON 15272 181820Z

44

ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, SS 20, GPM 04, NSC 10, INR 07, CIAE 00, NSA 02, ACDA 16, MC 01, 1

RSR 01, RSC 01, /092 W

082054

R 181721Z-DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7867
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
DOD WASHDC

S E C R E T LONDON 15272

DOD FOR ISA/OSD

SUBJ: CHIEFTAIN TANKS FOR ISRAEL

1. CROSTHWAIT, (HEAD DEFENSE SUPPLY DEPT., FONOFF) CONFIRMED TODAY THAT UK HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO SALE OF CHIEFTAIN TANK TO ISRAEL. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT SALE HAD BEEN AGREED BY DEFENSE AND OVERSEAS POLICY COMMITTEE AFTER CONSIDERABLE SOUL SEARCHING.

DOPC CONCURRENCE APPARENTLY BASED ON ARGUMENTS (WHICH WE PRESUME CARRIED BY MOD AND SUPPORTED BY TREASURY) THAT UK BADLY NEEDED OVERSEAS SALES MARKET TO MAINTAIN CHIEFTAIN PRODUCTION LINE AND, PARENTHETICALLY, EMPLOYMENT LEVEL ENGAGED ON TANK. AVAILABILITY OF ISRAEL MARKET ASSUMED ADDED IMPORTANCE WITH DUTCH DECISION TO BUY THE GERMAN LEOPARD IN LIEU OF THE CHIEFTAIN (AND US MBT). PROponents OF SALE ALSO ADVANCED CASE THAT ISRAEL IN ANY EVENT TRADITIONAL UK ARMORED MARKET. SAYING ALL OF THIS CROSTHWAIT EMPHASIZED POSITION OF HMG THAT NO FINAL COMMITMENT HAD BEEN MADE TO SELL CHIEFTAINS ALTHOUGH CROSTHWAIT ADDED THAT IN DEALING WITH ISRAELIS ANY AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE IS LIABLE TO BE CONVERTED INTO AN IRREVOCABLE COMMITMENT.

2. CROSTHWAIT WAS VAGUE, AND WE BELIEVE BY DESIGN, ON DETAILS OF PROPOSED SALE. HE INDICATED DELIVERIES

SECRET

23

London - 15 4 72
12-18-68

0286

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 LONDON 15272 181820Z

WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL 1970 OR AFTER. ON NUMBERS
HE ADMITTED FIRST BATCH MIGH RUN BETWEEN 50-100.

3. COOPER, DEPUTY UNDER SEC. (MOD) ALSO TOLD POLITICAL
COUNSELOR TODAY THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING ON WITH
ISRAELIS RE CHIEFTAIN SALE. BOTH COOPER AND CROSTHWAIT
EMPHASIZED EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF FOREGOING AND REQUESTED
INFORMATION BE VERY TIGHTLY HELD.
BRUCE

SECRET

23

0287

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State

DEF 12-5 ISR

TELEGRAM

NR DEF 15 LIBYA-UIS

CONFIDENTIAL 554

PAGE 01 TRIPOL: 05563 161631Z

44
ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 10, EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,
L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, ACDA 16, MC 01, AID 28,
SA 01, SAL 01, RSR 01, 173 W

068491

R 161415Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3623
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
CINCEUR
CINCUSAFE
AMEMBASSY BAIDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 5563

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: PHANTOMS FOR ISRAEL

(2) 1. AMERICAN SOURCE HAD ADVISED CHIEF MAAG THAT RUMOR
PREVALENT IN LIBYA AND "BELIEVED IN SOME HIGH PLACES"
THAT ISRAELIS BEING TRAINED ON PHANTOM AIRCRAFT AT
WHEELUS AIR BASE.

2. RUMOR, POSSIBLY GENERATED OR ENCOURAGED BY
EGYPTIANS, UNDOUBTEDLY SUPPORTED BY LOCAL KNOWLEDGE
THAT WHEELUS IS "TRAINING BASE" AND THAT MAJORITY
FLIGHT ACTIVITY BY USAF PHANTOMS (F-4). EFFORT
CONNECT LOCALLY UNPOPULAR PHANTOM SALE TO ISRAEL
WITH WHEELUS NOT UNEXPECTED.

CONFIDENTIAL

23

Handwritten: Tripoli 5563
12/16/68

0288

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TRIPOL 05563 161631Z

3. FOR INFORMATION OTHER POSTS AND FOR USE AS APPROPRIATE TO DENY RUMOR AMONG RESPONSIBLE ELEMNTS IN FRIENDLY ARAB GOVERNMENTS, LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAS HAS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1967 OBSERVER GROUP STATIONED AT BASE WITH PRIVILEGE REVIEWING ALL FLIGHT AND TRAINING AGREES RESPECT INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA, INCLUDING ARAB LEAGUE.

NEWSOM

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

CONFIDENTIAL

25

0289

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

SECRET

16426

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Part I of III

Memorandum of Conversation

approved in S, 12/30/68

DATE: December 13, 1968

SUBJECT: Phantoms for Israel

PARTICIPANTS: His Excellency Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir
al-Sabah, Minister of Foreign Affairs
His Excellency Talat al-Ghoussein, Ambassador of
Kuwait
The Secretary
Ambassador Howard R. Cottam, US Ambassador to Kuwait
Mr. Parker T. Hart, Assistant Secretary for NEA
Mr. William D. Brewer, Country Director, NEA/ARP

Copies to: S/S. DOD, NEA-3, S/NE, S/D, KUWAIT, TEL AVIV, USINT CAIRO;
S/P. JIDDA, MOSCOW, AMMAN, LONDON, TEHRAN, BEIRUT, DHAIRAN
INR/OD.
WH.
CIA.

The Foreign Minister said that his Government was friendly towards the USG, and he had had close relations, himself, with the Secretary. He knew that the US wanted moderates like the Kuwaiti regime to be strong. The announcement of a sale of Phantoms to Israel would, however, weaken the US's Arab friends. Since Kuwait was "neutral", the impact might be less strong but Jordan and Saudi Arabia would be particularly weakened because of their very close ties with the US. The Foreign Minister wondered "as a personal friend" what the Secretary could tell him about this transaction.

The Secretary said it was not easy to speak of all elements involved. He recalled that there were large supplies of arms going into the area. We had always been reluctant to become a major supplier, but the arms which Egypt was receiving created problems with respect both to Israel and its Arab neighbors. The Secretary said he regretted that his efforts over eight years with respect to arms limitation in the Near East had met only with indifference. If the Phantom agreement were

NEA/ARP:WDBrewer:bnk:12/20/68

(Distrib. Office and Others)

SECRET

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

FORM 2-65 DS-1251

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 96000

By J6 NARA Date 12/31/05

(52)



Pol 27 Arab-ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
Xr Sep 12-5PSR

SECRET 180

PAGE 01 KUWAIT 01864 111018Z

21
ACTION NEA 15

INFO SS 25,OPM 04,NSC 10,NSA 02,CIAE 00,INR 07,RSC 01,DODE 00,EUR 15,

IO 13,RSR 01,AID 28,MC 01,ACDA 16,138 W

R 110835Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2005
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

040260

S E C R E T KUWAIT 1864

REF: BEIRUT 14905 DATED DEC 10, 1968

FOR AMBASSADOR COTTAM, NEA/ARP

WISH DRAW YOUR ATTENTION BEIRUT'S 14905, WHICH FROM THIS

(2) VANTAGE POINT IS WELL WORTH SUPPORTING IN TERMS: USG
INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE KUWAIT.

WOLLE

SECRET

12/11/68
Kuwait 1864

Pol 27 Arab-ISR
Xr Sep 12-5PSR

RECEIVED BY 12/1

0291

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
EX-16 NARA Date 12/5/05

ACTION

NEA-10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

DEF 12-5 ISR

DEF 12-5 US
FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
	2	5
6/PM	FBO	AID
		12
5/5	3/2	R/AN
10		
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIB
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
		NSC
		6

A-519
NO.

UNCLASSIFIED

TO : Department of State

FROM : Amembassy AMMAN

SUBJECT : Resolution of the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies Condemning
the United States for its "Decision to Provide Phantom
Aircraft to Israel."

REF :

RECEIVED
DEPT. OF STATE
DEC 18 9 42 AM 1968
NOTED FILE
NEA/ARM
12/16/68
RFF
ANALYSIS BRANCH
DATE: December 10, 1968

On December 8, 1968 the Embassy received the following message:

"His Excellency, The Ambassador of the United States of America
Amman

"As the decision of your government to provide Israel with Phantom
aircraft represents an open and hostile act against the Arab Nation,
assists the Aggressive State (of Israel) to continue its occupa-
tion of Arab lands, and encourages it to continue in its acts of
aggression against Arab lands, in consequence thereof the Chamber
of Deputies of Jordan unanimously condemns this decision and hopes
that the American People, represented by the American Congress and
their President-elect, will intervene to prevent the implementation
of this decision in order to preserve peace and security in this
area of the world.

"Kamal Iraiqtat, President of the Chamber of Deputies."

This message in the form of a resolution was presented to the Chamber of
Deputies by Deputies Rizq Batayneh of Irbid, Ati Abd al-Iz of Ma'an,
Salman al-Qudat of Ajloun, Abdul-Salam al-Oury of Ramallah, Muhammad
Khashman of Salt and Fawzi Jarrar of Jenin at its first meeting since
the opening of the session November 1. According to the local press
December 8, the message will also be transmitted to other governments
and legislative bodies through diplomatic channels.

FORM
4-62 DS-323

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:RH
POL:RH Pelletreau/clc 12/10/68

Clearances: POL:MDraper
for

Content and Classification Approved by:
5/10 DCM:ESDuncan

1968 DEC 18 AM 10 42

COPYFLO-PBR

0292

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
DATE 12/5/05

Amman A-519

UNCLASSIFIED

2

The December 7 meeting of the Chamber of Deputies had been scheduled for at least a week prior to that date, with the primary purpose of hearing a statement by Prime Minister Talhouni. We believe it was only by coincidence that Governor Scranton happened to be in Amman the following day.

SYMMES

GT

UNCLASSIFIED

0293

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 968000
BY J61 NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State

POL 27 ARABISR
XR DEF 12-5 ISR

TELEGRAM

SECRET 561

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 14905 102225Z

88

ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 10, EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, MC 01, ACDA 16,

AID 28, IGA 02, RSR 01, SAL 01, SA 01, SAM 02, NIC 01, OPR 02, T80 W
037581

R 1017105Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6539
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
CINCSRIKE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USUN NY 683
STATE GRNC

SECRET BEIRUT 14905

REF: AMMAN 7785 POL 27 ARABISR

1. WHEN INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE OF SALE PHANTOM AIR-
CRAFT TO ISRAEL, OUR GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSION WITH LEBANESE
OFFICIALS CONTAINED THE STRONG IMPLICATION THAT THERE WOULD
BE SOME SORT OF QUID PRO QUO EXPECTED FROM ISRAEL IN RETURN
FOR THIS SUBSTANTIAL (AND IN THEIR VIEW DANGEROUS) BUT-
TRESSING OF HER MILITARY STRENGTH. LEBANESE OFFICIALS, AND
PERHAPS OTHER ARAB OFFICIALS, HOPED AND INDEED EXPECTED THAT
INCLUDED IN SUCH QUID PRO QUO WOULD BE US INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL
TO ACCEPT NOV 22 UN RESOLUTION AND FACILITATE UARRING MISSION.
THUS FAR, NO PROGRESS ON PART OF UARRING IS VISIBLE TO ARAB

SECRET

Beirut 14905
12-10-68

0294

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY JAC NARA Date 12/5/05

The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top right corner of the document. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are written in a circle around the top, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" around the bottom.

DEF 12-5 ISR

TELEGRAM

SECRET 168

PAGE: 01 STATE: 280512

82
ORIGIN: SS: 10

INFO: 7010 R

DRAFTED BY: IO: NHFRISBIE
APPROVED BY: IO: NORMAN H. FRISBIE
S/S: MR. BROWN

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INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0422)

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EXDIS:

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE DEC 2, 1968 FROM AMMAN REPEATED
 TO YOU:

QUOTE SECRET AMMAN 7684

EXDIS:

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: STATE 253744

1. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PALACE TO FORWARD FOLLOWING LETTER
FROM KING HUSSEIN TO THE PRESIDENT:
QTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I APPRECIATED RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE OF OCT 11, 1968.
UNFORTUNATELY IT CONFIRMED BY PREMONITION THAT THE UNITED
STATES WOULD DECIDE TO SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH (AIR SUPERIORITY)
PHANTOM JET AIRCRAFT.

IN YOUR MESSAGE, SIR, YOU EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT I WOULD UNDERSTAND THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED YOU TO TAKE THIS ACTION. FRANKLY, I COULD NOT HELP BUT BE MORE DISILLUSIONED BY THIS ACTION. AS YOU ARE AWARE, MR. PRESIDENT, I HAVE DONE, AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO, ALL THAT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE IN THE HOPE OF CLEARING THE WAY TO A JUST, HONOURABLE, AND THUS LASTING

~~SECRET~~

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0295

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AUTHORITY **NND 969000**
BY **64** INARA Date **12/5/05**

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 280512

PEACE IN OUR AREA. I AM WILLINGLY TAKING GREAT POLITICAL AND OTHER RISKS IN MY ENDEAVOURS TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE. IF WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE, IT IS BECAUSE OF ISRAEL'S INTRANSIGENCE AND FAILURE TO MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCESSIONS TOWARDS THAT END, AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S OBVIOUS TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS WHICH SHE OFTEN SHROUDS UNDER THE GUISE OF "NATIONAL SECURITY."

I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL, IF IT DOES INCREASE HER BELLIGERENT AMBITIONS, THEN IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS CURTAILING THEM. THE CONTINUOUS FLOW OF ARMS INTO ISRAEL MAY ONLY ENCOURAGE HER INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE, AND THUS, I FAIL TO SEE HOW THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PHANTOMS WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY DIMINISH YOUR SUPPORT FOR AMBASSADOR JARRING'S EFFORTS.

I QUITE AGREE THAT OUR SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE AREA WILL BE FACILITATED IF A METICULOUS BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE STATES CONCERNED WERE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE, BUT I SUBMIT THAT JORDAN CONTINUES TO BE LEFT OUT WHEN CALCULATION REGARDING ARMAMENTS ARE MADE. JORDAN IS THE ONLY COUNTRY INVOLVED IN THE JUNE WAR WHICH HAS NOT YET SATISFACTORILY REPLENISHED HER MILITARY LOSSES IN THE WAR, AND JORDAN HAS BEEN THE ONLY COUNTRY TO BEAR THE FURY OF THE NEW AMERICAN AIRCRAFT THAT HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED TO ISRAEL SINCE THE WAR. SOME MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE EASTERN ARMAMENTS OF THE UAR AND OTHER ARAB STATES MAY WELL HAVE TIPPED THE BALANCE IN FAVOUR OF THE ARABS. I WISH TO ASSURE SIR, AND IN ALL FRANKNESS, THAT AFTER STUDYING THE 1948 ARMED CONFLICT, WITNESSING AND NARROWLY MISSING ENTANGLEMENT IN THE 1956 CLASH AND LIVING THROUGH THE 1967 SO-CALLED WAR, WHERE THE AIR FORCES OF THE UAR AND OTHERS WERE NEARLY ALL COMPLETELY WIPED OUT BY ISRAEL'S WHICH HAS ALWAYS ENJOYED THE ADVANTAGES OF SUPERIOR PREPARATION IN EVERY RESPECT AS WELL AS THE ADVANTAGE OF STRIKING

ITS LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE FROM ITS TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF SUPPLY. I HOPE THAT OUR REQUESTS FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FAVOURABLY CONSIDERED. THE JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF, LT. GEN. AMER KHAMMASHI IS READY TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON D.C. WHENEVER OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON ARE READY TO MEET WITH HIM FOR THIS PURPOSE.

AS FOR YOUR COMMITMENT REGARDING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF JORDAN, MAY I PLEASE REMIND YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THIS INTEGRITY HAS BEEN VIOLATED FOR OVER A YEAR AND A HALF. IF NO PRESSURE CAN BE EXERTED BY THE UNITED STATES ON ISRAEL TO

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BY JAC/ARA Date 12/5/05

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PAGE 03 STATE 280512

ACCEPT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE PROBLEM, THEN THE UNITED STATES, IN KEEPING WITH HER COMMITMENTS TO US, SHOULD AT LEAST REFRAIN FROM HELPING ISRAEL TO CONTINUE HER VIOLATION OF OUR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

MR. PRESIDENT, I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT I VALUE OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP, AND I AM WELL AWARE THAT OUR ASSOCIATION IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. BUT WHAT WORRIES ME IS THAT AMERICAN ACTIONS AND POSITIONS REGARDING THE PROBLEMS OF OUR AREA ARE MAKING IT DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR ME AND FOR YOUR OTHER ARAB FRIENDS TO DEFEND OR JUSTIFY AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I TRUST AND PRAY THAT YOU WILL DO ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE TO HELP US CHANGE THIS IMAGE. WE ARE DOING OUR BEST, BUT WE NEED YOUR HELP, SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE, FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ENTIRE MIDDLE EAST IS AT STAKE, AND IF THERE IS NO JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THEN UNFORTUNATELY, THERE CAN BE NO PEACE IN THE WORLD.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, MY SINCERE REGARDS AND
BEST WISHES. SGD. HUSSEIN I. UNQTE

2. DEPT MAY WISH TO SEND THIS MESSAGE TO INTERMEDIATE POSTS ON GOM SCRANTON'S ITINERARY SO THAT HE MAY HAVE TIME TO READ IT PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL IN AMMAN.

3. SIGNED LETTER FOLLOWS BY POUCH. SIGNED SYMMES
(*)OMISSION, AS RECEIVED CORRECTION TO FOLLOW
#AS RECEIVED CORRECTION TO FOLLOW. UNQUOTE
RUSK

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BY JA INARA Date 12/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 10

DATE: 29 Nov 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: MC

FROM: _____ TO: _____

SUBJECT: US Requirements for Israeli held Soviet Equipment

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: _____ OTHER: ☒

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

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☒ Declassify with concurrence of OSD
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by ms Date: 3/7/96

Withdrawal No. DEF Box 91 - 1961-69

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION Central Files #11

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 981088
By Ham/SNV, NARA, Date 4-30-05

29 November 1968

I-26232/68

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and U.S. Intelligence Requirements

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESR Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1630 - 1730 29 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, The Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin began by saying he had three subjects to discuss. The first concerned the definition of "introduction" in Mr. Warnke's letter to him of 27 November 1968. Rabin said "some people" in Israel are not happy that the definition appears in the letter; they feel that it may imply that Israel accepts that definition, and that nothing in the correspondence makes it clear enough that Israel has its own definition.

Mr. Warnke said that he could not see any ambiguity in the situation. The letter clearly states that this is the American definition and the last sentence was changed to preclude the construction that Israel agrees with it.

Ambassador Rabin said that some people say that by failing to comment on it, we in fact accept it. Mr. Schwartz suggested that, in order properly to clarify that issue, Israel should write down its own definition. Ambassador Rabin said that he would have to send Mr. Warnke another letter. Mr. Warnke said: "I can not of course stop you from sending me a letter." Ambassador Rabin laughingly replied: "Yes, I know, but I want you to answer it." Mr. Warnke suggested that the Ambassador draft a letter to him and show it to him "and I'll tell you what my response would be." Ambassador Rabin agreed.

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DEF 12-5 ISR
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By JK, NARA Date 12/5/05

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Ambassador Rabin said that the second problem concerned publicity. The Ambassador mentioned an article in today's Baltimore Sun and a recent Finney article. Mr. Warnke said that he doubted that this was recent information. Ambassador Rabin said that publicity in this case should be different than in the A-4 negotiations. In this case, it was public knowledge that F-4 negotiations were going on, as was clear from the President's announcement. The Ambassador said he was concerned about future leaks and that, while he didn't want to give the numbers of aircraft involved, he would like to say something. The Ambassador said that, "political figures are involved" and it wasn't fully under his control.

Mr. Warnke said that the press knew already that negotiations were underway, and that there really wasn't much more to be said that could satisfy them without giving the full details. Mr. Warnke asked what the Israelis wanted to say.

Minister Argov said that he gets three to four calls a day from the press, and he finds it difficult to keep repeating the same thing day after day. He would like to say a deal has been consummated. Mr. Warnke said that that would not be appropriate: no contract has been signed, no final arrangements made, and there are a variety of loose ends to tidy up. Mr. Warnke said that he would think about it and let the Ambassador know.

Mr. Schwartz asked if the requirement for publicity was in Israel. The Ambassador replied: "Not only in Israel, but also here." The Ambassador thought that if we could say that in principle a positive decision had been taken, it would take the pressure off. Mr. Warnke said that this wasn't a problem for the Defense Department alone, that he would have to check with others including the White House, but that he would let the Ambassador know.

Ambassador Rabin next raised the problem of delivery of F-4 aircraft. The Ambassador said: "We think we have justified reasons for earlier deliveries. Six or eight or ten aircraft by the middle of 1969 should not be too much of a problem for the big U.S. Air Force." Rabin said that he had spoken with General McConnell who had said there are two problems, one is the political and the other is technical. Rabin said that McConnell is working on the technical problem, but the two were related. "If a political decision can be made" said Rabin, "then this would help along the technical decision."

Mr. Schwartz said that the Air Force was concerned about the technical difficulties of rapid introduction of this very sophisticated aircraft without adequate preparation. Mr. Schwartz said that the Air Force had had similar difficulties in Australia and Iran. Ambassador Rabin suggested that we not compare Israel with Australia and Iran. Israel has great technical capabilities. He noted that Israel was already flying the MIG aircraft without any assistance and without spare parts.

Mr. Schwartz noted that Israel under this plan would be able to fly the aircraft, but could not maintain the electronics systems or use the weapons systems. Ambassador Rabin said: "You give them to us and we'll use them" Rabin said that what was wanted was "six to twelve" aircraft by mid-1969. Rabin said he realized that there were some differences between our intelligence people on numbers of Soviet aircraft, but even so, the numbers in the Arab inventory were large. Rabin noted that since the June war Israel had not received one additional supersonic aircraft although it had lost four or five.

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Ambassador Rabin said that he had also raised the question of delivery with General Wheeler. Ambassador Rabin said, in reference to General Wheeler, "what he had to say at the Ranch was the most favorable from our point of view. When I met him again in May 1968, he (Wheeler) said Israel's situation depends on two things: if we get the MIRAGES, and the rate of Soviet shipments." On the first, said Rabin, "although we don't like it, there is no sign" of delivery. On the second, Soviet shipments (to the Arab states) have been faster than expected.

Mr. Warnke said that he could not give an answer now but that he would look into the problem.

The Ambassador said he had a fourth problem. The fourth problem, the Ambassador said, concerns technical negotiations. He asked whether we could now proceed to such negotiations?

Mr. Murray said that we were already doing this, that Generals Roth and Carmon and others met with the Air Force on Wednesday and that the Air Force was now in the process of arranging follow-on briefings. Mr. Murray said that it was our understanding that these negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily.

General Carmon said that they had had useful discussions on Wednesday but that they had not obtained certain information on weapons systems, mentioning specifically the Sparrow missile. Mr. Schwartz said the Air Force was authorized to discuss with Israel all the systems that we are now prepared to release; that there were certain systems which Israel could not have because they are not releasable to anyone and were used only by the U.S. military forces, and these of course the Air Force was not permitted to discuss; and there was a third category of items we were prepared to talk about but for which no final decisions on releasability have been made. Mr. Murray said that we are prepared to continue these discussions and that the Air Force was now preparing a briefing schedule to this end. Mr. Warnke said that we could not release full information on systems as to which we had not taken a decision to release. He commented that it might not be in Israel's interest to push for immediate decisions on these unresolved items.

General Carmon agreed that there were no serious problems in this connection at this time.

Prepared by *Robert J. Murray*
Robert J. Murray

(Signed)
PAUL C. WARNKE
Approved by
Assistant Secretary of
Defense, ISA

Date 29 November 1968

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Declassified
Authority: 2556
By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-15-2005

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

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☒ Declassify with concurrence of OSD
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/MDR by FW Date: 3/7/96

27 November 1968

Refer to: I-26197/68

Withdrawal No. DEF 91-1967-69

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: F-4 Negotiations with Government of Israel

Ambassador Rabin called on November 27th and said that he had discovered a further problem with respect to my letter of November 25 in response to his letter requesting the fifty F-4 Phantoms. His problem involved the final sentence which reads "It is understood that your letter of 22 November 1968 and this letter in reply together constitute an agreement between our two governments." Ambassador Rabin said that this language would imply that the Government of Israel agreed with the United States interpretation of the circumstances which would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons.

I said that I understood him to mean that he was unable to accept our interpretation and that this final sentence implied that he had. He confirmed that this was the case. I undertook to consider the matter and call him back.

About five minutes later, I called Ambassador Rabin and suggested that the letter might end with some "bland" statement such as: "It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details."

Ambassador Rabin said that this sounded satisfactory to him. I suggested that Ambassador Rabin return my original letter and he then asked that I formulate again the language that I would substitute. I said that the sentence might be more felicitous if it were to read:

"It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction."

Ambassador Rabin said that language along these lines would be satisfactory to him and that he would return the original letter for replacement.

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Paul C. Kerke

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Authority: NND 96000
By: JKA NARA Date: 12/5/05



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

27 November 1968

In reply refer to:
1-26174/68

His Excellency
Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Ambassador of Israel
2916 Chesapeake Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This will acknowledge and respond to your letter of 22 November 1968, requesting on behalf of the Government of Israel that the United States sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft and related equipment and training. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft and related equipment and services in accordance with this exchange of letters and technical and financial annexes to be negotiated separately. This transaction is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952.

The United States Government, for its part, accepts the assurances given by the Government of Israel as stated in your letter:

FOIA (b) 1

I wish also to confirm the understanding of the Government of Israel as set forth in the fifth paragraph of your letter of 22 November 1968. Such unusual and compelling circumstances would exist in the event of action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter.

The agreement contained in the last paragraph of your letter concerning the secrecy of this undertaking is satisfactory to us.

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
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It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction.

Sincerely,


Paul C. Warnke

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

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TAB 12

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 12

DATE: 21 Nov 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: MC

FROM: _____ TO: _____

SUBJECT: F-4 Negotiation with Govt. of Israel

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: _____ OTHER: ☒

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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Authority NND 981088
By Ham/SIN, NARA, Date 4-20-05

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

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☒ Declassify with concurrence of OSD
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by MS Date: 3/2/96

I-26172/68

25 November 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Reference No. DEF. By 91-1967-69
Central File #13

SUBJECT: Israeli F-4 Aircraft and U.S. Intelligence Requirements

Participants:

Israeli Side

Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Lieutenant Colonel Yarmon, Assistant Armed Forces Attache

United States Side

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray
Country Director - Israel, NESA Region (ISA), Delavan P. Evans

Time: 1600 - 1715 25 November 1968

Place: Deputy Assistant Secretary Schwartz's Office, The Pentagon

General Carmon opened the discussion by inquiring whether Mr. Warnke's version of the letter from Ambassador Rabin had been delivered to the Ambassador. Mr. Schwartz indicated that it had not been delivered because it was not yet cleared, but he hoped it would be this afternoon.

General Carmon explained that General Hod was leaving tonight but, if necessary, he could return; in any case, Brigadier General Roth will remain for any technical discussions.

General Hod explained that he had prepared a draft technical agreement, modeled on the old A-4 Letter of Offer, which he would leave with DoD. He said this agreement had been prepared without knowing the price of the various items or what items the U.S. Government was willing to release. The list reflected all Israel's requirements for U.S. consideration. General Hod said he hoped deliveries of the first planes could begin as soon as April 1969.

Mr. Schwartz explained that earlier delivery presented a real problem. The President told Mr. Eshkol last January that if he made the decision by December 1968, Israel would get F-4s as soon as it would have, had an agreement been concluded a year earlier. The U.S. took steps to cut the lead-time

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in half, from two years to one, we did things, we spent millions of dollars on long lead-time items, there has been planning and corners have been shaved. Now Israel is asking us to cut the lead-time in half once again.

General Hod explained that what Israel wants is a small number (2 per month) of aircraft from those on order for the Air Force; even 2 or 3 aircraft per month for just April, May, and June (i.e., a total of 6-9 aircraft) would be helpful. He understands the factory is producing 50-55 per month. What Israel is asking is that the United States take a few of these aircraft being produced for the Air Force in 1969 and deliver them to Israel; the Air Force would receive their aircraft from among those scheduled for Israel in 1970. General Hod said he had talked to General Wheeler and General McConnell about this and both had promised to look into the matter "sympathetically."

Mr. Schwartz explained that we are already robbing the Air Force by promising delivery starting in January 1970; we have spent money for long lead-time items, we have given tough orders, and we cannot cut the lead-time again. Mr. Schwartz noted that training of maintenance personnel was a major problem affecting delivery schedules because there was a long lead-time before Israelis could be trained to operate and maintain the aircraft. This was particularly true of maintenance of electronic components where at least 12 months training was required.

General Hod agreed that this was a key item. He said Israel planned to adhere to the previously agreed training schedule. He explained that he was asking for U.S. technicians to be assigned to work with the Israeli Air Force to keep those aircraft delivered in 1969 flying while the Israelis were training. Hod believed that 10-15 people could do this job and insisted that he wasn't expecting U.S. personnel to maintain the aircraft in the full sense of the word, but rather to help them keep them flying for the first half year. Israel's purpose in making this request was so that "Phantoms" will be seen over Israel. This would be a deterrent. This would go on during the time that Israeli personnel were being trained in the U.S. according to the schedule already worked out. They would not attempt during this period to maintain the electronically controlled weapons systems.

Mr. Schwartz noted that Israel apparently wished to fly the aircraft between April 1969 and January 1970 with "no teeth"; this was quite a change from the normal Israeli desire to be at their maximum effectiveness.

Generals Hod and Carmon stated that the aircraft would be there not to fight but simply to fly around, to be seen, and thus to serve as "deterrents." Hod explained that Israel also would gain flying experience and know-how during this period. Hod said that he had begged General McConnell for two F-4s per month from April 1969 to January 1970 and that this was a small

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number. Mr. Schwartz said it would be very difficult and he doubted seriously that this could be done responsibly in this short time period. Hod argued that they would require very little help during the first 6 or 8 months; they had learned how to operate the MIG-17s and MIG-21s with no help.

Mr. Schwartz asked if there were any other points he wanted to bring up in connection with the draft technical agreement. General Hod said yes, they were including 6 RF-4Cs in the request but did not know what components could be included nor the price. When told by Mr. Schwartz and Mr. Murray that the RF-4Cs might raise the price considerably, General Hod said that Israel might have to give up buying them or eliminate or reduce quantities of other things.

General Hod mentioned a number of other relatively minor matters such as assurances on future spare parts supply and the method of delivery. Mr. Schwartz made clear that the best thing to do was put their desires down in writing, which they had done, and we would review it.

General Hod explained that they had not included a flight simulator because of the difficulty of maintenance and the high cost - which was as great as that for the F-4 itself. "The simulator is nice to have, but not a must," said Hod.

Mr. Schwartz explained that Israel had indicated its desires, and he now wished to indicate ours. He said the intelligence agencies of the two governments had for some time been helping each other, and particularly Israel had been helping the United States with respect to Russian equipment. These intelligence discussions have become bogged down. We wish to forget the history of why they have done so. The United States now has a simple request. We asked General Hod and General Carmon and Ambassador Rabin not to insist on rivet-for-rivet barter arrangements for this Soviet equipment. Under U.S. budgetary procedures it is extremely difficult to provide items of U.S. equipment free of charge in return for items Israel may have that we need. We have made two offers involving the FAN SONG radar, the MIG-17 and the MIG-21 engines in return for two airborne jammers (ALT-6B) and 200 Sidewinder AIM-9B missiles, but in both cases Israel had said there had been a mistake, that they needed 82 jammers and Sidewinder AIM-9D instead of the 9B.

Mr. Schwartz said he did not wish to go into detail. General Hod had been present in the previous conversations between Mr. Warnke and Ambassador Rabin, and General Carmon knows the whole story of the intelligence exchanges by heart.

Mr. Schwartz pointed out that we now have, for all practical purposes, an agreement on the F-4, and General Hod is asking the United States to release as much as possible with the F-4. We now have a list of the priority items of Soviet equipment that we require. (Two copies of the list, a copy of which is attached to this Memorandum of Conversation, were passed to the Israelis.) These priority items are part of a much longer list, as General Carmon knew. What we are now asking is that Israel be generous with respect to this list.

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

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Generals Hod and Carmon said there were two problems. First is the problem of releasability. For example, Mr. Hoopes in the A-4 negotiations had refused certain components on the ground that they were not releasable; these included the Bullpup missile which Israel wanted for defense against the Egyptian Navy. Israel understood it could not be released and accepted it, but it made it more difficult for Israel. Second, some of the items of Soviet equipment were being used by the Israelis. If they were to be released to the United States, Israel may need a substitute. With respect to release of the Bullpup, General Hod stated that he understands that this now may be negotiable: If we release the Bullpup Israel will "come forward." Speaking frankly, Hod said they had used the Soviet equipment partly to bargain with the United States on releasability and partly as a way of saving money in their Defense budget.

General Carmon asked if the United States will be more generous with "teeth" for the Phantom if Israel were generous on the list of Soviet equipment? As examples he cited items in their draft agreement such as CBU (Cluster) weapons, better Sidewinders, and other items listed in the draft agreement.

Mr. Schwartz without addressing the specific examples, answered: "Naturally," it is in part a matter of frame of mind. He again explained that the intelligence discussions were stymied because we simply couldn't produce "off-the-shelf" what the Israelis want free of charge.

Mr. Schwartz quickly scanned the list presented by General Hod (attached) and said that the Walleye was definitely out. It had not and would not be released to anyone other than the U.S. Air Force. Mr. Schwartz said, however, that they should leave the list with us and we would see what we could do.

General Carmon said that, with reference to the Soviet equipment, he would send the list home right away. Some of the equipment may be in active service, but they would see. "We have a new situation" said General Hod.

Mr. Schwartz said: "Yes, we do have a new situation. As Mr. Warnke made clear in our prior discussions, we have become the major supplier to Israel and it is in this new situation that we ask for you to be more generous and not try to bargain pound-for-pound with us." General Carmon agreed that generosity was the key.

General Hod then stated that the Deputy Minister of Defense, General Tsur, would come to Washington to settle the financial terms of the sale. They had estimated the cost at \$200 million. Mr. Schwartz and Mr. Murray pointed out the total cost probably would be more than \$200 million, especially if reconnaissance aircraft were included. General Hod reiterated that Israel might have to omit some items.

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

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General Hod then asked about the timing of further discussions. Mr. Murray said he hoped we could have partial answers and perhaps further discussions between Israel and the Air Force by Wednesday or Thursday. General Hod said that he would leave General Roth here and that he, General Hod, might come back next week or whenever necessary.

General Hod asked whether Mr. Schwartz was giving the "final word" on the delivery schedules? General Carmon interrupted, saying that what Israel is asking is that during 1969 the Air Force divert a few F-4s to Israel, but that the bulk of the F-4s would be delivered in 1970 as originally contemplated. General Hod hoped that these aircraft would be available from among those not needed in Vietnam. Hod noted, parenthetically, that some of the A-4s originally scheduled for Israel had been diverted to Vietnam.

General Hod concluded by saying that it is all in Mr. Schwartz's generous hands. Mr. Murray noted that generosity was also in Israeli hands. Mr. Murray said he would contact General Carmon soon concerning "next steps."

Prepared by *DE*
Delavan P. Evans

Approved by *Henry H. Schriever*
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA)

Date 25 November 1968

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Declassified	
Authority: 2556	
By: Steve Vogel	Date: 04-15-2005

שגרירות ישראל
ושינמון

~~SECRET~~

22 November 1968

Dear Mr. Warnke:

In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding dated March 10, 1965, in which the Government of the United States reaffirmed its concern for the maintenance of Israel's security and renewed its assurance that the United States firmly opposes aggression in the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel, and;

Pursuant to the joint statement of January 7, 1968 by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel in which "the President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area";

I should like to request hereby that the Government of the United States sell to the Government of Israel 50 "Phantom" aircraft, together with related armament, ammunition, training, spare parts and other services to be specified in Annexes, which will be considered an integral part of this agreement.

FOIA(b)1

The Government of Israel understands that the United States reserves the right, under unusual and compelling circumstances when the best interest of the U.S. requires it, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide

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STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ Declassify with concurrence of OSD, LS, read
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by MS Date: 3/7/96

Withdrawal No. DEF Bag 91-1967-69
Control File #14

DEF 12-5 ISR

0311

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

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-2-

22 November 1968

F-4 aircraft and related equipment and services, at any time prior to the delivery of these defense articles or performance of these services. The Government of Israel further understands that the United States accepts the responsibility for all costs directly resulting from such cancellation.

The Government of Israel agrees to full secrecy on all matters concerning this sale until the Government of the United States decides to make the matter public and will cooperate fully with the Government of the United States with respect to the timing and method of public disclosure.

Sincerely yours,

Y. Rabin
Lt. General Y. Rabin
Ambassador

The Honorable
Paul C. Warnke
Ass't Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

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0312

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AUTHORITY NND 96800
BY J61 NARA Date 12/5/05

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TAB 4

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 14

DATE: 22 Nov 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: LC

FROM: Fahin, Y TO: Wamke, P

SUBJECT: _____

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: _____ OTHER: ☒

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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AUTHORITY: NND 96700
BY: J6 INARA Date 12/5/05



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
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☒ Declassify with concurrence of 030
 EO 12958, 25X
 FPC/HDR by RVS Date: 3/7/96

22 November 1968
 Refer to I-26126/68
 (Fifth Session)

Withdrawal No. DEF BOX 91-1967-69

Continuation #15

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
 Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
 Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
 Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache
 Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
 Deputy Director, NESR Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1740 - 1815, 22 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, The Pentagon

Ambassador Rabin said that he had received his Government's reaction to the US-proposed Memorandum of Understanding (referring to the draft Memorandum of Understanding sent to the Israeli Embassy on 19 November 1968). He said that there is a paragraph in that memorandum which looks to the Government of Israel as "quite awkward." Rabin said that the awkwardness was "not because of its practical implications" but because of the way it is worded.

Ambassador Rabin read a portion of the paragraph in question: "It is understood by the Government of Israel that action contrary to any of the understandings specified in paragraph II of this memorandum shall constitute 'unusual and compelling circumstances' and shall permit the United States to recover any aircraft already delivered under this Agreement." Rabin said that his Government could not accept that the United States could ask for such language. "There is no precedent. It creates something that I

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 BY: J6 NARA Date: 12/15/05

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don't believe that exists anywhere." Rabin said that the paragraph implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy" and that it did not believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel, and therefore this paragraph was worded as it is.

Mr. Warnke took issue with Ambassador Rabin's statement. Mr. Warnke said that he had talked with Mr. Clifford, and Mr. Clifford in turn with Mr. Rusk, and the United States Government clearly did not put such a construction on this paragraph. The United States does believe the undertakings made by the Government of Israel. "I believe you and what you have said." It is quite natural, however, that Israel would look after its own national security requirements. It would be understandable for Israel to enter into an F-4 agreement now and later feel compelled to change its mind for reasons existing at that time. It would not be unusual in international agreements for undertakings previously made to prove improvident in the future. But the United States for its part must look after its own national security interests; if Israel were to decide at some point that it could not adhere to the provisions of the agreement, it would revert to status quo ante. That is the purpose of this paragraph.

Ambassador Rabin said he couldn't understand why, for example, the United States could ask in ten years for these aircraft to be returned. Mr. Warnke said:

FOIA(b)1

Mr. Warnke said that what was put in the Memorandum of Understanding, after all, represents only the summation of our discussions. Ambassador Rabin said that he had not agreed to commitments in the contract; he said that Israel had agreed to reaffirm its previous understandings --

FOIA(b)1

"Why do you want us to do this?"

Minister Argov said: "We feel we are on parole." The Israeli Government is giving assurances, said Argov, but the paragraph presumes we will not live up to them. Ambassador Rabin said that it isn't the standard paragraph.

Mr. Warnke disagreed that there was a "presumption" in the contract that Israel would not live up to its assurances. Mr. Warnke also disagreed with Ambassador Rabin's statement that this wasn't a standard paragraph. "There is no such thing as a standard contract." Each one varies. A past contract is not a binding precedent for future contracts.

Ambassador Rabin, somewhat apologetically, said that his instructions were to follow the former wording. He said also that, although he agreed with the form of the U.S. proposal (i.e., a memorandum of understanding), "my Government has had second thoughts" and prefers the same format as in the Skyhawk Agreement: "I send you a letter, you send me a letter."

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

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Mr. Warnke observed that we had the form of a Memorandum of Understanding before, in the Skyhawk Agreement. Ambassador Rabin said he thought not. Minister Argov said that yes, at the time in 1965 of the visit of Mr. Harriman and Mr. Komer, there was a Memorandum of Understanding: "You participated in its development Mr. Ambassador." Ambassador Rabin agreed and said that that was the Harriman Mission, which was a different matter.

Mr. Warnke observed that that was the point he was trying to make: there are different matters and different circumstances that now exist. Mr. Warnke said that he understood that what Israel wanted now wasn't a Memorandum of Understanding but an exchange of letters; for this he had no instructions, and would have to discuss the matter with Secretary Clifford. Mr. Warnke also asked the Ambassador whether he had a letter to submit. The Ambassador passed him the Israeli letter (attached).

Mr. Schwartz suggested that Ambassador Rabin not press the A-4 analogy too far, that it consisted of a number of documents, not just an exchange of letters, and that it was negotiated under different circumstances. For example, it contained an agreement that Israel would not come back to the United States for planes for five years.

General Hod observed that the President, when Prime Minister Eshkol was here, was willing to overlook the five year clause. Ambassador Rabin said that the United States didn't say anymore that it would not be a major supplier; the formulation of the communique issued at the Ranch in 1968 was different from that of 1965. In 1965 it said that the United States would not be a major supplier; it did not say that in 1968, but said instead that the United States would keep Israel's defense requirements under review in light of the situation in the area.

Mr. Warnke said that the Ambassador's remarks were not inconsistent with what Mr. Schwartz had just said. Mr. Schwartz said that the 1965 precedent (of the Skyhawk) didn't apply.

Mr. Warnke said he would discuss the latest Israeli proposal with Mr. Clifford. Mr. Warnke asked Ambassador Rabin if he wished to sign the letter. Rabin did.

Ambassador Rabin said that there is a third problem. He laughingly said that he assumed we would overcome the "technical difficulties" of getting a satisfactory agreement in an acceptable form. Rabin said: "Everyone has his own superiors." Rabin asked if we could proceed with the technical talks while waiting to sort out the basic agreement.

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DATE 12/15/05

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Mr. Warnke said that the problem won't arise, for he expects to respond to Ambassador Rabin the first of next week. General Hod interjected that what he needs to know is what specific equipment can be included on the F-4 aircraft and its approximate cost, so that he can draw up a list of his specific requirements for the USAF, and they in turn may prepare a Letter of Offer. Mr. Murray said that he would review this and call General Hod on the telephone.

Prepared by:

Robert J. Murray
Robert J. Murray

Approved by:

Paul W. Marbe
The Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA)

Date: 22 November 1968

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0317

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AUTHORITY: NND 969000
BY: J6 NARA Date: 12/3/05

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24-19-05

TAB 15

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 15

DATE: 22 Nov 1968 MSG NO.: TYPE: MC

FROM: TO:

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: OTHER: ✓

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

 OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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AUTHORITY NND 96200
BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05

DEPT. DISTRIBUTION ORIGIN/ACTION				DEPARTMENT OF STATE		DEF 12-5 ISR DEF 19-845-ISR POL 15-2 LEB FILE DESIGNATION	
NEA-10				AIRGRAM			
RS/R	REP	AF	ARA	Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files. <i>NR</i>			
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				FROM : Amembassy BEIRUT			
AGR	COM	FRB	INT	DATE: November 21, 1968			
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB	SUBJECT : Lebanese Parliament Censures US-Israeli Phantom Jet Negotiations			
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSD	REF :			
5	3	5	34	Noted - file NEA/ARM 12-6-68			
USIA	NSA	CIA	NSA				
10	3	20	6				
SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION				<p>The Lebanese parliament on November 19 passed a unanimous motion censuring the "determination of the American Government to sell Phantom aircraft" to Israel. The motion was introduced by Deputies Majid Arslan and Munir Abu Fadl, both of whom are moderates affiliated with the Chehabist Parliamentary Democratic Front.</p> <p>The substantive points of the motion are:</p> <p>a. A decision to sell Phantom aircraft to Israel would constitute a challenge to the Arab people and would encourage the "aggressor" to continue its aggressive acts, its defiance of the UN, and its violations of UN resolutions.</p> <p>b. Such a decision would constitute a threat to stability in the Middle East and to world peace.</p> <p>c. The Chamber asks the President of the United States and the President-elect, both of whom advocate peace, to prevent the realization of this plan which would have serious repercussions on the future of Lebanese-American relations.</p>			
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TO:	Action	Info.	Initials				
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Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:CFJones							

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DEF 12-5 ISR

273170

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Classification

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18 NOV 68 17 38Z

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy, TEL AVIV

Info:

STATE

Please inform Fonoff and Col Kovats Military HDQ Tel Aviv Dept approves
 Sale Sikorsky helicopters Serial Nos 581549 and 581647 to Robards Enterprises.
 FYI Robards has signed document assuring Dept he will not (Rpt NOT) sell
 or otherwise transfer helicopters without Depts prior approval.

273170

RECLASSIFIED BY 6573

KATZENBACH

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

John W. Sipes

S/S:GP/M-MC-Bowis:ius

2409

classification approved by:

S/S-GP/M-MC - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Cleared in substance:

AFW - Raymond J. Wach

UNP - Miss Jones

OES - Otis Mulliken

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Classification

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5011
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 6103

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1968 NOV 15 AM 7 25

~~NOV 15~~

SUBJECT: F-4 PHANTOMS

1. PAPERS REPORT EBAN SAID AT AIRPORT ON RETURN TO ISRAEL THAT HE HAD DRAFT AGREEMENT ON PHANTOMS IN HIS POCKET.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE BEING BROUGHT UP TO DATE ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

GP-3. BARBOUR

*Tel Aviv 6103
11/15/68*

*Basic agr
prob signed
early next week
Related tech
agreements will
be spread
over period
time*

NODIS REVIEW	
Cat. A	Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B	Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access granted by S/S
Cat. C	Caption and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II	
Date: 5/13 1975	

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<p><u>MASTER CONTROL</u></p> <p>Number of Copies Received <u>10</u></p> <p>Classification <u>Secret</u></p> <p>Suggested Distribution By <u>JPW</u></p> <p>IMPORTANT:</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">No additional distribution may be made of this communication without prior approval of the President or the Secretary of State.</p>		<p>Review: _____</p> <p>Ex Secy. _____</p> <p>Deputy _____</p> <p>Deputy <u>Sub</u> _____</p> <p>POST <u>Tel Aviv</u></p> <p>INCOMING NO. <u>6103</u></p> <p>OUTGOING NO. _____</p> <p>DATE <u>11/15/68</u></p> <p>CONTROL NO. _____</p> <p>SUBJECT <u>Phantom</u></p>
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 BY 64 INARA Date 12/5/05

38
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE II

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 20, 1968

SUBJECT: Possible Israeli Arms Sales in East Asia

PARTICIPANTS: Moshe Ereli, Eastern Affairs Division, Israeli Foreign Ministry
Moshe Raviv, Political Counselor, Israeli Embassy
G. McMurtrie Godley, EA
James H. Bahti, NEA/IAI

DISTRIBUTION: NEA

NOV 28 1968

EA

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INR - 10

Ambassies: Manila, Seoul, Bangkok, Tel Aviv

In the course of a courtesy call on Ambassador Godley, Mr. Ereli said he would appreciate comments on rumors that the USG had objected to the possible sale of Israeli "UZI" machine guns and mortars to Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. Mr. Ereli emphasized that he was not sure of any details relating to those rumors.

Ambassador Godley said he did not know of any such instances, but would check. In Mr. Ereli's presence, he called the Thailand and Philippine desk officers, neither of whom were aware of any such USG action. Ambassador Godley said he would check with the appropriate Korea desk officer and let Mr. Raviv know what he learned.

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NEA/IAI: JHB: mob
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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Department of State

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XR DEF 19-8 US ISR

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 TRIPOL 05284 110645Z

16

ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, NEA 13, RSR 01, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,
L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, ACDA 16, MC 01, AID 28,
IO 13, SAL 01, /176 W

005908

R 091035Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3485
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BAIDA

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 5284

SUBJ: PHANTOM JETS FOR ISRAEL

REF: TRIPOLI 5231

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR SARELL REPORTED TO ME THAT
ON NOV 6 LIBYAN FOREIGN MINISTER AL-ARABI HAD REQUESTED HIM
TO URGE HMG INTERVENE WITH U.S. PREVENT SALE PHANTOMS
TO ISRAEL. SARELL REPORTED AL-ARABI MADE SIMILAR APPROACH
FOREIGN MINISTER STEWART IN NEW YORK.

2. AL-ARABI ARGUED THAT PHANTOMS WERE OFFENSIVE WEAPON

WITH CAPABILITY BOMBING "MECCA AND MEDINA" AND EVEN LIBYA,
FROM ISRAEL.

3. SARELL RESPONDED TO AL-ARABI EMPHASIZING BRITISH
SUPPORT JARRING MISSION. HE EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT AL-ARABI
HAD NOT RAISED QUESTION CHIEFTAIN TANKS WHICH UK SUPPLYING
ISRAEL. NEWSOM

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0324

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AMEMBASSY WND 96700

BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05



DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

VN DEF 12-5 JORDAN

SECRET 929

PAGE 01 LONDON 14191 082141Z

81
ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, RSR 01, ACDA 16, MC 01, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02,

INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, 133 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7132
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
CINCSTRIKE
DOD

SECRET LONDON 14191

DOD FOR ISA/OSD

RECEIVED SUBJECT: ISRAELI & JORDANIAN INTEREST IN HARRIER AIRCRAFT

1. CHRISTIE, (UNSEC, MINTECH) (PROTECT) INFORMED EMBOFF TODAY THAT BOTH ISRAELIS AND JORDANIANS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN POSSIBLE PROCUREMENT OF HARRIER VSTOL AIRCRAFT FOR DELIVERY IN 1970-71 TIME FRAME. HE SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN AND KHAMMASH HAD VIEWED DEMONSTRATION OF HARRIER DURING THEIR MOST RECENT SOJOURN TO LONDON AND HAD REGISTERED ENTHUSIASM FOR THE AIRCRAFT. CHRISTIE ADMITTED THAT PAST ISRAELI INTEREST IN THE HARRIER HAD BEEN MARGINAL BUT THAT A DEMONSTRATION HAS BEEN PLANNED SOME TIME NEXT YEAR FOR ISRAELI AIR FORCE OFFICERS. HE ADDED THAT ISRAELIS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED SOME INTEREST IN HAWKER-HUNTER AVAILABILITY ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT SURE THAT ISRAELIS WERE REALLY SERIOUS ON HUNTERS.

BRUCE

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BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

Declassified
Authority: 2556
By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-15-2005

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11/10/68

Presented to the
Israelis November
1968 by DOD/ISA
RPA

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I. The United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty (50) F-4 Phantom aircraft in accordance with the terms of this Memorandum of Understanding and an agreement to be negotiated for the sale of aircraft which will be considered an integral part of this Memorandum of Understanding.

II. The Government of Israel reaffirms its prior assurances to the Government of the United States

FOIA(b)1

III. The Government of Israel understands that the United States reserves the right, under unusual and compelling circumstances when the best interest of the United States requires it, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide F-4 aircraft and related equipment and services, at any time prior to the delivery of these defense articles or performance of these services. The United States accepts the responsibility for all costs directly resulting from such cancellation. It is understood by the Government of Israel that action contrary to any of the understandings specified in paragraph II of this memorandum shall constitute "unusual and compelling circumstances" and shall permit the United States to recover any aircraft already delivered under this Agreement.

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Center Files

DEF 12-5-ISR

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AUTHORITY: NND 96000
BY: J6 NARA Date: 12/5/05

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IV. With respect to the supply of the 50 F-4 aircraft and related items, the Government of Israel understands that this transaction is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Foreign Military Sales Act; and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952.

V. The Government of Israel agrees to full secrecy on all matters concerning this sale until the Government of the United States decides to make the matter public and will cooperate fully with the Government of the United States with respect to the timing and method of public disclosure.

For the Government of Israel

For the Government of the
United States

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05

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TAB 16

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 16

DATE: 11/10/68 MSG NO.: TYPE: MC

FROM: TO:

SUBJECT:

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: OTHER: ☒

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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AUTHORITY NND 969000
BY Y6 NARA Date 12/3/05

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Declassified
Authority: 2556
By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-15-2005

November 9, 1968

At about noon Walt Rostow told me that Abe Fernberg had told him that the morning meeting with Paul Warnke on F-4s had gone well. He believed the discussions would be concluded on or by next Tuesday. Although there are now no preconditions to the sale, the Israelis are prepared to

FOIA(b)1

Rostow told Fernberg that the Israelis should realize that Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and he have a deep sense of foreboding that Israeli policies could lead to a FOIA(b)1 Fernberg, in response, said he agreed that Israel should not go further down the nuclear road. He urged Walt to recommend to the President that he heavily emphasize the gravity of this issue when Prime Minister Eshkol visits Washington.

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ Declassify with concurrence of OSD
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by FW Date: 9/1/96

John P. Walsh

Withdrawal No. DEF. Box 9/-1167-69
Central Index #17

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Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II	
Date: <u>2/24/76</u>	

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AUTHORITY: NND 96000
DATE: 12/15/05

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TAB 17

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 17

DATE: Nov. 9, 1968 MSG NO.: — TYPE: H1

FROM: Walsh, JP TO: —

SUBJECT: —

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: — OTHER: ✓

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Declassified

Authority: 2556

8 November 1968

By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-15-2001

Refer to: 1-35993/68
(Third Session)

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☒ Change/classify to ~~SECRET~~
☒ Declassify with concurrence of ~~030~~
EO 12958, 25X
PPC/HDR by ~~1003~~ Date: 2/7/96
Withdrawal No. ~~003~~ 81-1001-69
6-1-81

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4

FOIA (b) 1

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1810-1840, 8 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, The Pentagon

① Ambassador Rabin began the conversation by asking whether Mr. Warnke had changed his mind with respect to the assurances we had requested of the Israeli Government. Mr. Warnke replied in the negative.

Ambassador Rabin, saying his words might not be diplomatic, read from a prepared talking paper as follows:

"I wish to address myself first to Article 3 of your proposed Memorandum of Agreement. I am now in a position to confirm that my original personal reaction upon first reading this paragraph -- namely, that it is completely unacceptable to us -- is indeed my Government's official position. We have come here for the purpose of purchasing 50 Phantoms. We have not come here in order to mortgage the sovereignty of the State of Israel, not even for 50 Phantoms. Furthermore, I wish to state that we consider Article 3 to be in the nature of a very major condition precedent to the sale of aircraft and it is therefore not acceptable to us also as

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BY: J4 NARA Date: 12/5/05

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a matter of principle. My Government's position is that the matters raised in Article 3 are extraneous to the question before us, namely, the terms for the sale of 50 F-4 aircraft. These matters have been the subject of separate discussions between our two Governments. Most recently, 28 October 1968, we submitted through the U.S. Ambassador to Israel a comprehensive statement concerning these issues, the contents of which I can make available to you now.

FOIA(b)1

"May I also comment on the Preamble to Article 3 and state that the Government of Israel does not consider itself qualified to express an opinion on what constitutes an endangerment of the security interests of the U.S. This is the exclusive prerogative of the Government of the U.S. Similarly, with reference to subsection 2 of Article 2, the Government of Israel does not feel that it is qualified to comment on what is or is not a major tenet of U.S. policy. Again, this is the exclusive prerogative of the U.S. Government.

"This is my Government's position and the only basis on which we consider it possible to conduct negotiations for the purchase of military equipment -- in this case, 50 Phantoms."

Ambassador Rabin, having finished reading from his prepared text, observed that paragraph 1 of the American draft Memorandum of Agreement is an exact wording of the 1965 Memorandum of Understanding, and therefore adds nothing new. He reiterated that Israel did not believe that they were qualified to comment or to make judgments concerning the points covered in Article 2. Ambassador Rabin also thought that Article 5 on secrecy was not even as favorable as the paragraph on secrecy in the A-4 Agreement, which he thought was "more mutual." Rabin said, however, that this was not a major point.

(At this point, Ambassador Rabin passed to Mr. Warnke a copy of the Government of Israel's statement which had been given to Ambassador Barbour on 28 October 1968. Mr. Warnke glanced at it, confirmed that we already had a copy, and returned it to Ambassador Rabin.)

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Ambassador Rabin said that General Hod had met with the Air Force. General Hod said that, while he had one briefing, nothing more was being done, the Air Force was waiting for Mr. Hoopes. Mr. Schwartz explained that Mr. Hoopes had forwarded the Israeli requests to Mr. Warnke, but, because Mr. Warnke had just returned from Europe, he had not yet seen Mr. Hoopes' memorandum.

Ambassador Rabin said: "So there we are." Mr. Warnke said: "Yes, Mr. Ambassador. We have managed to isolate a major difference."

Mr. Warnke said he would like to take issue with two points raised by the Ambassador: first, that our request for assurances in connection with the sale of the F-4 aircraft is extraneous. What Israel does with strategic missiles ~~FOIA(b)1~~ affects the national security of the United States. "It is the national security of the United States that I am charged with protecting. By law I am required to consider the impact of the sale on the United States. You, from your vantage point, do not have to accept my judgments, but I am required to make them." Second, the assurances we have requested are not, and are not intended to be, an invasion of sovereignty. All international agreements impinge on absolute sovereignty. Our request is no different than other international agreements.

Mr. Warnke said that however these negotiations come out he has felt that this dialogue has been useful. "I have felt it was important to get across to you how we feel about Israel's acquisition of strategic missiles ~~FOIA(b)1~~ ~~FOIA(b)1~~ As you know, there is a provision in our sales contract that permits cancellation of the contract by the United States for 'unusual and compelling circumstances.' To me, if Israel goes ahead with its missile ~~FOIA(b)1~~ programs this would involve that paragraph; and while I can not speak for the next administration, I feel sure they will feel the same way too. Therefore, to a considerable extent, the arguments we are having about the wording of assurances are mere words and not substance. The substance remains the same."

Ambassador Rabin said: "I can understand you would like to have assurances about the way your hardware is going to be used -- ~~FOIA(b)1~~ ~~FOIA(b)1~~ But in Article 3 you ask for all the rights to know and for us to give agreement for you to inspect in our country. We were very careful not to use the word "inspect" with respect to ~~FOIA(b)1~~ We see in the two words quite a difference. The word "visit" means you are a guest in our country -- not an inspector.

Mr. Warnke said: "I would be prepared to accept an amendment to our memorandum substituting "visit" for inspection."

Ambassador Rabin said: "We have an agreement today."

Mr. Warnke said: "Yes, but that applies only to ~~FOIA(b)1~~ not to the sites where missiles are being produced" (nervous laughter from Israelis).

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Ambassador Rabin asked: "What do you call strategic missiles in the Arab-Israeli context?" Mr. Warnke replied: "Those capable of reaching the Arab capitals." Rabin agreed, saying: "At least we have the same definition." He also commented that the missiles "would not reach all the Arab capitals."

Mr. Warnke observed that the F-4 aircraft would be part of Israel's total defense environment; that they would be used, as the General well knew, to protect strategic missile sites as well as other possible targets. It is the totality of Israel's defense that we are involved in; it is not just a question of aircraft.

Ambassador Rabin said: "You are only selling arms. How do you feel you have the right to ask all these things?"

Mr. Warnke said: "I think I do. Otherwise I wouldn't bring it up."

Ambassador Rabin said:

FOIA(b)1

Mr. Warnke replied: "We will think about what you have said and talk with Secretary Clifford and Secretary Nitze. I will talk with you again tomorrow."

Prepared by:

R.J. Murray
Robert J. Murray

Approved by:

(Signed) *idraft RJH.*
PAUL G. WATKINS
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(ISA)

Date: 8 November 1968

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BY: J6 NARA Date: 12/5/05

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TAB 18

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 18

DATE: 8 NOV 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: _____

FROM: _____ TO: _____

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and Advanced Weapons

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: _____ OTHER: ☒

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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AUTHORITY: NND 96700
BY: JK NARA Date: 12/3/05

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DEF 12-5 ISR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 181

PAGE 01 TEL AV 05991 071019Z

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ACTION GPM 04

INFO EUR 15, NEA 13, L 03, AID 28, IGA 02, MC 01, E 15, INR 07, CIAE 00,

NSA 02, DODE 00, RSR 01, RSC 01, /092 W

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TO USAF (R&M FMC) WIESBADEN AB GER
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4964
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 5991

SUBJ: SALE OF EXCESS PERSONNEL CARRIERS

REF: USAF (R&M FMC) 051240Z NOV 68 (NOTAL)

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CARRIERS TO GOI PROVIDED PRIOR APPROVAL OF WASHINGTON OBTAINED.

GP-4. BARBOUR

Tel Aviv 5991
11-7-68

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BY JAC NARA Date 12/5/05

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FOUO/DR by ~~SECRET~~ Date: 3/7/96

Withdrawal No. ~~SECRET~~ DEF Doc 91-61-67 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

Central File # 19

Declassified
Authority: 2856
11/5/28
By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-15-2003

I. The Government of the United States reaffirms its concern for the maintenance of Israel's security and renews its assurances that the United States firmly opposes aggression in the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel.

II. The Government of Israel understands that a decision by the U.S. to offer F-4 "Phantom" aircraft represents a major policy decision for the United States, inasmuch as the Government of the United States:

(1) Continues to consider achievement of a limitation on the scale and types of arms introduced into the Near East to be important to Israel, the United States, and the area as a whole.

(2) Recognizes that, in releasing jet aircraft to Israel, along with the many and varied other military items released by the USG, the United States has become the principal supplier of military equipment to Israel, thus reversing a major tenet of United States policy toward the Near East.

(3) Anticipates continuing its practice of making available other items of military equipment, materiel, and training and to consider sympathetically requests by the Government of Israel for military equipment on a case-by-case basis.

III. The Government of Israel understands the United States Government position that the introduction of either strategic missiles into the Middle East would greatly endanger the security interests of the United States. The Government of Israel, having now heard in full the views and position of the United States Government, agrees that Israel:

FOIA(b)1

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Authority: NND 96000
By: JAC NARA Date: 12/5/05

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(1) Will not test or deploy strategic missiles without the advance knowledge and consent of the United States Government.

(2) Will not develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire strategic missiles [FOIA(b)1] without the advance knowledge and consent of the United States Government.

(3) Will permit semiannual inspection by United States Government personnel of specified missile [FOIA(b)1] sites in Israel and will provide full information on missile [FOIA(b)1] programs.

[FOIA(b)1]

IV. The United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty (50) F-4 Phantom aircraft in accordance with the terms of this Memorandum of Agreement and annexes hereto. The United States further agrees to continue to keep Israel's military defense capability and requirements for additional defense equipment under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area.

V. The Government of Israel will maintain full secrecy concerning the provisions of this Memorandum of Agreement and its annexes and agrees to consult with the United States and abide by the decision of the United States in matters pertaining to the release of information pertaining to it.

VI. With respect to the supply of the 50 F-4 aircraft and related items, the Government of Israel understands that this transaction is subject to copies.

Copy 3 of 3 Pages

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BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

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the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Foreign Military Sales Act; and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952, which provides that Israel will use the aircraft and supporting defense articles to be supplied solely for its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or for collective security arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter, and that the Government of Israel will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.

VII. The Government of Israel understands that the United States reserves the right, under unusual and compelling circumstances when the best interest of the United States requires it, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide F-4 aircraft and related equipment and other services, at any time prior to the delivery of these defense articles or performance of these services. The United States accepts the responsibility for all costs directly resulting from such cancellations. It is further understood by the Government of Israel that Israeli action contrary to any of the understandings specified in paragraph III of this agreement shall constitute "unusual and compelling circumstances."

For the Government of Israel

For the Government of the USA

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TAB 19

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 19

DATE: 11/5/68 MSG NO.: TYPE: M1

FROM: TO:

SUBJECT:

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: OTHER: ✓

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05



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STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

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☒ Declassify with concurrence of OSD
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by las Date: 3/7/86

5 November 1968
Refer to: I-35993/68
(Second Session)

Withdrawal No. DE F. BOX 91-167-69
Control 742 #20

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4

FOIA(b)1

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Major General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1410-1440, 5 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, Pentagon

Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that what he had done was to set out in a Memorandum of Agreement the points discussed yesterday. Mr. Warnke then passed the memorandum to Ambassador Rabin to read.

Ambassador Rabin, having finished reading the memorandum said: "As I understand it you put three basic conditions to the sale of F-4s."

Mr. Warnke said that the word "understandings" would perhaps be more appropriate.

Ambassador Rabin said: "I prefer to put it in my words: First, Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles; second,

FOIA(b)1

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You also ask to make inspections, making a fourth condition." Ambassador Rabin asked: "Is this the official United States position, that without these conditions we do not get Phantoms?"

Declassified
Authority: 2556
By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-18-2005

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Mr. Warnke: "That would be my recommendation." Ambassador Rabin said he was not in a position to give his Government's answer.

Mr. Warnke said we understood that. He would like to say that the words of the memorandum were his. It is the assurances we seek, not the form.

Ambassador Rabin restated that he could not give his Government's position, but that his reaction was: "I don't believe Israel is going to accept conditions within a Memorandum of Understanding about selling the Phantoms. We were told more than once that there would be no conditions -- at least not these kinds of conditions." The Ambassador then added, haltingly: "It would be a pity --- all these conditions on paper --- just for 50 Phantoms."

Mr. Warnke said that he did not consider what was being discussed was "just 50 Phantom aircraft." He said that if we sold these 50 Phantom aircraft to Israel, our position would have changed markedly to one of the principal supplier of arms to Israel and he thought that the significance of this change is something that should be thought about very carefully by the Israeli Government as well as by our own. It is of great importance to Israel on the one hand and it is of significance to the United States on the other because it means that the security of the United States is more closely involved in the area. It is this larger matter which should be considered concurrently with the assurances for which we have asked.

Ambassador Rabin said that it would be possible to have discussions on each of the items. But he again said, as his personal reaction, that "to have these conditions just for selling of 50 Phantoms, I don't think it is right."

Mr. Warnke repeated that the Department of Defense would consider any other form which would give us similar assurances that Israel would care to propose. Ambassador Rabin asked for time to study the memorandum more carefully. He asked also whether, in the meantime, it would be possible for Major General Hod to talk with the U.S. Air Force.

Mr. Warnke said that he had spoken with Mr. Hoopes, Under Secretary of the Air Force, who agreed to arrange for a F-4E briefing for General Hod and would expect a call from Hod tomorrow.

Mr. Warnke said that we had drafted the Memorandum of Agreement so that Israel could see clearly the things that trouble us. Whether the assurances we receive are contained in separate documents or whether we come to separate understandings is, to our way of thinking, irrelevant. We feel we must know what missile FOIA(b)1 developments are going on in the Middle East. These vitally affect the national security interests of the United States. There has been a long and strong relationship between our two countries. We must

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BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

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have mutual trust and confidence. We have not had mutual understandings and therefore the facts as we now know them have frankly come as a surprise and shock to us. Ambassador Rabin asked: "What, may I ask, comes as a shock to you?" Mr. Warnke replied: "The fact that Israel is acquiring strategic missiles, is close to testing them, is in the process of producing them, and that an FOIA(b)1 This is what shocks us. These developments involve the security interests of the United States as well as of Israel." (Ambassador Rabin made no reply. After a moment, he said: "General Hod will call Mr. Hoopes tomorrow.")

Mr. Warnke said that he would be gone for the next several days, but if it was necessary to have further discussions in this period that the Ambassador should contact Mr. Nitze or Mr. Schwartz.

Prepared by:

R. J. Murray
Robert J. Murray

Approved by:

(Signed)
PAUL C. WARNKE

The Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA)

Date: 5 November 1968

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BY: J6 NARA Date: 12/5/05

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TAB 20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 20

DATE: 5 Nov. 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: MC

FROM: _____ TO: _____

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Karmel-P-4 and Ahmed Wazir

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: _____ OTHER: ☒

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

_____ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

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EO 12958, 25X

FPC/HDR by WWS Date: 3/7/86

4 November 1968

Refer to I-35993/68

Withdrawal No. DEF. 12-5 91-1967-68

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Central Files # 21

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4

FOIA (b) 1

Participants:

Israeli Side

Ambassador of Israel, Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin
Minister Shlomo Argov, Israeli Embassy
Brigadier General Hod, Commander, Israeli Defense Force Air Force
Brigadier General David Carmon, Defense and Armed Forces Attache
Mr. J. Shapiro, Director, Ministry of Defense Mission, New York

United States Side

Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Paul C. Warnke
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Harry H. Schwartz
Deputy Director, NESA Region (ISA), Robert J. Murray

Time: 1400 - 1445, 4 November 1968

Place: Assistant Secretary Warnke's Office, Pentagon

① Ambassador Rabin opened the conversation by referring to his meeting on 30 October with Ambassador Hart, in which Hart had asked Rabin to write a proposed Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the provisions Israel considered necessary to the F-4 sale. This was written and delivered to Ambassador Hart. "We put in it what we thought was necessary, following the precedent of the prior agreement (A-4 aircraft)." Last Friday, 1 November, Rabin said he received a call from Department of State to the effect that "in principal, the answer is yes" with regard to Israel's request for F-4s and that he was to get in touch with Mr. Warnke. Ambassador Rabin said that today he would like to get agreement on how we proceed but not go into details.

Mr. Warnke said that he would like at the outset to set forth the United States' position. The President agrees in principal to the sale. It is a difficult decision, not because we are not interested in Israel's security,

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Authority: 2556

By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-16-2005

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AUTHORITY: NND 96000
DATE: 12/15/05

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but precisely because we are interested. Heretofore, we have avoided becoming the principal arms supplier to Israel. Wherever possible we have urged that Israel acquire its arms from other Western countries. We felt that this was to our mutual benefit for it lessened the risk of US-USSR confrontation in the Middle East and therefore lessened the dangers to the security of the United States and Israel. We would prefer to continue that policy; however, the Europeans apparently have opted out, and the French particularly seem reluctant to supply the Mirage aircraft Israel has purchased.

Mr. Warnke stressed that with a decision to go ahead on the sale of F-4 aircraft we will have a different set of circumstances concerning our supply relationship to Israel. We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel's security situation and involving more directly the security of the United States.

Mr. Warnke reminded Ambassador Rabin that Secretary Rusk had talked with Foreign Minister Eban about the problems and the dangers of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. Mr. Warnke referred specifically to the paragraph in the standard sales contract which permitted cancellation "under unusual and compelling circumstances"; he suggested that Israeli acquisition of strategic missiles and [FOIA(b)1] would comprise such circumstances. Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that because the security of the United States was clearly involved we must seek from the Government of Israel certain assurances:

- (1) that Israel will not test or deploy strategic missiles,
- (2) that Israel will not develop, manufacture, or otherwise acquire strategic missiles [FOIA(b)1]

[FOIA(b)1]

At a subsequent point in the conversation, Mr. Warnke mentioned the inspection arrangement [FOIA(b)1] as a precedent that might be required here.

Mr. Warnke noted that we had not sought such specific assurances in our prior agreements because, based on the information we had at that time, these developments were not imminent. Our present information, however, indicates that

[FOIA(b)1] This development would seriously and adversely affect the security interests of the United States; it involves the Soviet Union and risks a US-USSR confrontation; it dramatically changes the situation in the area.

(Ambassador Rabin did not dispute in any way our information on Israel's [FOIA(b)1] missile capability, nor did he comment directly on the assurances we requested. He did not seem particularly surprised or upset at Mr. Warnke's presentation. He referred to the fact that the Israeli position on the question of Israeli [FOIA(b)1] missile programs had been conveyed to Ambassador Barbour.

Ambassador Rabin observed that this question (of missiles [FOIA(b)1]) had been raised two weeks ago, and that an answer was given by the Israeli Government to the United States Embassy in Israel. "I don't have anything to add to my Government's position." Rabin said he was asked to draft a

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

Copy 10 of 10 Copies.
Page 3 of 7 Pages.

0346

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AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY JKA NARA Date 12/5/05

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

3

Memorandum of Understanding which he had done and which we have. Rabin said that "if you wish to suggest changes or additions to that memorandum you of course may do so." Rabin remarked that, when he saw Secretary Rusk on Sunday, the Secretary said that the American acceptance in principal "did not mean that we accept your draft Memorandum of Understanding."

Commenting more generally, Ambassador Rabin said that Israel did not come to the United States for military equipment when it could go elsewhere; with other governments Israel did not have the problem of "conditions" that it has with the United States. In any case, we do not see, said Rabin, that your selling us 50 Phantoms changes things appreciably.

Mr. Warnke said that it is not just 50 Phantoms, but 50 Phantoms plus 100 Skyhawks plus the great variety of other equipment that Israel is requesting that makes the policy we are entering upon a distinct change from our prior policy. Nevertheless, the United States is interested in doing what is necessary to assist Israel. Opinions vary on how best to do this but our goal is the same. It is for this reason that we are so concerned with Israel's missile FOIA(b)1 plans and intentions and this is why we need to "up-date" your assurances to us on these matters.

Mr. Warnke told Ambassador Rabin that we would prepare by tomorrow for his review a revised Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the kinds of assurance we require. Mr. Warnke asked if there were other questions that Ambassador Rabin would like to speak about today.

Ambassador Rabin said that he would like to call to our attention the current Israeli intelligence appreciation of the build-up of Soviet aircraft in Egypt and Syria. He said that the figures General Weizman had presented us in September 1967 had proven to be entirely too low. The inventories that Weizman had projected for those two countries by 1970 had in fact already been exceeded on 1 November 1968. The Ambassador undertook to provide details separately. Rabin went on to say that a number of technical terms needed going into, for example, Israel would like a certain number -- the more the better -- of F-4s delivered in the first half of 1969 (he later put the number at 25 aircraft). He attributed the urgency to "what was happening on the other side." Rabin said that they would like credit arrangements if possible, preferably on the same terms as the first Skyhawk sale (10 per cent down, 3½ per cent interest, 10 years repayment). Rabin said they would like the F-4E configuration generally, but wish to include in the 50 aircraft 6 RF-4Es. Ambassador Rabin and General Hod asked if they could begin discussions on the F-4E with the Air Force. Mr. Warnke said he would inform them when this was possible.

Prepared by: R.J. Murray
ROBERT J. MURRAY
Copy 10 of 10
Page 4 of 7

Approved by: [Signature]
The Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA)
Date: 4 November 1968

0347

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 96000
BY: J6 NARA Date: 12/5/05

SANITIZED COPY ATTACHED

4-19-05

74321

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 21

DATE: 4 Nov. 1968 MSG NO.: TYPE: MC

FROM: TO:

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel - F-4 and advanced Weapons

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: OTHER: ✓

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
 OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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0348

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 96000
BY: JK NARA Date: 12/31/05

Case No. 532 Israel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs (ILN)
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Request Involving the Purchase of Military
Equipment, Materials or Services under the
Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968

Enclosed are eight copies of a note dated October 31,
1968, from the Embassy of Israel, submitting a request for
the purchase of 1500 each 010-76/62 Fuzes for Gunboats
manufactured by Ottomelara, Italy.

① The Department of State approves from an economic,
legal, and political viewpoint, the meeting of this
request as a sale under the legislative authority of
the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. This approval
is subject to any patent or proprietary rights as well
as any security or disclosure policy considerations that
may apply to this material.

B
Robert J. Barnard
G/PM-Military
Assistance and Sales Policy

Enclosures: A/S

Concurrences: NEA/IAI - Mr. *Bahar* ~~Lambrakis~~
NEA/RA - Mr. ~~Padelford~~ *col. Brute of*
MC - Mr. ~~Bowie~~ *SK for JAB*
PPC/MAS - Mr. Klein
L/E - Mr. Massey *cam*

RECEIVED BY S/S

G/PM-MASP:RJBarnard:scb:10/5/68

Aug 12-5 205R

0349

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
BY *JK* DATE 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

3
שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

1968 NOV 1 PM 1 33

EG / 1806

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

ACTION
is assigned to

G/PM

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable
the Secretary of State and has the honor to inform the Secretary that
the Government of Israel desires to purchase 1500 each 010-76/62
Fuzes for Gunboats manufactured by Ottomelara, Italy.

The above is requested for the Israel Navy.

① 11-1-68

23742

y.f.

del 12-5-68

RECEIVED BY RS/AN

OCT 31 1968

#552

0350

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96700
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State

POL 27 ARAB ISR

NR DEF 12.5 ISR

TELEGRAM

NR POL NEARE US

SECRET 147

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 14021 011650Z

42 S
ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, TRSY 11, SA 01, SAL 01, RSR 01,
/116 W

087378

R 011531Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6301
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
CINCSRIKE CINCEAFSA
AMEMBASSY JODDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 14021

1. ISRAELI DEPUTY PREMIER ALLON'S RECENT REMARKS TO ISRAELI PARLIAMENT (AS REPORTED IN BEIRUT PRESS) STATING THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT HAVE TO STAND ALONE IN THE EVENT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE AREA BY THE SOVIETS, PLUS EBAN'S STATEMENT IN RECENT ADDRESS TO LABOR PARTY PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERS THAT US PHANTOM AIRCRAFT WILL BE DELIVERED BY US TO ISRAEL "WITHOUT CONDITIONS OF ANY SORT," ARE ODDLY REMINISCENT OF ISRAEL LEADERS' STATEMENTS IN SPRING 1967 THAT ISRAEL COULD RELY ON PROTECTION OF US SIXTH FLEET. THIS ISRAELI "ADOPTION" OF SIXTH FLEET WAS, AS DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL, THE IMMEDIATE REASON WHICH OBLIGED LEBANESE TO CANCEL SCHEDULED SIXTH FLEET VISIT TO BEIRUT IN MAY 1967. AND NO FLEET VISITS HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE SINCE.

2. WHILE BEIRUT PRESS MAY HAVE DISTORTED BOTH ALLON'S AND EBAN'S STATEMENTS, IMPRESSION LEFT HERE IN ARAB MINDS IS THAT ISRAEL CONSIDERS THAT USG AND ITS SIXTH FLEET COMMITTED TO PROTECTION OF ISRAEL (AND ITS OCCUPIED TERRAIN) AGAINST ARABS (WITH OR WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT) AND THAT PHANTOMS WILL IN EFFECT BE DELIVERED TO ISRAEL SPEEDILY AND WITHOUT CONDITIONS. WE QUESTION PROPRIETY OF THESE REMARKS. ALLON

SECRET

Beirut 14021
11-68

RECEIVED BY

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
DATE 12/5/05



Department of State

POL ARAB-US
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1R DEF 14-8 US-ISR

CONFIDENTIAL 353

PAGE 01 TRIPOLI 05231 041528Z

52
ACTION AF 16

INFO NEA 13, EUR 15, IO 13, AIO 28, ACOA 16, MC 01, CIAE 00, DDOE 00, GPM 04,

H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02,

SA 01, SAL 01, RSR/01, 177 W

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R 041215Z NOV 68
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
AMEMBASSY BAIDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 5231

REF : TRIPOLI 5221

SUBJ: US-ARAB RELATIONS: PHANTOM JETS

FROM CUNNINGHAM

1. FOREIGN MINISTER 'ARAABI TOOK AMBASSADOR ASIOE AT
OPENING ARAB LABOR MINISTERS CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 3 TO
INQUIRE ABOUT ACCURACY OF BRIEF NEWS ITEM REPORTING ISRAELI
AIRMEN EN ROUTE TO US FOR ACCELERATED TRAINING ON PHANTOM
AIRCRAFT.

2. AL-ALAM (GOVERNMENT DAILY) AND AL-YOUM (INDEPENDENT DAILY)
NOVEMBER 3 CARRIED FOLLOWING LIBYAN NEWS AGENCY (GOVERNMENT
SPONSORED) STORY DATE LINED AMMAN NOVEMBER 2 BOXED ON FRONT
PAGE BELOW FOLD: QTE ONE HUNDRED ISRAELI AIRMEN BEING TRAINED ON
PHANTOM IN AMERICA-DESTOUR NEWSPAPER IN STORY FROM JERUSALEM
REPORTED TODAY THAT ABOUT ONE HUNDRED AIRMEN FROM ISRAEL
DEPARTED LYDIA AIRPORT LAST THURSDAY (OCTOBER 31) TO ONE OF

CONFIDENTIAL

0352

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
DATE 12/5/05



Department of State

POL ARAB - US
12 POL 7 IRAR
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NR DEF 12-5 ISK
NR DEF 17-343 ISK

CONFIDENTIAL 705

PAGE 01 TRIPOL 05221 051103Z

20
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, NEA 13, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, ACDA 16,
MC 01, RSR 01, /175 W

105045

R 040940Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3453
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USUN NEW YORK 117
AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
AMEMBASSY BAIDA

CONFIDENTIAL TRIPOLI 5221

CORRECTED COPY (CORRECTIONS THROUGHOUT ENTIRE TEXT)

DEPT PASS INFO CAIRO

SUBJ: US-ARAB RELATIONS

1. QUERY TO LIBYA'S FOREIGN MINISTER 'ARAABI NOV 2 REGARDING
ATTITUDE RECENT IRAQI MINISTERIAL VISITORS (TRIPOLI 5178)
TOWARD US STIMULATED FURTHER STRONG EXPRESSION HIS OWN CONCERN
RE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD ARAB STATES, AND PARTICULARLY PHANTOM
NEGOTIATIONS.

2. WITHOUT ANSWERING QUERY DIRECTLY, 'ARAABI SUGGESTED U.S.

CONFIDENTIAL

Handwritten: Tripoli 5221
11/4/68

0353

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

NEA-10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

DEF 12-5 ISR

FOR RM USE ONLY

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OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
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		6

A-367

UNCLASSIFIED

NO.

TO : Department of State

INFO : Amembassy BEIRUT

FROM : Amembassy KUWAIT

SUBJECT : Press Criticism of US-Israeli Negotiations
on Phantoms

REF :

RECEIVED

HANDLING INDICATOR

NOV 22 2 28 PM 1968

DATE: November 14, 1968

An unidentified writer in the Kuwait weekly al-Hadaf has portrayed in vigorous terms the retribution that he would recommend be visited upon American Embassies in the Arab World in the event of delivery of Phantom aircraft to Israel. Translated excerpts from this item are attached. This journalistic foray, exceedingly blunt and virulent by local press standards, has evoked considerable comment in local diplomatic and western circles.

COTTAM

1968 NOV 22 PM 4 29

COPYFLO-PBR

Enclosure: Translation of excerpts from unsigned column in Kuwait weekly al-Hadaf, October 31, 1968

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FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

COUNS:WDWolle:msg 11/14/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

COUNS:WDWolle

Clearances:

0354

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY NND 96000

DATE 12/5/05

UNCLASSIFIED

ENCLOSURE
Kuwait A-367

Translation of Excerpts from Unsigned Column
in Kuwait Weekly "al-Hadaf," October 31, 1968

If Israel obtains these planes and attacks Kuwait, killing my son or daughter, what do I do? Everyone in Kuwait, in Iraq, in Egypt, in North Africa, in the Arabian Peninsula, in the Sudan, should ask himself this question. Are we to leave the American Flag hoisted in our country?

No.

If I am not hit by a Phantom Super-Jet, I shall find a bomb and go straight to the American Embassy and blow it up, and I shall fight every American for killing my children. The American people should realize the horrible mistake of giving such planes to Israel in exchange for internal political matters in USA.

If Phantom Super-Jets are given to Israel, a massacre will take place.

All American Embassies in the Arab World will be blown up and there shall be rivers of American blood in the streets.

This is ugly, very ugly indeed.

The oil of the Arabs willingly serves the interest of the Arab people and the American people.

Is this the compensation for goodness? Let the American Embassies in all the Arab World listen.


If Phantoms are delivered to Israel, the Americans should say goodbye to oil and to American interests. The Arab East shall be cleansed of every American citizen, and American policy will deliberately open the Arab World for Communism.

The following appeared in a box in al-Hadaf on the same date: 7

The Society of the Friends of the Enemies of USA in Kuwait announces its need for 14 FIDA'IYIN to be distributed over 14 Arab states, in order to blow up American Embassies in these states, and to kill Americans if their Government agrees to deliver Phantom Super-Jets to Israel.

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ENCLOSURE
Kuwait A-367

Applicants should not be:

- i. Citizens of countries suffering from aggression, so that the above action will not destroy the blessed peaceful efforts.
- ii. Citizens of the oil states.

He who finds himself qualified for the above action should call at the above society accompanied by a Kuwaiti guarantor!

END OF EXCERPTS

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0356

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 962000
BY JAC INARA Date 12/5/05

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Staff Study Worksheet

Control No. 14473

Staffing Officer: R. G. Houdie

I. FOR S/S-S Officers: (Notes/Recommendations)

II. FOR S/S - 7224: MR. WALSH - I HAVE NOT REQUESTED ANY CLEARANCES OR MADE ANY DISTRIBUTION ON THIS MEMO, BUT WOULD SUGGEST COPIES TO MR. ROSTON AND AMB. HART.

III. FOR CMS: Review Operations: (Follow-up Requirements)

0357

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 981089
By NND/SHY, NARA Date 4-20-05

DEF 12-5 ISR

XP DEF 18-4

OCT 31 1968

NEA/IAI: MISTERNER

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

(2)

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : NEA - Parker T. Hart

SUBJECT: F-4 Negotiations -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

NODIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Wilman, II

Date: 5/13/87

DISCUSSION:

In response to my request to the Israelis yesterday that they submit their proposal for the terms of an agreement on Phantoms, we received this morning the attached letter from Ambassador Rabin enclosing a draft "Memorandum of Agreement" (Tab A).

Not unexpectedly, the Israeli draft proposes a sale agreement for early delivery of 50 F-4 Phantoms and contains no specific assurances concerning Israel's nuclear weapons and strategic missile intentions. The draft merely refers to "the assurances" by the GOI in its paper of October 28, 1968, (Tab B) and states that in accordance with these assurances the GOI agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier. The Israeli paper of October 28, 1968, does not advance beyond the previous Israeli position on the nuclear or missile problem. It states that the GOI is engaged in continuous and detailed study of the NPT, but contains no assurance that Israel will sign the Treaty, merely reiterating previous Israeli assurances that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area.

The question now arises as to whether we proceed to try to get, in the context of the F-4 negotiations, assurances along the lines of those recommended by DOD and in my memorandum to you of October 29. The Israelis naturally are pressing for an expeditious response to their draft memorandum, but I would propose that we delay until at least the middle of next week before we give our preliminary response. I would suggest that at that time we hand Rabin the text of our proposal for additional paragraphs to the Agreement embodying the assurances discussed in my memorandum to you of October 29.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ Declassify with concurrence of 150283
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by MJS Date: 3/2/96

Withdrawal No. DEF BOX 91-1967-69

Control File # 22

0358

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 96000
By NND/SHY, NARA Date 12/5/05

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

2

Meanwhile, Israeli Air Force Chief General Hod is now in Washington and pressing to begin technical discussions on F-4's with DOD. We understand that Secretary Clifford has said that no one in Defense is to discuss F-4s with the Israelis at this time. In our view preliminary discussions between the General and DOD is unavoidable and would not necessarily prejudice our position on the political issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you authorize me to take the position outlined above in the next phase of our negotiations with the Israeli Government for Phantom aircraft.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2. That you discuss with Secretary Clifford the question of how to deal with General Hod in the days immediately ahead.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter from Ambassador Rabin

Tab B - GOI paper of October 28, 1968 (Tel Aviv 5683 NODIS)

Concurrences:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
NEA - Mr. Davies

NEA/IAI:MSerner:pjw:10/31/68

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

0359

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
DATE 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

30 October 1968

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with your request during our conversation on 30 October 1968 I take much pleasure in transmitting herewith a proposed "Memorandum of Agreement" with respect to the sale of F4 ("Phantom") aircraft by the Government of the United States to the Government of Israel.

Permit me to express the hope that your Government may find it possible and appropriate to give this matter its expeditious attention.

Yours sincerely,

Y. Rabin
Lt. General Y. Rabin
Ambassador

The Honorable
Parker T. Hart
U. S. Department of State
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

0360

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96800
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05


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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

1) Recalling the joint statement by the President of the United States and Prime Minister Eshkol on January 8, 1968, in which the President agreed "to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area", and pursuant to the President's statement of October 9, 1968, in which he stated: "I understand it to be the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab states and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the 1967 conflict", the Government of the United States will sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft in accordance with the terms enumerated below:

- a) Order for Aircrafts. The Government of Israel hereby places an order for fifty (50) F4 ("Phantom") aircraft produced by McDonnell-Douglas Corporation along with necessary spare parts and related equipment and armament on terms and conditions to be jointly determined.
- b) Delivery. The Government of Israel requests that, in view of the accelerated rate of supply of military aircraft to neighboring countries, consideration be given to expedite deliveries to Israel and that endeavor be made to supply an agreed number in early 1969.

0361




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page 2.

- c) Training. The Government of Israel requests that the United States accept a reasonable number of Israeli military personnel for training on the "Phantom" and related equipment on a reimbursable basis and subject to the availability of training spaces, under conditions to be agreed upon.
 - d) Additional Equipment and Services. The Government of Israel requests that the Government of the United States agree to provide such other technical services, parts, ancillary equipment and training related to the "Phantom" as may be mutually agreed. Such additional equipment and services will be the subject of an appropriate annex or annexes to this agreement.
 - e) Payment. The Government of Israel is prepared to make a down payment on the date of acceptance of the offer of 10 per cent of the estimated total cost of the items and services. The balance of the total cost of said items and services shall be mutually agreed upon.
- 2) In accordance with the assurances given by the Government of Israel to the Government of the United States on October 28, 1968, the Government of Israel agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier.

0362





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

OCT 31 1968

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S *RPW*
FROM : NEA - Parker T. Hart *per RPD*
SUBJECT: F-4 Negotiations -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

In response to my request to the Israelis yesterday that they submit their proposal for the terms of an agreement on Phantoms, we received this morning the attached letter from Ambassador Rabin enclosing a draft "Memorandum of Agreement" (Tab A).

Not unexpectedly, the Israeli draft proposes a sale agreement for early delivery of 50 F-4 Phantoms and contains no specific assurances concerning Israel's nuclear weapons and strategic missile intentions. The draft merely refers to "the assurances" by the GOI in its paper of October 28, 1968, (Tab B) and states that in accordance with these assurances the GOI agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier. The Israeli paper of October 28, 1968, does not advance beyond the previous Israeli position on the nuclear or missile problem. It states that the GOI is engaged in continuous and detailed study of the NPT, but contains no assurance that Israel will sign the Treaty, merely reiterating previous Israeli assurances that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area.

The question now arises as to whether we proceed to try to get, in the context of the F-4 negotiations, assurances along the lines of those recommended by DOD and in my memorandum to you of October 29. The Israelis naturally are pressing for an expeditious response to their draft memorandum, but I would propose that we delay until at least the middle of next week before we give our preliminary response. I would suggest that at that time we hand Rabin the text of our proposal for additional paragraphs to the Agreement embodying the assurances discussed in my memorandum to you of October 29.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

NODIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II

Date: 2/19/76

0363

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 96000
EX-16 NARA Date 12/5/05

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

2

Meanwhile, Israeli Air Force Chief General Hod is now in Washington and pressing to begin technical discussions on F-4's with DOD. We understand that Secretary Clifford has said that no one in Defense is to discuss F-4s with the Israelis at this time. In our view preliminary discussions between the General and DOD is unavoidable and would not necessarily prejudice our position on the political issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you authorize me to take the position outlined above in the next phase of our negotiations with the Israeli Government for Phantom aircraft.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2. That you discuss with Secretary Clifford the question of how to deal with General Hod in the days immediately ahead.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter from Ambassador Rabin

Tab B - GOI paper of October 28, 1968 (Tel Aviv 5683 NODIS)

Concurrences:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

NEA - Mr. Davies

NEA/IAI:MS ^WSterner:pjw:10/31/68

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

0364

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

30 October 1968

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with your request during our conversation on 30 October 1968 I take much pleasure in transmitting herewith a proposed "Memorandum of Agreement" with respect to the sale of F4 ("Phantom") aircraft by the Government of the United States to the Government of Israel.

Permit me to express the hope that your Government may find it possible and appropriate to give this matter its expeditious attention.

Yours sincerely,

Y. Rabin
Lt. General Y. Rabin
Ambassador

The Honorable
Parker T. Hart
U. S. Department of State
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

DEF 12-5 15R

0365

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

~~SECRET~~

page 2.

- c) Training. The Government of Israel requests that the United States accept a reasonable number of Israeli military personnel for training on the "Phantom" and related equipment on a reimbursable basis and subject to the availability of training spaces, under conditions to be agreed upon.
 - d) Additional Equipment and Services. The Government of Israel requests that the Government of the United States agree to provide such other technical services, parts, ancillary equipment and training related to the "Phantom" as may be mutually agreed. Such additional equipment and services will be the subject of an appropriate annex or annexes to this agreement.
 - e) Payment. The Government of Israel is prepared to make a down payment on the date of acceptance of the offer of 10 per cent of the estimated total cost of the items and services. The balance of the total cost of said items and services shall be mutually agreed upon.
- 2) In accordance with the assurances given by the Government of Israel to the Government of the United States on October 28, 1968, the Government of Israel agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier.

0366

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

1) Recalling the joint statement by the President of the United States and Prime Minister Eshkol on January 8, 1968, in which the President agreed "to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area", and pursuant to the President's statement of October 9, 1968, in which he stated: "I understand it to be the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab states and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the 1967 conflict", the Government of the United States will sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft in accordance with the terms enumerated below:

- a) Order for Aircrafts. The Government of Israel hereby places an order for fifty (50) F4 ("Phantom") aircraft produced by McDonnell-Douglas Corporation along with necessary spare parts and related equipment and armament on terms and conditions to be jointly determined.
- b) Delivery. The Government of Israel requests that, in view of the accelerated rate of supply of military aircraft to neighboring countries, consideration be given to expedite deliveries to Israel and that endeavor be made to supply an agreed number in early 1969.

0367



EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

30 October 1968

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with your request during our conversation on 30 October 1968 I take much pleasure in transmitting herewith a proposed "Memorandum of Agreement" with respect to the sale of F4 ("Phantom") aircraft by the Government of the United States to the Government of Israel.

Permit me to express the hope that your Government may find it possible and appropriate to give this matter its expeditious attention.

Yours sincerely,

Y. Rabin
Lt. General Y. Rabin
Ambassador

The Honorable
Parker T. Hart
U. S. Department of State
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

0368

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96400
BY JLG/NARA Date 12/5/05

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

1) Recalling the joint statement by the President of the United States and Prime Minister Eshkol on January 8, 1968, in which the President agreed "to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area", and pursuant to the President's statement of October 9, 1968, in which he stated: "I understand it to be the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab states and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the 1967 conflict", the Government of the United States will sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft in accordance with the terms enumerated below:

- a) Order for Aircrafts. The Government of Israel hereby places an order for fifty (50) F4 ("Phantom") aircraft produced by McDonnell-Douglas Corporation along with necessary spare parts and related equipment and armament on terms and conditions to be jointly determined.
- b) Delivery. The Government of Israel requests that, in view of the accelerated rate of supply of military aircraft to neighboring countries, consideration be given to expedite deliveries to Israel and that endeavor be made to supply an agreed number in early 1969.

0369

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY WNP 96900
BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05

~~SECRET~~

page 2.

- c) Training. The Government of Israel requests that the United States accept a reasonable number of Israeli military personnel for training on the "Phantom" and related equipment on a reimbursable basis and subject to the availability of training spaces, under conditions to be agreed upon.
- d) Additional Equipment and Services. The Government of Israel requests that the Government of the United States agree to provide such other technical services, parts, ancillary equipment and training related to the "Phantom" as may be mutually agreed. Such additional equipment and services will be the subject of an appropriate annex or annexes to this agreement.
- e) Payment. The Government of Israel is prepared to make a down payment on the date of acceptance of the offer of 10 per cent of the estimated total cost of the items and services. The balance of the total cost of said items and services shall be mutually agreed upon.

2) In accordance with the assurances given by the Government of Israel to the Government of the United States on October 28, 1968, the Government of Israel agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier.

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AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

SANITIZED COPY SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED



NODIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Department of State
transferred to S/NADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/EADRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Condition and custody
retained by S/S

14737

Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II
Date: 4-9-76

October 29, 1968

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S 4PW

FROM : NEA - Rodger P. Davies RMD

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel for Phantom Aircraft
ACTION MEMORANDUM

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ Declassify with concurrence of OSD
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by ms Date: 3/7/96

Withdrawal No. DEF. Box 91-1967-61
Central File #23

Negotiations which you have instructed Ambassador Hart to begin with Ambassador Rabin on possible sale of the F-4 "Phantom" aircraft are scheduled to begin tomorrow. There is one major complication which it would be desirable to resolve before we become more deeply engaged in negotiating with the Israelis: the extent to which we should seek quids pro quo from the Israelis. In a separate memorandum we have recommended that we should seek to obtain the following:

FOIA(b)1

3. An assurance that Israel will not be the first in the area FOIA(b)1 to produce, further acquire or deploy strategic missiles capable of FOIA(b)1

Defense feels strongly that the sale of F-4's should be explicitly conditioned on the foregoing quids pro quo. Defense would, in fact, go one step further and require Israel to agree to terminate its domestic missile program entirely.

If you agree that we should seek more from Israel in the F-4 negotiations

FOIA(b)1

we should soon make this clear to the Israelis.

Declassified

Authority: 2556

By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-18-2005

We believe

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification.

NEA: RPD Davies

0371

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 96900
DATE: 12/5/05

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

-2-

We believe it would be useful for you to discuss the question of assurances in our negotiating tactics generally with Secretary Clifford and with the President. I understand from Defense that Mr. Clifford may also be raising this question with the President.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

This material with Luncheon
Meeting with the President
10/29/68. Secretary Saw

HBrock

Copy with Luncheon Memos

Clearance: IAI - Mr. Atherton

NEA:RPDavies:bw
10/29/68

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

0372

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J4 NARA Date 12/5/05

SANITIZED COPY ATTACHED
> 4-19-05

TAB 23

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 23

DATE: Oct 29, 1968 MSG NO.: _____ TYPE: ME

FROM: Daines, R P TO: The Secretary

SUBJECT: Negotiations with Israel for Phantom aircraft

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: _____

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

_____ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 96000
BY: JK NARA Date: 12/5/05

(53)



DEF 12-5 VSR
Department of State

TELEGRAM

27

UNCLASSIFIED 289

PAGE 01 LONDON 13959 311749Z

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO NEA 13, ACDA 16, NSA 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, AID 28, AEC 11, SCI 05, E 15, RSR 01,

/181 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6965
INFO DOD WASHDC UNN
CINCSRIKE UNN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

UNCLAS LONDON 13959

DOD FOR ISA/OSD AND DIA.

SUBJ: SPECULATION ON ISRAELI ACQUISITION OF SOPHISTICATED
ARMAMENT.

(1) PUBLICATION OF NEW EDITION JANE'S ALL THE WORLD'S AIRCRAFT TODAY
HAS PROMPTED FLURRY OF SPECULATION ON MOVEMENT OF ISRAEL TO-
WARD NUCLEAR POWER STATUS. DAILY TELEGRAPH, ON BASIS OF JANE'S
REPORTS SAYS THAT ISRAEL HAS THE MD-660 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILE, "PROBABLY DEVELOPED IN FRANCE, WHICH IS FIRED FROM A
MOBILE RAMP, SAID TO HAVE A DESIGNED RANGE OF 280 MILES AND TO
BE CAPABLE OF CARRYING NUCLEAR OR HIGH-EXPLOSIVE WARHEADS."
JANE'S ALSO SUGGESTED IN TELEGRAPH REPORT, "THAT ISRAEL WILL
HAVE SUITABLE NUCLEAR WARHEADS OF ITS OWN DESIGN AVAILABLE
BY 1970, PRODUCED IN THE DIMONA REACTOR CENTRE NEAR THE DEAD
SEA." ARTICLE IN DAILY MAIL COVERS SIMILAR GROUND. IT ADDS THAT
THE MD-660 IS CALLED THE JERICHO, WHICH IS BUILT BY MARCEL
DASSAULT, THE FRENCH AVIATION FIRM. DAILY MAIL ASSERTS THAT THE
JERICHO HAS ALREADY BEEN TESTED IN THE MED. BUT WILL HAVE A
NUCLEAR WARHEAD ENTIRELY ISRAELI MADE WHICH IS BEING BUILT
AT DIMONA.
BRUCE

REPRODUCTION BY DS/B

UNCLASSIFIED

London
10/31/68
13959

0374

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96200
BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05

SANITIZED COPY SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED

14567

NODIS REVIEW



Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Washington, D.C. 20520

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Wilentz

Date: 11/9/76

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Declassified

Authority: 2556

By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-16-2005

MEMORANDUM

October 28, 1968

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: NEA - Parker T. Hart

SUBJECT: Language in A-4 Agreement with Israel

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to

☒ Declassify with concurrence of

EO 12958, 25X

FPC/HDR by

Date: 3/7/96

Serial No. DEF Box 91-1967-69

Central File #24

DEF 12-5 ISR

In response to your request, the following is the text of the language in the A-4 Agreement with Israel relating to nuclear weapons:

Ambassador Harman's letter to Mr. Hoopes of the Department of Defense dated March 17, 1966 contains the following paragraph:

"On its part, the Government of Israel, after setting forth its views on the security situation in the Middle East, reaffirms its long-standing policy that

FOIA(b)1

Annex A of the A-4 contract contains the following provision:

FOIA(b)1

The antecedent of Ambassador Harman's letter is Article 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding concluded between the United States and Israel on March 10, 1965 (an Agreement to provide tanks to Israel):

FOIA(b)1

NER: Hprecht

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

0375

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 96000

By: JKA INARA Date: 12/15/05

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

2

I attach copies of the complete texts of the Harman letter and the Memorandum.

Attachments:

1. Copy of letter from Amb. Harman to Mr. Hoopes
2. Copy of Memorandum of Understanding

NEA:HPrecht:lab
10/28/68

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

0376

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY *JK* NARA Date 12/3/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

March 17
1966

Dear Mr. Hoopes,

In February and March of last year talks took place between our two Governments on various levels with regard to the security situation in the Middle East in general and the security situation in Israel in particular. As a result of these talks a Memorandum of Understanding was signed March 10, 1965 between our two Governments.

In this Memorandum of Understanding the Government of the United States reaffirmed its "concern for the maintenance of Israel's security and has renewed its assurance that the US firmly opposes aggression in the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel."

On its part the Government of Israel, after setting forth its views on the security situation in the Middle East, reaffirms its long-standing policy that

FOIA(b)1

Following the discussions between our two

Copy 1 of 4 Copies.

0377

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 9600
BY JLA NARA Date 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

2.

Governments relating to the desire of the Government of Israel to purchase tactical aircraft in the US, I should like to request that the Government of the US sell to the Government of Israel aircraft, together with related armament, ammunition, training, spare parts and other services specified below and in the Annexes hereto which will be considered an integral part of this Agreement.

1. Order for Aircraft. The Government of Israel hereby places an order for forty-eight (48) A-4F "Skyhawk" aircraft to be produced by Douglas Aircraft Corporation along with necessary spare parts and related equipment on the terms and conditions specified in Annex A hereto.

2. Training. The Government of Israel requests that the United States accept a reasonable number of Israeli military personnel for training on the A-4F "Skyhawk" and related equipment on a reimbursable basis and subject to the availability of training spaces, under conditions specified in Annex B hereto.

3. Additional Equipment and Services. The Government of Israel requests that the Government of the

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY J4 NARA Date 12/15/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושיכונת

~~SECRET~~

3.

United States agree to provide such other technical services, parts, ancillary equipment and training related to the A-4F "Skyhawk" as may be mutually agreed. Such additional equipment and services will be the subject of an appropriate annex or annexes to this agreement.

4. Credit. The Government of Israel is prepared to make a down payment on the date of acceptance of the offer of 10 per cent of the estimated total cost of the items and services. The Government of Israel is further prepared to pay the balance of the total cost of said items and services in ten equal annual installments beginning one year after date of the acceptance of the offer. The last payment shall include any adjustments to reflect actual costs. Interest shall be at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum on the unpaid balance, and shall be payable at the same time that principal payments are due. The exact schedule of payments and interest is as specified in Annex C hereto.

5. Other conditions. With reference to the discussions between Foreign Minister Eban and the Secretary of Defense on February 12, 1966, the Government of Israel

0379

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY 161 NARA Date 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

4.

understands that the following conditions attach to the above-described aircraft sale, and fully accepts and agrees to these conditions; namely:

a. The Government of Israel recognizes that this sale does not constitute a precedent for future United States action.

b. The Government of Israel agrees to continue to look to Europe for the bulk of its military requirements, and will not regard the United States as a major arms supplier. It notes the United States Government expectation that Israel will request no additional US military aircraft for at least five years from the date of this agreement, but in view of the importance of an effective Israel deterrent capacity as a major factor preventing aggression in the area, the US Government will continue as in the past to be ready to discuss with Israel its needs and problems.

c. The Government of Israel agrees to full secrecy on all matters concerning this sale until the Government of the US decides to make the matter public and will cooperate fully with the Government of the US with respect to the timing and method of public disclosure. The

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AUTHORITY NND 96400
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

~~SECRET~~

5.

Government of Israel further agrees to keep the Government of the US informed as to those Israeli personnel authorized to discuss the aircraft program.

d. The Government of Israel recognizes that the Government of the US considers it necessary to offer a limited number of aircraft to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

FOIA(b)1

Sincerely yours,

Avraham Harman
Avraham Harman
Ambassador

The Honorable
Townsend Hoopes
Deputy Assistant Secretary
International Security Affairs,
Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

A true copy of
the signed original.

Ellen McNeill

0381

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY 64 NARA Date 12/5/05

SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I. The Government of the United States has reaffirmed its concern for the maintenance of Israel's security and has renewed its assurance that the United States firmly opposes aggression in the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel.

FOIA(b)1

III. In view of the importance of an effective Israel deterrent capacity as a major factor in preventing aggression in the area, the United States will of course continue, as in the past, to be ready to discuss with Israel its needs and problems.

IV. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it may sell quantities of arms and military equipment to Jordan in order to preclude the Soviet supply of arms through the UAC to Jordan. King Hussein has assured the United States that if he purchases US tanks, he intends to keep his armor on the east bank of the Jordan. The United States also has made clear to King Hussein that if he purchases Soviet arms there will be no sales from the United States. The United States will keep Israel informed of the completion of any deal with Jordan for the provision of US arms and equipment.

V. It is understood that Israel is not interested in buying some of the particular items sold to Jordan. Instead the United States will sell Israel on favorable credit terms, or otherwise help Israel procure, certain arms and military equipment as follows:

a. The United States will ensure the sale directly to Israel at her request of at least the same number and quality of tanks that it sells to Jordan.

b. In the event of the Federal Government of Germany not supplying to Israel the remainder of the 150 M-48 tanks outstanding under the German-Israel tank deal of 1964, the United States will ensure the completion of this program.

c. The United States is further prepared to ensure an opportunity for Israel to purchase a certain number of combat aircraft, if not from Western sources, then from the United States.

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 96700
BY: J6 NARA Date: 12/5/05

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VI. The Government of Israel intends to provide the Government of the United States with a list of its requirements in the near future and requests that discussions on this list take place in Washington at a mutually convenient time.

VII. The Governments of the United States and Israel agree that full secrecy shall be maintained on all matters referred to herein and all subsequent actions taken in this connection, until the two Governments agree on how and when to divulge them. The Government of the United States has explained to the Government of Israel that premature publicity on the matters covered under this understanding could create serious complications for the United States in its relations with other states in the area. The Government of Israel has informed the Government of the United States that it understands this concern and will be guided accordingly.

10 March 1968

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

0383

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY J6 NARA Date 12/5/05

SANITIZED COPY ATTACHED

4-79-05

TAB 24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 24

DATE: Oct 28, 1968 MSG NO.: TYPE: ME

FROM: Hart, PT TO: The Secretary

SUBJECT: Language in A-4 Agreement with Israel

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: ☐

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL: Attachment in Israel Material classified 'Secret'

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96000
BY J6 INARA Date 12/5/05

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L	FBO	AID
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INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
NSC		
6		

AIRGRAM

DEF 12-5 1SR

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-366
NO.

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 25 9 16 AM 1968

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy KHARTOUM

DATE: October 23, 1968

SUBJECT : Press Reaction to Announcement Regarding Sale of
Phantoms Through October 20

REF : KHARTOUM 2004

JOINT STATE/USIS MESSAGE

Following October 15, on which the story about the announcement that the United States was initiating discussions with Israel regarding the sale of Phantom aircraft was front-paged in Rai al-Amm and Sudan al-Jadiid, the issue tended to drop out of the press because of the latter's continued preoccupation with the press censorship issue posed by the suppression of Umma and because of local political preoccupation with the new taxes and developments leading toward a reunification of the Umma Party. LONA of October 18 carried a lengthy interview with Sadiq al-Mahdi quoting the latter briefly in a final paragraph as criticizing the American "decision" to sell Phantoms on the grounds that it would encourage Israel. While Rai al-Amm's "Foreign Diary" column on October 18 also briefly attacked the "instructions" to provide Israel with Phantoms, there have been no major editorials so far concentrating on the Phantom story per se.

The Communist-dominated Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization held a meeting October 20 and according to Sahafa decided to attempt to stage a demonstration this coming week calling for the closure of USIS in retaliation for the US action on supplying Phantoms.

NOEL

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:LLKinsolving:gsd 10/21/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:
Charge: CANoel, Jr.

Clearances:

USIS:PAO:CCManley (in draft)

0385

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 969000
BY JEA INARA Date 12/5/05

371

POL 7 JSR
XR 259244

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

DEF 12-5 JSR
DEF 19-8 US-JSR
220000 148

Origin ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

Info: INFO.: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
Amembassy BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy KUWAIT
Amembassy LONDON
USUN NEW YORK
Amconsul JERUSALEM
CINCSTRIKE

STATE

LIMDIS

1. At his request, Israeli Foreign Minister Eban now scheduled call on President and then on Secretary Tuesday, October 22, after which Eban plans brief trip to Israel before returning to New York. and
~~President will be on the record, with~~
call on President ~~to be~~ announced routinely by White House
Monday afternoon, October 21. ~~Next day will be on the record, with~~
~~announcement.~~
2. Eban calls in Washington at this time will inevitably lead to press questioning and speculation about their relationship to problems of Arab-Israel settlement and Phantom negotiations. We hope keep publicity on Eban visit low key. In response to

RECEIVED 11 15 A

11

Drafted by: NEA/IAI:ALAtherton:lab Tel. Est. 2942 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved NEA - Parker T. Hart

Clearance: 10/19/68
NEA/P - Mr. Wheelock
NEA - Mr. Davies (draft)
XXXX IO/UNP - Miss Brown
P - Mr. McCloskey (Info)
DOD - Mr. Evans (Info)
S/S - Mr. Walsh
WH - Mr. Saunders

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0386

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96400
DATE 12/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			DEF 12-5 NR		
NEA-10			AIRGRAM			FOR RM USE ONLY		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-572			LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		
1		5	NO.			HANDLING INDICATOR		
ARA	EUR	FE	TO : Department of State			RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE OCT 25 9 18 AM 1968 ANALYSIS BRANCH DATE: October 21, 1968		
NEA	CU	INR	FROM : Amembassy ALGIERS			TAT AEA JHE JDE JEM F 20		
E	P	IO	SUBJECT : Reaction to Phantom Negotiations					
L	2	5	REF : Algiers 2359 NEA					
MC	ACDA	G/PM						
1	17	1						
AGR	COM	FRB						
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34	10	3						
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6								

1968 OCT 25 AM 11 59
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It took until October 15 for the quasi-official press to react editorially to the announcement that negotiations would begin concerning the sale of Phantom jets to Israel. (There has as yet been no official statement on the subject. It is possible, of course, that the Foreign Minister will deal with the matter if and when he speaks at the UN General Assembly.) Enclosed is an editorial on the subject which appeared on an inside page of Moudjahid of October 15. By local standards, it is not unusually harsh and relies heavily on repetition of adverse foreign reaction to the negotiations.

HOFFACKER

Enclosure: Clip E1 Moudjahid 10/15

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: CHARGE: LHoffacker:mw 10/15

Clearances: POL: MThompson/USIS: AHanna/CONS: C Drescher (in draft)

0387

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: NND 96900
DATE: 12/5/05

10/15/68

Enclosure No. 1

AlgiersAS72

L'AFFAIRE DES « PHANTOM » U.S. POUR ISRAEL

LA DECISION du président américain M. Johnson de doter Israël de chasseurs supersoniques du type « Phantom 4 » ne cesse de susciter des commentaires et les observateurs continuent de scruter les réactions diverses, principalement auprès des pays directement intéressés, c'est-à-dire les pays arabes victimes de l'agression israélienne. La livraison par les Américains d'une cinquantaine de ces appareils redoutables, considérés parmi les plus rapides du monde, a évidemment soulevé une vive réaction chez les Arabes qui sont maintenant définitivement fixés sur l'intervention américaine, lourde pour eux, de conséquences dans la crise du Moyen-Orient.

Pour amener les Etats-Unis à leur fournir les « Phantom », les Israéliens, certainement inquiets devant la reconstitution rapide du potentiel égyptien et des autres pays arabes voisins qui ont perdu une importante partie de leur matériel militaire durant la guerre des six jours, ont fait état, utilisant, pour ce, tous leurs moyens de propagande, d'un prétendu accord entre l'Union Soviétique et la RAU selon lequel un important armement sera livré à celle-ci.

Il y a trois semaines de cela, la presse sioniste annonçait en effet que l'URSS se serait engagée à fournir à l'Egypte 200 avions supersoniques « Mig 21 » et « Sukhoi 7 » ainsi que 500 chars d'assaut du type récent « T 54 » et « T 55 ». Depuis lors la presse américaine, mise au pays par les sionistes, s'est jointe à celle de Tel-Aviv et, toutes en chœur, se sont mises à clamer à tue-tête la conclusion d'un prétendu accord en dépit de tous les démentis publiés à ce sujet.

Les services de renseignements américains, se bornant en fait à reproduire les « informations » des organes israéliens de propagande, dont l'appui est indispensable pour couvrir d'une certaine véracité les allégations sionistes, ont confirmé « la nouvelle ».

Il fallait bien un alibi au président Johnson pour justifier la livraison à Israël des 50 chasseurs-bombardiers. « C'est pour assurer l'équilibre des forces dans le domaine de l'air » et pour faire réfléchir les Egyptiens, déclarait dernièrement l'ambassade américaine à Rabat.

On serait tenté de croire que c'est pour consolider la position de forces des Israéliens en vue d'un règlement de dictat de la crise du Moyen-Orient.

Mais la position actuelle d'Israël peut largement se passer de ces « Phantom ». Leur livraison prochaine a incontestablement jeté une ombre supplémentaire sur les maigres chances de paix au Moyen-Orient. La décision de Washington a replongé l'opinion mondiale dans le pessimisme en relançant de son côté la guerre froide pour prétendument équilibrer les forces.

Les milieux politiques égyptiens rappellent à ce sujet les récentes déclarations des responsables de la RAU : la vente des « Phantoms » à Israël sera aussitôt suivie de la fourniture à l'Egypte par l'URSS d'un matériel équivalent.

Voilà qui permet de penser que l'aide américaine de Tel Aviv n'aura pas les résultats escomptés ni sur le plan militaire ni sur le plan politique et n'a été en définitive qu'un coup d'épée dans l'eau.

D'autre part, le passage des forces armées arabes de la stratégie statique et à une stratégie mobile, amène nécessairement à la révision les données scientifiques de la guerre dans cette région et ceci limitera dans une large mesure l'efficacité destructive des appareils américains dans l'éventualité d'une nouvelle conflagration.

En outre, on ne peut plus nier qu'une nouvelle situation s'est créée au Moyen-Orient, depuis l'entrée en action d'une manière fracassante des commandos d'El-Feth qui, par l'intensité des combats et la création des conditions nécessaires à une guerre de guérilla, font progressivement de la Palestine arabe usurpée un nouveau Vietnam.

L'emmagasinement chez les sionistes d'un matériel de guerre dont l'inefficacité a été, on ne peut plus, prouvée face à l'ardeur des combattants des forces armées populaires de libération du Sud-Vietnam, freinera-t-il vraiment l'action des guerrilleros palestiniens ?

Le renforcement et l'extension de la guerre populaire s'avère donc indispensable pour les Arabes afin de contrer la gravité de la situation. La livraison par les Etats-Unis de ces « Phantom » et d'autres encore, ne changera dès lors rien à la situation.

Lits HAMDANI

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AUTHORITY NND 96000

DATE 12/15/05



DEF 12-5 JORDAN
X DEF 12-5 JSR
Department of State TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

SECRET 80

PAGE 01 LONDON 13618 01 OF 02 181837Z

42

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, MM 01, CCO 00, /031 W

008233

O R 181653Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6727
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 LONDON 13618

EXDIS

FOR DAVIES, NEA AND AMB. SYMMES

1. EMBOFF LUNCED WITH KHAMMASH TODAY (17 OCTOBER). FOLLOWING REPRESENT POINTS OF CONSEQUENCE THAT PASSED OVER YORKSHIRE PUDDING.

2. TIGER CATS--KHAMMASH WAS QUITE FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING INFORMATION ON TIGER CAT ARRANGEMENTS. HE CONFIRMED THAT ONE BATTERY WAS INVOLVED IN SAUDI ARMS PACKAGE. FULL COSTS OF BATTERY (WHICH KHAMMASH IS TELLING JAA COLLEAGUES IS A REGIMENT FOR OPTICAL REASONS) IS POUNDS 2.25M. BATTERY DELIVERY WILL RUN BETWEEN 9 AND 12 MONTHS (SEE LONDON 13294). FINALLY OVERALL SAUDI PACKAGE HAS JUST ABOUT BEEN TIED UP AND NO SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS REMAIN.

KHAMMASH ADDED THAT HE HAD ARRANGED TO CONTRACT FOR TWO ADDITIONAL TIGER CAT BATTERIES (TOTAL COST POUNDS 4.5M) OUT OF ABU DHABI'S POUND 5M GIFT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT ARRANGEMENT ALREADY MADE FOR ABU DHABI TO DEAL DIRECT WITH HMG AND SHORT BROTHERS (PRODUCER OF TIGER CAT AND 65 PERCENT OWNED BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT) IN EFFECTING PURCHASE IN BEHALF OF GOJ. THUS AS IN SAUDI CASE NO ABU DHABI MONEY WILL FILTER THROUGH JORDANIAN TREASURY. KHAMMASH WENT ON TO SAY THAT THIS SHOULD EASE ANY ANXIETY ON THE PART OF WASHINGTON, TESTILY ADDING THAT AT THIS CRITICAL STATE IN JORDAN'S DESTINY HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WASHINGTON'S PREOCCUPATION WITH SUCH MODEST AND /IRRELEVANT PROBLEMS. KHAMMASH WAS REMINDED OF VERY REAL

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By 16 NARA Date 12/5/05

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Classification

43

Origin ACTION: USUN

Info: INFO: AmEmbassy ADEN
" JIDDA
" LONDON
" MOGADISCIO
" ROME

STATE

SUBJECT: Somali Representation on Behalf ~~RE~~ Yemen

REF: USUN 7118 (not rptd Mogadiscio)

1. Somali Ambassador Yusuf Azhari called on Deptoff October 16 to protest orally on behalf Yemen USG announcement re supersonics for Israel. Azhari spoke in same ~~KKK~~ terms Yemeni Foreign Minister Jaghman used with ARP Country Director Brewer in New York October 15.
2. Azhari also took occasion reinforce Jaghman's expression of hope that YARG/USG relations might soon be normalized. Speaking personally he said he knew Yemenis "very anxious" that this come about. Deptoff responded along same lines Brewer took in New York. Azhari said he prepared act as intermediary at any time in event USG decided time was right for resumption relations with YARG.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/ARP:JNGatchrf:10/16/68
Clearances:

Tel. Ext. 5655

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA/ARP: John N. Gatch

AT/AFNE - Mr. Beyer (info)

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FORM DS-322
8-65

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BY: JKA INARA Date: 12/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 891

PAGE 01 USUN N 07134 162246Z

14
ACTION IO 15

INFO NEA 13, EUR 15, AF 10, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,

LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, SAH 02, ACDA 6,

MC 01, AID 28, RSR 01, 174 W

126162

R 162133Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3874
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO

S E I C R E T USUN 7134

KUWAIT FONMIN'S VIEWS ON ME

1. DURING COURTESY CALL BY ARP COUNTRY DIRECTOR BREWER OCTOBER 16, KUWAIT FONMIN SABAH EXPRESSED CONCERN AT RECENT USG ANNOUNCEMENT RE SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. BREWER NOTED CLEAR CONSENSUS OF THE CONGRESS, AND FACT ARMS REDUCTION COULD NOT BE ONE-SIDED, NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME AND ARGUABLY ANNOUNCEMENT HAD STRENGTHENED HAND ISRAELI "DOVES". SABAH SAID HE UNCONVINCED AND AGAIN DEPLORED TIMING. HE ASSERTED SOVIETS CONTINUE OFFER MODERN ARMS TO MODERATE ARAB STATES, INCLUDING KUWAIT. GOK WOULD FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT CONTINUE TO DECLINE IN FACE CONTINUING EVIDENCE USG ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL.

2. AS TO STATUS JARRING EFFORTS, SABAH SAID HAD JUST ARRIVED AND NOT YET MET WITH UARI OR JORDAN FONMINS. HE STRESSED PROBLEM PRIMARILY CONCERNED ARAB STATES BORDERING ISRAEL. BREWER OPINED PARTIES SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE ENCOURAGED BY RESPECTIVE FRIENDS MOVE TOWARDS SETTLEMENT, NOTING FEAR OF PUBLIC CRITICISM FACTOR IN INHIBITING ARAB FLEXIBILITY. WE WERE CONTINUING DO ALL WE COULD SUPPORT JARRING'S EFFORTS. SABAH SAID GOK WOULD NOT OPPOSE A SETTLEMENT TO WHICH OTHER ARABS MIGHT

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PAGE 02 USUN N 07134 162246Z


AGREE BUT FELT ONLY NASSER HAD SUFFICIENT STANDING CARRY ARAB
OPINION ALONG TO ACQUIESCE. OTHERWISE SOLUTION SHOULD BE IMPOSED
BY USG AND USSR. BREWER SAID NEITHER GREAT POWER ENJOYED THAT
DEGREE OF INFLUENCE OVER THE PROTAGONISTS. THERE HAD TO BE BASIS
FOR COMPROMISE WORKED OUT TO WHICH PARTIES THEMSELVES WERE
COMMITTED. FONMIN REITERATED THAT GREAT POWERS COULD ARRANGE
MATTERS IF THEY WISHED.

3. BREWER SAID WE LOOKING FORWARD DECEMBER STATE VISIT OF RULER
AND HOPED KEY ITEMS SUCH AS COMPOSITION PARTY MIGHT BE WORKED
OUT SOON. AMBASSADOR COTTAM HAD HAD USEFUL MEETING WITH AMIR
OCTOBER 14 AND PLANNING MOVING FORWARD. SABAH SAID HE WOULD ALSO
CABLE KUWAIT TO ENCOURAGE EARLY DECISION ON OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS.
MEANWHILE HE HOPED NOTHING WOULD OCCUR WITH REFERENCE SUPERSONIC
QUESTION (ABOVE) WHICH WOULD "EMBARRASS" RULER. BREWER REITERAT-
ED NEGOTIATIONS LIKELY TAKE SOME TIME.

GP-3
WIGGINS

SECRET

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(5)



Pol 23-8 Feb
X R 5/12-5 PSR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 031

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 13538 161643Z

52
ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, SAM 02, SAL 01,

AID 28, SY 03, OPR 02, O 02, OC 06, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /177 W
----- 124365

R 161448Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6191
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 13538

SUBJ: PHANTOMS AND LEBANESE SECURITY

1. MAHMOUD AL BANNA, DIRECTOR GENERAL INTERNAL SECURITY,
INFORMED EMBASSY OCT 12 OF REPORTS OF POSSIBLE DEMONSTRATION
OR INCIDENT DIRECTED AGAINST US EMBASSY BY "ARAB NATIONALIST"
GROUPS BECAUSE OF US DECISION OPEN PHANTOM NEGOTIATIONS WITH
ISRAEL. BANNA TOOK INITIATIVE ASSIGN RIOT CONTROL POLICE (RED
BERETS) TO GUARD EMBASSY.

2. TO DATE NO TROUBLE NOTED, AND EMBASSY EXPECTS NONE NOW.
WE HAVE REPORTS FROM BOTH RIGHT-WING CHRISTIAN AND LEFT-WING
MUSLIM GROUPS THAT NO STREET DEMONSTRATIONS CURRENTLY CON-
TEMPLATED.

GP-3. PORTER

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48
Beirut 13538
10/16/68

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26
YU DEF 12-5 ISR

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 13471 141757Z

YU POL ARAB-USSR

46
ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 10, EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, BPM 04, W 02, INR 07,

L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, AID 28, MC 01

ACDA 16, SA 01, SALI 01, RSR 01, 175 W

111048

R 141529Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6179
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 13471

REF: STATE 254594

1) PRIMIN ABDALLAH YAFI (ACTING FOMMIN) CALLED ME IN OCT 14
TO REAFFIRM ARAB-UN PROTESTS AGAINST PHANTOM NEGOTIATIONS
WITH ISRAEL AND SIMILAR APPROACH MADE BY LEBANESE CHARGE
WASHINGTON.

2) TONE OF THE MODERATE YAFI'S APPROACH WAS MORE ONE OF
SORROW AND INCREDULITY THAN ANGER. ABOVE ALL, HE SAID, ARABS
FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE UNDERSTAND WHY US ANNOUNCED DECISION AT
MOST CRUCIAL POINT OF JARRING MISSION. ANNOUNCEMENT HAD
THROWN COLD WATER ON ARAB HOPES FOR MORE ACTIVE AND "EVEN-
HANDED" USG EFFORTS TO PUSH FOR PEACE IN ME. HE REASONED:
FURTHER THAT SINCE US MUST SURELY HAVE ANTICIPATED EFFECT ON
ARAB PUBLIC OPINION IT SHOULD NOT BE HARD TO UNDERSTAND ARAB
PUBLIC OPINION PREPARED BELIEVE THIS IS CONSCIOUS US DECISION
GIVE TOTAL SUPPORT TO ISRAEL, LEAVING ARABS TO FEND FOR THEM-

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3

BEIRUT - 13471
141757Z

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S/S-S-CMS	<u>30-31</u>	Serial No.	<u>7024 Sect. 1</u>	Dpty
S/S-O	<u>11</u>	Date	<u>10-12-68</u>	
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS		
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U	<u>5</u> ✓	ARA		
M	<u>6</u> ✓	EA		
G	<u>7</u> ✓	EUR		
G/PM		NEA <u>✓✓ 13-14</u>		
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES		
S/AL		White House <u>✓✓ 2+3</u>		
S/C		Vice President		
S/P		Defense <u>✓ 15</u>		
		CIA <u>✓ 16</u>		
		NSA		
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E		State Rep <u>✓ 17</u>		
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INR		AID		
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S/S-O	<u>11</u>	Date <u>10-12-68</u>		
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS		
S	<u>4</u> ✓	AF		
U	<u>3</u> ✓	ARA		
M	<u>6</u> ✓	EA		
G	<u>7</u> ✓	EUR		
G/PM		NEA ✓ <u>13-14</u>		
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES		
S/AL		White House ✓ <u>2+3</u>		
S/C		Vice President		
S/P		Defense ✓ <u>15</u>		
		CIA ✓ <u>16</u>		
		NSA		
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		Treasury		
E		State Rep ✓ <u>17</u>		
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DEF 12-SIR

12 Oct 68 18 14

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

Info

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK

STATE

1. Lebanese Charge Farah called on Davies October 11 on instructions to express concern provision Phantom aircraft to Israel. Lebanese concern based on (1) fear supply will encourage Israeli "aggression and retention of conquered territories", (2) possible use of aircraft in retaliatory raids against civilian targets in Arab countries, and (3) adverse affect on Jarring Mission.
2. Davies noted that President's statement was that Secretary was to initiate discussion on Israeli request for supersonic aircraft and report back. This development was in context of clear intent of both Houses of Congress which are concerned at failure of Arabs and Israel to progress toward settlement, large-scale deliveries Soviet military equipment to some Arab states, and bellicose statements still being made by some area leaders. He could not predict what decision would be but, if favorable, negotiations plus production lag would mean that aircraft would not be in area until sometime well into the future.

RECORDED BY 154

Drafted by: NEA/RPDavies
NEA/ARN:RFDavies 10/12/68 2700
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodgers Davies

Clearances
NEA/ARN - Mr. See

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

POL 27 ARAB-ISR
284884

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BY JKA NARA Date 12/5/05



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43

48

CONFIDENTIAL 001

PAGE 01 USUN N 07073 122106Z

81
ACTION ID 15

INFO AF 10, NEA 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, RSR 01, SA 01, SAL 01,

AID 28, EUR 15, /156 W

105370

R 122908Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3805
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CARIO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 7073

US PLANES FOR ISRAEL

1. AT FONMIN EBAN'S RECEPTION OCT. 10 DELOFF RECEIVED SEPARATELY SAME GENERAL REACTION FROM FORMER DIRECTOR OF ARMISTICE AFFAIRS ERROL CAHANA, WHO IS ISRAELI MISSION'S ARABIST, AND AMB BARROMI. THEY EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION AT THIS TURN OF EVENTS. ALL THOUGHT THAT NOW ARABS, KNOWING THAT US NO LONGER WITHOLDING PLANES, MIGHT FEEL MORE COMPELLED TO BE REASONABLE AND MAKE MORE GENUINE EFFORTS TO SEEK PEACE.

2. THEY THOUGHT SOFT-LINERS IN ISRAEL WOULD BE STRENGTHENED. ON SUBJECT OF ISRAELI APPROACH TO PEACE PROCEDURES, THREE OFFICIALS BELIEVED ISRAEL MIGHT NOW BE ABLE TO TAKE "SOFTER, MORE MAGNANIMOUS" ATTITUDE TOWARDS ARABS. CAHANA SAID SECURITY IS A PACKAGE AND PERHAPS WITH PLANES LESS RELIANCE NEED BE PLACED ON TERRITORY.

3. CHIEF OF CABINET OF ETHIOPIAN FONMIN KETEMA, YOUNG MAN WHO CAREFULLY REFLECTS HIS MINISTER'S VIEWS, VOLUNTEERED FOLLOWING

RECEIVED BY ES/A

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*USUN 7073
10/12/68*

0398

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DATE 12/3/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN NI 07073 122106Z

TO AMB. VANCE REGARDING ME: (1) SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL IS SLIPPING
RATHER NOTABLY AMONG COUNTRIES NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED; (2) US
ANNOUNCEMENT RE NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALE OF AIRCRAFT IS
REGARDED IN A NUMBER OF CIRCLES AS LIKELY TO COM-
PLICATE JARRING'S CURRENT EFFORTS.

GP-3.

WIGGINS

CONFIDENTIAL

0399

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ORIGINAL PRES LETTER SENT ESHKOL DATED 10/23 POUCH 1258468

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



13626

HB 10/25
Sec # 14245
10/23/68 P/C

October 11, 1968

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Message to the President from
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol

The enclosed message to the President from
Prime Minister Eshkol expresses the Prime Minister's
appreciation for the President's decision to initiate
negotiations for the sale of supersonic aircraft.

The Department's recommendation regarding a
reply will follow shortly.

D. H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Message from Prime Minister Eshkol

NODIS REVIEW	
Cat. A - Caption removed:	
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Date: 7/19/76	

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NEA - Mr. Precht

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

13626

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit the following communication from His Excellency the Prime Minister of Israel, Levi Eshkol, to His Excellency the President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson:-

"Dear Mr. President,

"May I send you a personal word of deep appreciation for your decision to initiate negotiations for the sale of Supersonic aircraft to Israel. Over the years, it has been my privilege to feel the depth of your friendship to Israel reborn and your dedication to peace in the Middle East. It is my conviction that the strengthening of Israel's defense capacity through Phantom aircraft will be a powerful factor in deterring further hostilities and in advancing the hope of peace in the area.

"With warm personal regards,

"Yours sincerely,

Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister"

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this opportunity of renewing to the Honorable the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.

Washington, D.C.
10 October 1968

y.R

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DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY NND 96900
BY SP-6 NARA Date 12/5/05



Department of State

DEF 12-5 15R

TELEGRAM

29

CONFIDENTIAL 225

PAGE 01 ALGIER 02359 111542Z

51

ACTION: NEA 15

INFO: AF 10, IO 13, EUR 15, MC 01, ACDA 16, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04,

H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01,

SAH 02, SAL 01, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, 151 W

098145

R 111503Z OCT 68

FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3562

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USUN NEW YORK 150

CONFIDENTIAL ALGIERS 2359

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: ALGERIAN REACTION TO PHANTOM JETS FOR ISRAEL

1. TO DATE ALGERIAN MEDIA HAVE DISPLAYED CURIOUS RESERVE RE: PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON PHANTOM JETS FOR ISRAEL, ALMOST AS IF WAITING FOR OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO GO ON RECORD FIRST.

2. THIS MORNING'S (OCT 11) "MOUDJAHID" CARRIES VERY SMALL ANNOUNCEMENT ON FRONT PAGE, WITH MORE DETAILED ARTICLE INSIDE. LATTER CARRIES HEADLINE "SHARP REACTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES" BUT CONSISTS EXCLUSIVELY OF QUOTES FROM MOROCCAN DAILY "OPINION", FROM RADIO CAIRO AND RADIO DAMASCUS.

3. BELIEVE ALGERIANS WILL INEVITABLY REACT WITH STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT VIEWS, BUT IT APPEARS TO BE TAKING THEM LONG TIME TO CRANK UP AN OFFICIAL REACTION.

GP-4 HOFFACKER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY DCXT.

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Algeria, Tel. 2359
10/11/68

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MR Pal Ser-US
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CONFIDENTIAL 554

PAGE 01 USUN: N 07022 170326Z

22

ACTION ID 15

INFO AF 10, EUR 15, NEA 13, ARA 08, EA 10, RSC 01, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, ACDA 16,

SAL 01, SA 01, RSR 01, 162 W

095086

R 110001Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3747
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ADEN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 7022

SUBJ: REACTIONS TO JETS FOR ISRAEL

1. MOROCCAN FORMIN LARAKI DESCRIBED ARAB REACTION TO WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT ON PHANTOM JETS IN COMMENT TO MISOFF AS FOLLS: "NOW WE UNDERSTAND PRESSURE USG HAS SAID IT EXERCIZING ON ISRAEL CONSISTS OF LENDING TOTAL SUPPORT TO GOI FOR ATTAINMENT OF ITS OBJECTIVES."

2. GHORBAL (UAR) SAID IT IS PARTICULARLY DISCOURAGING THAT US -- WHICH HAS BEEN URGING EVERYONE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME TO ENCOURAGE PROCESS OF PEACE IN ME -- IS PARTY WHICH NOW DEALS MOST DAMAGING BLOW TO EFFORTS FOR PEACE. ISRAEL'S UNCOMPROMISING ATTITUDE HAS BEEN GREATLY

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PAGE 02 USUN NI 07022 110326Z

STRENGTHENED BY US ACTION.

3. HAMMAD (ARAB LEAGUE) REPORTED THAT REACTION AMONG ARABS TO PLANE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS VERY BAD. WHILE SOME SUCH DECISION HAD NOT BEEN UNEXPECTED, TIMING DISASTROUS. RESULT WILL BE TO MAKE ISRAEL MORE RIGID AT VERY TIME WHEN US HAS BEEN EMPHASIZING THAT CRITICAL STAGE OF JARRING MISSION REQUIRES UTMOST FLEXIBILITY OF PARTIES. HE SAID TALK ABOUT ARABS GETTING MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER ISRAEL IS NONSENSE.

4. BADAWI (UAR) COMMENTED IRONICALLY ON TIMING OF PLANE ANNOUNCEMENT BEING "PERFECT" REFERRED TO PARA IN RIAD'S SPEECH ON PLANES WHICH PUT THERE "FOR USG". CHAMMAS (LEBANON) ADDED THAT "POT BOILING" IN ME NOW AS RESULT PHANTOM DECISION.

5. OLEANDROV (USSR) SAID THAT BEFORE MAKING FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE MATTER, ONE MUST AWAIT RESULTS OF US-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS. IF IT PROVES TO BE BEGINNING OF NEW ARMS SPIRAL IN NEAR EAST, THAT WILL BE BAD.


6. ERALP, THE YOUNGER, (TURKEY) THOUGHT IT UNFORTUNATE THAT ANNOUNCEMENT MADE NOW. HE SUGGESTED MORE ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO QUALITATIVE ARMS BALANCE BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS (I.E. ONE ISRAELI PILOT AND AIRCRAFT EQUALS SEVERAL ARAB PILOTS AND PLANES, ETC).

GP-3.

WIGGINS

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PAGE 01 USUN: 07023 110404Z

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ACTION: IO 15

INFO: AF 10, NEA 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 25, USIA 12, E 15, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 140 W
095204

PIR 110001Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3748
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ADEN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM
USINT CAIRO

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 7023

SUBJ: REACTION OF ARAB COUNTRIES TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE
RE: JETS FOR ISRAEL

1. THIS AFTERNOON OCTOBER 10 SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO UN BAROODY CALLED ON WIGGINS TO PRESENT MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY ON BEHALF OF REPS OF UAR, SUDAN, LIBYA, AND IRAB WHO HAD REQUESTED HIM, IN COURSE OF LUNCH TIME SESSION, TO MAKE DEMARCHE VOICING THEIR "DISPLEASURE" AT PRESIDENT'S ACTION.

2. BAROODY INTRODUCED SUBJECT BY REMARKING THAT SAUDI-US RELATIONS HAD BEEN MADE DIFFICULT OVER YEARS BY US'S "STAUNCH" SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. NOTING EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN US AND VARIOUS ARAB COUNTRIES, BAROODY SAID SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN PLACED IN DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS SAUDI PEOPLE AND BROTHER ARAB STATES. HE ASSERTED THERE WERE WIDESPREAD

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PAGE 02 USUN: NI 07023 170404Z

"RUMBLINGS" ABOUT QUESTION OF MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH US. PRESSURES ARE HEAVY AGAINST KING, BAROODY SAID, BUT KING HAS COUNSELLED PATIENCE. NEVERTHELESS YOUNG PEOPLE ARE BECOMING AGITATED AND "PILLARS OF FUTURE IN ARAB EAST ARE BEING ALIENATED." HE SAID FERMENT MUST BE ANTICIPATED AND THAT WHILE HE HOPES ALL WILL BE WELL IN SAUDI ARABIA, HE CAN'T BE SO SURE ABOUT FERTILE CRESCENT OR "SO-CALLED" REPUBLICS OF YEMEN AND SOUTH YEMEN. FROM THESE LATTER TWO AREAS, HE COMMENTED HIS GOVERNMENT HAS DISQUIETING REPORTS OF COMMUNIST INCURSION, AND HEAVY PRESSURES ARE BEING BROUGHT "TO PUT A MATCH TO THE OIL."

2. WIGGINS UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY BAROODY'S MESSAGE TO SECRETARY.

3. BAROODY LEFT FOR AIRPORT AFTER BRIEF APPOINTMENT TO MEET ARRIVING SAUDI ARABIAN MINISTER IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

GP-3.

WIGGINS:

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Authority: 2556

By: Steve Vogel Date: 04-18-2005

EXDIS:

FOR: SEELYE NEA/ARN AND SYMMES: FROM: DUNCAN

SUBJECT: SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT SALE TO ISRAEL

IN VIEW REPRESENTATION BY KING HUSSEIN TO AMB. SYMMES FOIA(b)1
FOIA(b)1 REGARDING DESIRE FOR.

MAXIMUM NOTICE AND OFFSET IN EVENT USG DECIDED SELL PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL, IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER TO GUIDANCE CONTAINED STATE 252286, THAT I MIGHT BE AUTHORIZED TO SAY TO SENIOR OFFICIALS HERE. SINCE NO USG OFFICIALS PRESENTLY IN TOUCH WITH KING AND IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE, THERE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHAT HIS REACTION IS. WE UNDERSTAND KHAMMASH HAS BEEN CALLED TO LONDON BY KING AND WILL DEPART OCT 13 OR 14. HE COULD PROVIDE CHANNEL TO KING IF THERE WERE ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT TO PASS. IN ABSENCE OF KING AND OTHER LEADERS CABINET MAY FEEL IMPELLED TO TAKE SOME PUBLIC, PREJUDICIAL POSITION. I RECOGNIZE THAT IF GIVEN LOW KEY TREATMENT, THIS MAY PASS WITHOUT MAJOR REPERCUSSIONS IN VIEW OTHER IMPORTANT STAKES FOR JORDANIANS. BUT PENCHANT FOR RASH ACTION AND POSSIBILITY OUR RELATIVE SILENCE WILL BE MISINTERPRETED. ARGUE FOR ANY REASSURING INDICATIONS WE CAN GIVE.

DUNCAN:

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ Declassify with concurrence of: FOIA (b) 1
 EO 12958, 25X
 FPC/HDR by THS Date: 3/7/96

Withdrawal No. DEF Box 91-1967-69
Central Files - # 25

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0407

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BY JK NARA Date 12/5/05

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TAB25

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. 25

DATE: 10 Oct '68 MSG NO.: 6999 TYPE: TE
FROM: Am Embassy Amman TO: SecState
SUBJECT: Supersonic Aircraft Sale to Israel
DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: ☐

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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PAGE 01 LONDON 13418 101900Z

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ACTION: NEA 15

INFO: EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, IO 13, NIC 01, ACDA 16, AID 28,

SA 01, SAH 02, SAL 01, RSR 01, /165 W

092339

R 101809Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6591
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

UNCLAS LONDON 13418

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: PRESS REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT RE PHANTOM
NEGOTIATIONS

1. LONDON PRESS COVERAGE OF ANNOUNCEMENT RE US/ISRAELI PHANTOM
NEGOTIATIONS: LIGHT WITH ONLY THREE OF MAJOR PAPERS REPORTING.

2. TIMES FRONT-PAGED ITEM WITH LEAD-OFF BY ITS WASHINGTON
CORRESPONDENT IAN MCDONALD SIMPLY REPORTING FACTS OF
ANNOUNCEMENT. REMAINDER TIMES ARTICLE DEVOTED TO DESPATCH FROM
ITS MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT ON INITIAL ARAB AND ISRAELI
REACTION. ISRAELIS REPORTED AS GREETING PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT
WITH DELIGHT. "SOURCE CLOSE TO GOVERNMENT" CITED AS SAYING
MOVE WOULD HELP OFFSET MEI ARMS IMBALANCE AND MIGHT SERVE
"TO DETER AGGRESSION." GENERAL ARAB FEELING, ACCORDING TO
TIMES CORRESPONDENT, IS THAT ANNOUNCEMENT HAS DEALT "SEVERE,
IF NOT FATAL" BLOW TO HOPES FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ARABS
ARE REPORTED TO REGARD TIMING AS SURPRISE SINCE THEY HAD
ANTICIPATED SOME SUCH U. S. MOVE AS LIKELY ONLY AFTER CURRENT
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR PERHAPS FROM NEXT ADMINISTRATION.
DESCRIBING ARAB REACTION TO TIMING AS ONE OF BEWILDERMENT
BECAUSE OF FEELING THEY HAD ESTABLISHED "DIALOGUE" WITH U.S.,

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DATE 12/5/05

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 LONDON 13418 101900Z

CORRESPONDENT SAID ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDED AS BELATED ANSWER TO SOVIET WARNING TO ISRAEL AND INTERPRETED AS MEANING AMERICA NO LONGER FEELS POLITICAL SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE. CORRESPONDENT CONCLUDED WITH SPECULATION THAT U.S. MOVE WILL HAVE FAR-REACHING REPERCUSSIONS IN THE ARMS RACE, CITING AS EXAMPLE EGYPTIAN CLAIMS THAT USSR WOULD SUPPLY THEM WITH EQUALLY EFFECTIVE WEAPONS SHOULD ISRAELIS GET PHANTOMS.

3. IN DAILY TELEGRAPH, BRIEF ARTICLE EXPRESSES OPINION THAT U.S. MOVE MAY PRESAGE END OF ITS ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS ON ARMS LIMITATIONS IN ME. CITING ELECTION YEAR AND IMPORTANCE JEWISH VOTE AS LEADING NIXON, HUMPHREY AND MANY CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES TO ENDORSE PHANTOM SALE, ARTICLE STATES THAT PRESSURES HAVE INCREASED RECENTLY BECAUSE OF CONTINUED SOVIET SALES OF ARMS TO ARABS. ARTICLE EXPRESSES PRESUMPTION THAT RUSK/GROMYKO TALKS THIS WEEK TOUCHED ON QUESTION OF ME ARMS LIMITATION AND CONCLUDES THAT GROMYKO MUST HAVE GIVEN NO ASSURANCES THAT FLOW SOVIET ARMS WOULD BE CUT DOWN.

4. J. D. S. GRAHAM, WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT OF FINANCIAL TIMES, INTERPRETS ANNOUNCEMENT TO MEAN THAT FINAL DECISION ON SALE NOT YET MADE ALTHOUGH IT HAS "EDGED A FRACTION NEARER." STATING THAT "ALL IS NOT OVER BUT THE SHOUTING", GRAHAM SAYS PRESIDENT NOT BOUND BY "SENSE OF CONGRESS" PASSAGE BUT LIMITED HIS RESPONSE TO TAKING FIRST STEP WITH NO PROMISE THAT WHEN HE RECEIVES SECRETARY'S REPORT HE WILL TAKE FAVORABLE ACTION. GRAHAM SAYS HE UNDERSTANDS THAT BELIEF "IN SEVERAL CIRCLES" THAT PRESIDENT WILL ACT BEFORE LEAVING OFFICE IS NOT TRUE AND THAT PRESIDENT MAY DECIDE TO "PASS THE BUCK TO HIS SUCCESSOR." ACCORDING TO GRAHAM, FACT THAT "VERY GREAT DISCUSSION" WAS DEVOTED TO PROBLEM BEFORE ANNOUNCEMENT SUPPORTS "REASONABLE CONCLUSION" THAT PRESIDENT IS RESERVING HIS FINAL JUDGMENT IN HOPE THAT SOMETHING IN ARMS LIMITATION FIELD MAY STILL BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SOVIETS BEFORE HE LEAVES OFFICE. BRUCE

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PAGE 01 USUN N: 06999 100313Z

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ACTION IO 15

INFO NEA 13, AF 10, EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01, ACDA 16,

AID 28, SAL 01, SAH 02, SA 01, E 15, /189 W

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R 100036Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3719
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN 6999

SUBJ: SALE OF PLANES TO ISRAEL

1. MANY ARABS AT UN REACTED IN SHOCKED DISBELIEF TO OCT 9 ANNOUNCEMENT ON INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALE OF PLANES TO ISRAEL. CHAMMAS (LEBANON) ASSERTED ARABS CONVINCED US WANTS ISRAEL TO BE POLICEMAN OF ME. EVEN MODERATE ARABS, HE SAID, FEEL ARAB FORMING SHOULD PACK AND GO HOME. HE, GEHMAN (YEMAN FORMIN) AND HAMMAD (ARAB LEAGUE) EXPRESSED VIEW THAT JARRING TALKS HAVE BEEN UNDERMINED.

2. MISHRA (INDIA) TOLD MISOFF THAT, JUDGING FROM ARAB REACTIONS HE HAD HEARD, ARABS WERE GENUINELY SUSPICIOUS THAT RELATIVELY MILD TONE OF EBAN'S OCTOBER 8 SPEECH WAS PRICE ISRAELIS HAD TO PAY FOR OCT 9 ANNOUNCEMENT RE PLANES.

EXEMPT.

WIGGINS

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Ham/SHY, HARA, GPO 4-28-05

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ Declassify with concurrence of 52
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by mu2 Date: 3/2/96
Withdrawal No. DEF Box 91-1967-68
Central File 26

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of his Note of August 5, 1968, expressing the desire of the Government of Israel to purchase twelve A-4H Skyhawk aircraft in order to compensate for normal attrition requirements and in view of the projected cessation of the A-4H production line by April, 1970.

The Government of the United States having approved this request as an extension of the Exchange of Letters between Ambassador Avraham Harman and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Townsend W. Hoopes dated March 17 and March 23, 1966 respectively, the June 2, 1966 Minute of Meeting signed by Deputy Minister of Defense Zvi Dinstein and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, and the further Offer and Acceptance of January 31, 1968, the Department of Defense on September 30, 1968 signed with the appropriate Israeli authorities the necessary contract which fulfills the commitment to meet attrition needs.

DEF 12-5 ISF

The Government of the United States considers that the security provisions of the above-cited agreements continue to govern this case.

Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

October 9, 1968

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Drafted by:
NEA/IAI:JDL Leonard:cr:10/8/68
Ext. 4967

Cleared by:
NEA - Mr. Davies RMD
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton AK
NEA/RA - Col. Bunte
DOD/ISA - Dr. Evans
G/PM - Mr. Junior

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OCT 9 1968 PM

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

EG-1799

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1968 AUG 6 AM 10 18

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בשילוח

NOTICE
ORIGINAL SENT TO
FOR ACTION
(RS/AN)

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments
to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the
honor to submit a request for the purchase of twelve
A-4H Skyhawk planes.

In submitting this request the Government of
Israel is guided by two principal considerations: firstly,
the need to compensate for normal attrition requirements;
secondly, the expected cessation of the A-4H production
line by April 1970.

The Government of Israel will be agreeable to
accepting delivery of these planes at the end of this
production line.

The Ambassador of Israel avails himself of this
opportunity of renewing to the Honorable the Secretary
of State the assurances of his highest consideration.

Washington, D.C.
5 August 1968

October 9, 1968

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BY JAC NARA Date 12/5/05



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PAGE 01 USUN N 06931 082154Z

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FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3643
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y T O EXDIS

SECTO 51

REF: USUN 6760 (SECTO 3)

REFTEL IS APPROVED FINAL MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
FOR PORTION CONVERSATION TREATED

END
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NOTE: SS FOR MR. BROWN

USUN 6931
10-8-68

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G/PM		NEA <i>✓✓ 15-16 ✓✓</i>		
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES		
S/AL		White House <i>✓✓ 2+3 ✓✓</i>		
S/C		Vice President		
S/P		Defense <i>✓ 17 ✓</i>		
		CIA <i>✓ 18 ✓</i>		
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